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Abstract 
At the outset of China's reform period in 1978, the industrial sector was 
dominated by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which accounted for 77.6 
per cent of gross industrial output. By 1997 this share had shrunk to 25.5 
per cent. Over this twenty-year period China emerged as one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world. This thesis is motivated by questions as to 
whether the continued existence and gradual reform of the SOE sector 
helped or hindered the growth of the Chinese economy under reform, and 
whether the sector can survive under state ownership for another two 
decades or whether more fundamental changes are needed. 
The thesis reviews the reforms that have been carried out, focusing on the 
period up to 1994. Reforms took the sector away from planned allocation of 
resources under state ownership, towards competitive market allocation, 
still under state ownership. In general, faster progress was made in the 
reform of SOE output markets than of their input markets. The dynamics of 
the reform process may have given rise to firm behaviour that sought to 
maximise employee remuneration rather than maximising profits. SOE 
output grew strongly, though not as quickly as in the non-state sector, and 
growth was extensive in nature. Total Factor Productivity growth was 
probably positive but very low, especially in comparison with the non-state 
sector. Financial performance declined alarmingly, to the extent that by the 
mid-1990s, there appeared to be a risk that accumulated SOE liabilities 
could trigger a financial crisis. Assessments of SOE peiformance tended to 
divide into two schools. The convergence or 'pessimistic' school assessed 
productivity and financial peiforma71:ce as poor and advocated more 
fundamental reform including privatisation. They attributed poor financial 
performance to poor productivity and over-compensation of SOE 
employees. The experimental or 'optimistic' school assessed productivity 
peif ormance as positive and tended to advocate continued gradualist 
reform. They attributed the poor financial peiformance to competition from 
the non-state sector. 
IV 
The thesis seeks to advance the debate over SOE reform by producing more 
insightful evidence on the question of over-compensation. The theoretical 
framework is carefully considered, drawing on the work of Sicular ( 1995) 
and the theory of the labour-managed firm (LMF). It is determined that the 
best available empirical test is a comparison of the output elasticity of 
labour with the labour share of income. Such tests are carried out on a 
sample of Chinese state-owned manufacturing firms covering the years 
1980 to 1994. Estimates of over-compensation are generated for the full 
data set, for five industrial sectors and for the large, medium and small 
categories of firms. Under the preferred measurement techniques, 
substantial overcompensation is revealed by the mid-l 990s, both for the 
overall sample and for all five sectors. Small and medium-sized forms are 
found to over-compensate their employees to greater extent than do large 
firms. 
The findings can be interpreted as endorsing the Chinese government 's _ 
reform strategy as pursued from the late 1990s, of accelerating reform by 
privatizing the small and medium-sized state-owned firms while 
strengthening the internal governance of large SO Es. 
V 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 1: China's state-owned enterprises: to be or not to be? 1 
1.1 The SOE issue and the reform agenda 3 
1.2 Structure of thesis 10 
Chapter 2: Enterprise reform in review 14 
2.1 The pre-reform SOE system 15 
2.2 SOE reform - general directions 24 
2.3 Incentives and autonomy 27 
2.4 Price reform 38 
2.5 Capital and investment 42 
2.6 Labour 50 
2.7 Competition with the non-state sector 63 
2.8 Some unintended consequences: the behavioural issue and 
the compensation issue 66 
2.9 Summary: directions and progress of reform, 1978 to 1994 70 
Chapter 3: State-owned enterprise performance over the 
reform period 
3.1 Output growth 
3.2 Productivity and efficiency 
3.3 Profitability 
3.4 SOE performance and policy debate 
3.5 Explanations of poor profitability 
3.6 Addressing the debate: the burden of proof 
3.7 Conclusion: proposed analysis 
Chapter 4: Explaining the puzzle of state-owned enterprise 
performance: the labour-managed firm 
4.1 Review of theoretical models 
4.2 Realism of assumptions 
4.3 Review of Meng and Perkins 
4.4 Proposed empirical test 
VI 
73 
73 
77 
91 
97 
101 
114 
117 
119 
121 
139 
141 
144 
Chapter 5: The overcompensation question: empirical analysis 148 
5 .1 Estimation of labour elasticity of output 149 
5 .2 Estimation of the labour share of income 167 
5.3 Output elasticity and labour income share estimates compared 171 
Appendix 5.1: Description of data and data preparation 
A5.1 Data for production function estimations 
AS .2 Data for labour share of income calculations 
Appendix 5.2: Miscellaneous results tables and charts 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and policy implications 
References 
Vll 
183 
185 
193 
199 
229 
247 
1 
China's state-owned enterprises: 
to be or not to be? 
At the outset of the economic reform period in 1978, China's industrial 
sector was dominated by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which accounted 
for 77 .6 per cent of gross industrial output. 1 At that time, the only other 
significant ownership category of industrial firms was Collectively Owned 
Enterprises (COEs), which accounted for 22.4 per cent of gross industrial 
output. Over the following two decades, economic reforms brought far-
reaching changes both inside and outside the SOE sector. As the centrally 
planned system of resource allocation gradually gave way to market-
oriented systems, SOEs were steadily granted the autonomy to make their 
own production, pricing and marketing decisions and the incentives facing 
SOEs and their employees were improved. Outside the state sector, new 
entrants in the form of foreign-invested and individually-owned firms 
flourished, as did the collectively-owned sector including the rural township 
and village enterprises (TVEs).2 By 1997, the SOE share of gross output had 
shrunk to 28.2 per cent, as Table 1.1 shows. Over the san1e period in which 
the relative presence of SOEs contracted so significantly, the Chinese 
economy emerged as one of the fas test growing economies in the world. 
From 1980 to 2000, real GDP grew by an average of 9.6 per cent per annum, 
and per capita real GDP grew by 8.3 per cent per annum; these figures 
amount to cumulative growth factors of 6.3 times and 4.9 times 
respectively.3 
The dramatic contraction in the presence of SOEs in the Chinese economy 
relative to other ownership sectors, against a background of strong economic 
growth, raises questions with important implications for the future course of 
the still-reforming Chinese economy. Have the SOEs, which have clearly 
grown more slowly than the non-state enterprises, acted as a drag on overall 
economic performance? Would the Chinese economy have grown even 
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faster if the state sector had been rapidly privatised? Or alternatively, has the 
continued existence and gradual reform of the SOEs enhanced the overall 
reform process by providing it with a stable base upon which to experiment 
with the development of alternative ownership forms? Can the SOEs be 
expected to survive the next two decades of economic development and, 
indeed, is it desirable that they should? Should SOE reform initiatives 
continue to be gradualist in design, or are more fundamental changes 
needed?4 
Table 1.1 Value of gross industrial output by type of ownership 
(percentage shares) 
Year State <a) Collective Individual Other 
1978 77.6 22.4 
1979 78.5 21.5 
1980 76.0 23.5 0.5 
1981 74.8 24.6 0.6 
1982 74.4 24.8 0.1 0.7 
1983 73.4 25.7 0.1 0.8 
1984 69.1 29.7 0.2 1.0 
1985 64.9 32.1 1.8 1.2 
1986 62.3 33.5 2.8 1.5 
1987 · 59.7 34.6 3.6 2.0 
1988 56.8 36.1 4.3 2.7 
1989 56.1 35.7 4.8 3.4 
1990 54.6 35.6 5.4 4.4 
1991 56.2 33.0 4.8 6.0 
1992 51.5 35.1 5.8 7.6 
1993 47.0 34.0 8.0 11.1 
1994 37.3 37.7 10.1 14.8 
1995 34.0 36.6 12.9 16.6 
1996 36.3 39.4 15.5 16.6 
1997 31.6 38.1 17.9 18.4 
1998 28.2 38.4 17.1 22.9 
1999 28.2 35.4 18.2 26.1 
<a) Includes state-controlled shareholding enterpri_~es. 
Notes: Data before 1984 are not comparable because of definitional changes. 
Data for 1991-1994 was adjusted (by SSB) in accordance with data of the 1995 Industrial 
Census, and therefore differs from the data in previous editions of the China Statistical 
Yearbook. 
Adjustment was made (by 'SSB) on data since 1998 for compatibility with previous years. 
Sources: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 2001 and previous is·sues. This data 
also appears in the China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook. 
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Such questions relating to the SOE reform agenda have been at the forefront 
of economic policy debate in China. The next steps in SOE reform will be 
crucial in enabling China to continue on the favourable economic growth 
. path of the past two decades. For the most part, this thesis concerns itself 
with questions of considerably narrower focus than that of the very survival 
of the Chinese SOE sector. Nevertheless, it is the author's hope that that the 
analysis conducted herein will in some modest way advance the debate in 
relation to such big. questions, which we shall address directly in the 
concluding chapter. 
This chapter has two main sections. The first section presents an overview 
of the issue of SOE reform and its importance to the economic policy debate 
both within China and further afield. The second section presents an 
overview of each of the ensuing chapters, and in so doing outlines the 
specific questions addressed by the thesis and the approaches taken to 
address them. 
1.1 The SOE issue and the reform agenda 
SOE reform in the Chinese policy agenda 
The importance of the Chinese economy is readily apparent from the 
country's size. As a schoolboy, I was taught that three-quartets of the human 
race lived in general poverty, at living standards far below those of the 
affluent quarter. While perhaps simplistic, this statement was basically true 
and remains so, and within the field of econonucs there can surely be no 
issue more worthy of address. It was also true that the Chinese people alone 
virtually accounted for one of those three quarters; in 2000 China's 
population exceeded 1.26 billion and was growing by over 10 million per 
year (SSB 2001a). However, the growth that China has achieved over the 
past quarter-century raises the prospect that she may follow Japan and the 
Asian Tigers as the next 'growth miracle', joining the ranks of the world's 
developed economies within our lifetimes (Garnaut 2002). 5 If the whole of 
China could succeed in promoting itself from the impoverished to the 
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affluent category of humanity, then the overall scale of human poverty, 
while still appalling, would by this single development be much reduced. 
Sheer size also motivates the study of the Chinese SOE sector, since it still 
occupies a very significant fraction of that massive country's economy. In 
2000, SOEs provided a livelihood for some 20.96 million regular full-time 
employees, a figure that ( even without including the dependents of SOE 
employees) exceeds the population of Australia. In fact, this figure had been 
over 40 million as recently as 1997 (SSB 2001a: 402). Moreover, the SOE 
sector still occupies crucial tracts of the Chinese industrial landscape. 
Although no longer enjoying the overwhelming dominance of the pre-
reform period, SOEs still dominate the markets for a number of key 
commodities, particularly in heavy industry and infra-structure sectors. For 
example, the State still has monopolies in posts and communications, civil 
aviation and railways, and has majority shares in the coal, petroleum, gas; 
metallurgy, chemical and transport equipment industries (see Table 1.2). 
Although now producing less than 30 per cent of gross industrial output, 
SOEs enjoy disproportionate access to various industrial resources. In the 
year 2000 SO Es employed 51.1 per cent of the industrial labour force ( 66.4 
per cent in 1995), carried out 50.1 per cent of industrial investment (54.4 per 
cent in 1995) and absorbed 61.8 per cent of domestic credits (61.4 per cent 
in 1995).6 Such is their continuing weight that no comprehensive 
understanding of the contemporary Chinese economy or the reform process 
can be had without due consideration of the particular issues of SOEs. 
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Table 1.2 SOE share of gross output in selected sectors 
(billion yuan, percentage) 
1995 (a) 
Coal Mining & 
Processing 
Petroleum & 
Natural Gas 
Extraction 
Petroleum 
Processing & 
Coking 
Chemical Raw 
Materials & 
Products 
Ferrous Metals 
Smelting & 
Pressing 
Non-Ferrous 
Metals Smelting & 
Pressing 
Ordinary 
Machinery 
Transport 
Equipment 
Electricity, Steam 
& Hot Water 
Gas Production and 
Su 1 
SOE gross 
output 
100.0 
208.1 
239.8 
260.5 
303.5 
93.0 
115.1 
316.5 
342.4 
10.4 
SOE share of 
total 
80.9 
99.8 
88.6 
52.9 
74.1 
51.9 
42.7 
67.9 
85 .7 
79.2 
1999 (b) 
SOE gross 
output 
89.7 
136.3 
178.9 
214.1 
252.3 
76.1 
94.8 
170.1 
189.5 
6.8 
SOE share of 
total 
77.7 
95.4 
88.2 
56.0 
68.9 
55.4 
40.1 
51.5 
77 .6 
89.7 
Notes: (a) SOE figure for 1995 represents state-owned industrial enterprises with independent 
accounting systems. Total represents all industrial enterprises with independent accounting 
systems. 
Cb) SOE figure for 1999 represents state-owned and state majority shareholding industrial 
enterprises. Total represents all state-owned industrial enterprises and non-state-owned 
industrial enterprises above designated size. 
Sources: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 2000 and China Statistical Yearbook 
1996. 
Considering the scale and urgency of various socio-economic issues in 
China, it is probably the case that the SOE sector is , to borrow a phrase from 
another context, ' too big to fail'. By this I do not mean that SOEs cannot be 
allowed to go bankrupt, but that the sector cannot be allowed to become a 
dead weight for the rest of the economy to carry. The pressures of China's 
massive population are creating various problems that will require a 
flourishing industrial sector if China is to address them. The rapid ageing of 
the population means that China' s productive-age workforce in coming 
years will be required to maintain a large elderly population in relative 
terms. This makes it vital to raise the per capita productivity of that 
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workforce as quickly as possible. China's rural population of over 800 
million persons subsists on substantially lower incomes than their urban 
counterparts 7 and endures extensive underemployment. This makes it vital 
to expand as quickly as possible the employment base of the urban 
manufacturing and service sectors so as to absorb the rural labour overhang. 
The environmental damage caused by rapid industrial growth has given rise 
to serious problems of water, soil and air quality that imperil the very 
habitability of some regions. This makes it vital for China to undertake 
substantial environmental investments in coming years while at the same 
time restricting or closing some high-polluting manufacturing enterprises. 
All of these pressing socio-economic objectives could be seriously hindered 
if the still-large SOE sector were to stagnate, slowing the overall economy's 
growth, generating financial losses and draining the country's fiscal 
resources. 8 
Wider implications: issues of economic transition 
The lessons from China's experience in SOE reform are important not only 
for China but for all economies in transition from central planning. China is 
a unique and valuable case study in the field of transitional economics, both 
in its approach to reform and in the results achieved. No other country from 
the former 'communist bloc' has achieved the high growth rates that China 
has in its reform period, and numerous examples of sharp negative growth 
and painful dislocation litter the field (Kaser and Allsopp 1992). A detailed 
understanding of the issues of Chinese SOE reform can contribute much to 
our understanding of related issues in other economies. For example, many 
researchers have contrasted the gradualist reform strategy of the PRC with 
the 'big bang' or 'shock therapy' approach adopted by transitional 
economies in Eastern Europe (McMillan and Naughton 1992). McKinnon 
( 1993) argues that the initial Soviet reforms from 1985 to 1991 were 
unsuccessful, leading to hyperinflation and macroeconomic instability 
because the reforming Soviet authorities 'got the order of liberalisation 
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Table 1.3 Macroeconomic indicators for various transforming 
• econormes 
(percentages) 
GDP growth Inflation UnemQ 
1990 1991 90-99 1990 1991 90-99 1991 
China 3.8 9.3 10.7 5.6 6.7 8.2 2.3 
Bulgaria -12 -23 -2.7 19 550 111.8 11 
Czech_(a) 
-2 -16 0.9 10 60 13.7 7 
Ex-GDR -14 -19 -3 14 12 
Hungary -4 -8 1.0 29 36 20.7 8 
Poland -12 -9 4.7 585 60 24.5 11 
USSR/ 
-2 -17 -6.1 5 86 189.6 3 
Russia (b) 
Notes: Ca) Czechoslovakia in 1990 and 1991. Czech Republic thereafter, not for the full 1990-99 
period. 
Cb) USSR/CIS in 1990 and 1991. Russian Federation thereafter. 
Sources: 1990-99 growth and inflation data from World Bank World Development Report 
2000/2001. 
1990 and 1991 East European data from Kaser and Allsopp (1992) quoting various original 
sources. 
Other China data from State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
wrong', whereas Chinese reforms followed a more appropriate sequence.9 
China's experience in SOE reform may be very instructive for example for a 
country like Vietnam, which is commencing its reforms under fairly similar 
conditions. Besides the sequencing of reforms, another issue affecting all 
transitional economies concerns the end-point of market-oriented reform. 
Should formerly centrally planned economies seek to evolve all the way to 
fully-fledged market economies after the model of Western countries or is 
there a workable 'third way' combining features of socialism and free 
enterprise? Is China's formula of substantial state ownership within 
competitive markets just such an alternative, a feasible end-point? Or have 
Chinese authorities merely succeeded in postponing the inevitable pain of 
fundamental ownership reform that other transitional economies have 
already confronted? 
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Performance, behaviour and options for reform 
So, is the SOE sector a dead weight on China's economic growth capacity? 
This question remains contentious, and therefore an important topic for 
continuing research. Some might assert that the simple fact that SOEs have 
been outgrown by NSEs implies the failure of SOE reform. Others, such as 
Lin, Cai and Li ( 1996) and Naughton ( 1995) present more integrated views, 
stressing roles that the SOE sector played in supporting the overall reform 
strategy that are not necessarily reflected in the trading results of SOEs 
themselves. Lin et al. note that the pre-reform centrally planned system 
distorted the prices of inputs and outputs so as to advantage the 
development of heavy industry over labour-intensive light industry and 
agriculture. As controls were steadily lifted, new non-state firms were free 
to grow within the light industrial sectors while many SOEs remained hog-
tied to heavy industry. Naughton emphasises the role of the dual-track 
approach to reform, wherein planned quotas and prices remained in place 
for SOEs while above-plan output could be sold at market-clearing prices. 
The relative magnitude of non-plan output thus grew steadily, a process 
described as 'growing out of the plan'. While the lingering planned 
component of economic activity continued to disadvantage SOEs in relation 
to their non-state competitors, the overall strategy was successful in creating 
an economy responsive to market prices, without the shocks that may have 
accompanied any ·alternative strategies such as their sudden mass 
privatisation. Some scholars such as Woo (1993, 1994a) offer less sanguine 
views of SOE reform under the gradualist strategy, criticising the sector's 
efficiency and poor financial performance. Lardy ( 1998) stresses the 
excessive accumulated liabilities of the sector to the state-owned banks that 
service it, and warns of an impending financial crisis. One China-watching 
economist of the author's acquaintance is fond of declaring the term 'SOE 
reform' to be an oxymoron. These competing views are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3. This thesis seeks to produce further evidence on SOE 
performance that advances the debate. Specifically, it investigates the issue 
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of employee over-compensation as a possible explanation of the sector's 
poor profit performance up to the mid-1990s. 
Questions of industrial performance are intimately linked with questions of 
governance and behaviour. If Chinese SOEs have under-performed, what 
model of firm behaviour can explain that under-performance? Sicular 
(1995) has put forward the hypothesis that SOEs behave somewhat in the 
manner of the labour-managed firm model and seek to maximise net 
remuneration (wages, benefits and retained profits, net of taxes) per 
employee rather than profits. An alternative hypothesis would be that SOEs 
do genuinely seek to maximise profits, but tend to perform poorly in this 
area because of various policy-mandated financial burdens and stiff 
competition from the non-state sector. Evidence that SOEs do in fact behave 
in the manner of labour-managed firms would not only go far to explain 
why profitability performance has been less impressive than productivity 
performance, but would also have specific implications for appropriate · 
policy choices. It would imply, for example, that the removal of unequal 
policy burdens would not be enough to rescue the sector, and that the 
incentive structure surrounding SOEs would need to fundamentally change 
so as to reinstate true profit-maximising behaviour. 
Whether or not SOE managers can ever be made to pursue true profit-
maximising behaviour under state ownership where the profits from their 
efforts must be remitted to the state is a matter of further controversy. A 
substantial body of scholars argues that they cannot, and that the only 
governance structures that can reliably pursue profits and efficiency are 
those commonly found in market economies. Such scholars argue for 
'ownership reform', or rapid privatisation, and reject the formula of 
gradualist reform under state ownership. However, other scholars argue that 
reforming the institutional structure and corporate governance of SOE firms 
could be sufficient to enable them to compete on an equal footing with the 
non-state sector, as some state-owned firms do in market economies (Lin, 
Cai and Li 1998). 
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From the mid- l 990s, amid growing concern over the financial performance 
of the SOE sector, the government commenced an acceleration of the pace 
of SOE reform, under the banner of 'holding the big and releasing the small' 
(Zhuada Fangxiao ). Under this policy, the state would allow small and 
medium-sized SOEs to change their ownership structure in a variety of 
ways, while a core of large firms would remain in government hands. While 
this policy change represented a partial victory for the advocates of 
ownership reform, the principle that the state must retain a significant role in 
the direct ownership of industry remains intact, both ideologically and in 
practice. Partly for reasons of data availability, the core chapters of this 
thesis focus upon the reform period up until the time of the announcement 
of the Zhuada Fangxiao policy. The empirical analysis is conducted on a 
data set covering the years 1980 to 1994. A review of events since 1995 is 
conducted in the final chapter to provide further context for our 
consideration of the policy implications of the findings of the thesis. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The present chapter establishes the importance of SOEs in the Chinese 
economy and the economic policy debate in China about their importance 
and role. 
Chapter 2 reviews the character of the SOE reform process. It first reviews 
the economic system that prevailed in China prior to the reform period, 
including the deep economic problems that initially motivated new policy 
directions. The chapter then proceeds with a roughly chronological view of 
reform measures that have affected state-owned enterprises. It examines 
particular aspects of economic organisation, such as labour and capital 
markets, price reform and competition, facilitating a fairly detailed 
understanding of the operating environment into which SOEs have been 
placed as the developments of the period have unfolded. The chief concerns 
of this chapter are the directions of reforn1, the extent of progress that was 
made, and some new problems that seem to have arisen as unintended 
consequences of the reform process. These problems include the pursuit by 
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SOE management of objectives other than profit maximisation (what I call 
the 'behavioural issue'), and the related overcompensation of SOE 
employees. This chapter, along with Chapters 3, 4 and 5, mainly concerns 
itself with developments up to the mid-1990s, which point marked a change 
in the nature of SOE reform. Subsequent developments are reflected upon in 
the concluding chapter. 
Chapter 3 presents a review of SOE performance. It commences with an 
empirical examination under the following topics: output and output 
growth; productivity; and profitability and financial performance. In short, 
we find that SOEs enjoyed rapid output growth, mainly through the 
expanded use of resources rather than improvements in productive 
efficiency. The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth of the sector was 
probably at low positive levels through the period, and fell well short of the 
TFP growth achieved by the non-state sector. The profitability of the sector 
declined alarmingly over the period, creating a severe debt problem with 
dangerous macroeconomic consequences. We review the literature 
surrounding SOE reforms and performance, and find that views are 
generally split between an 'Optimistic' camp that views the existing 
gradualist strategy as a success and a 'Pessimistic' camp that urges more 
fundamental reform. A dispute over the evidence regarding employee 
overcompensation is an integral part of this debate; the 'Pessimistic' camp 
argues that overcompensation was a prime reason for SO Es' poor profit 
performance. Therefore, the remainder of the thesis seeks to advance the 
debate via an analysis of the overcompensation issue and the related 
behavioural issue. 
Chapter 4 conducts a theoretical analysis of the behavioural and 
overcompensation issues with a view to designing appropriate empirical 
tests. Two alternative models of firm behaviour are proposed; the orthodox 
Profit-Maximising Firm (PMF) and the Labour-Managed Firm (LMF) 
which seeks to maximise the remuneration of its own employees. A version 
of the LMF model has been advanced to explain the poor profit performance 
of SOEs in the presence of positive TFP growth. The chapter examines the 
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characteristics of the PMF and of three versions of the LMF in some detail. 
We then search for an empirical test to determine whether an observed 
group of firms engages in PMF or LMF behaviour, and conclude that the 
best test for our purposes is a comparison of the output elasticity of labour 
with the labour share of value added. This also happens to be a standard test 
for overcompensation, so we are able to investigate both the behavioural 
issue and the overcompensation issue simultaneously. 
Chapter 5 carries out the empirical tests proposed in Chapter 4 to test the 
hypothesis of overcompensation. We use a data set covering 840 state-
owned firms from 1980 to 1994. The output elasticity of labour and the 
labour share of value added are each estimated annually, for the entire data 
set and also for five individual manufacturing sectors. Any excess of the 
former estimate over the latter represents overcompensation. Using a similar 
methodology to Raiser ( 1997b) strong and consistent evidence is found to 
show that overcompensation was occurring by the early to mid-1990s, both 
in manufacturing industry overall and in each of the five individual sectors 
examined. It is also found that the extent of overcompensation was greater 
in the small and medium-sized firm sectors than in large firms. 
Chapter 6 reflects on the conclusions of the empirical analysis and discusses 
their implications for the debate over SOE reform. In this context, we 
consider the new reform developments that have occurred since the mid-
1990s, centring on the policy of Zhuada Fangxiao ('hold the big and release 
the small'). This policy is largely motivated by the view that state 
monitoring is more effectively carried out with a small number of large 
firms than a large number of small firms. The empirical findings of the 
thesis are found to broadly endorse the Zhuada Fangxiao policy direction. 
The findings are also broadly consistent with Derong Chen's (1995) 
assertion that state controls and monitoring were withdrawn more rapidly 
from light industrial sectors than from heavy industry. We discuss the future 
prospects for the SOE sector, the optimal pace of future reform, and its 
likely endpoint. Finally, potential avenues for further research are suggested. 
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Endnotes 
1 Gross Industrial Output, a measure reported in official Chinese statistics, is defined as 'the 
total volume of industrial products sold or available for sale in value terms which reflects 
the total achievements and overall scale of industrial production during a given period' 
(SSB 2001a: 461). 
2 For descriptions of these various ownership types see Section 2.7 in Chapter 2. 
3 Calculated from SSB (2001a: 52), using geometric mean. While there are widespread 
suspicions that official statistics may ·overstate Chinese growth rates somewhat, it is 
universally agreed that Chinese growth in the reform period has been rapid by any 
international comparison. For example, Maddison (1995) generated adjusted data that 
indicates real GDP growth of 7.7 per cent from 1978 to 1992. On the other hand, the World 
Bank's World Development Report 2000/2001 reports Chinese GDP growth of 10.1 per 
cent from 1980 to 1990 and 10.7 per cent fro 1990 to 1999. 
4 From 1994 onwards the pace of SOE reform quickened considerably. Smaller SOEs were 
privatized and surplus labour was being shed on an unprecedented large scale. Yet even 
these more radical reforms should be described as 'gradualist' if considered in comparison 
with the 'shock therapy' policies of other transforming economies. Crucially, Chinese 
policy still stresses the maintenance of a significant state-owned industrial sector at the end-
point of reform. 
5 Garnaut (2002) regards as feasible the prospect of China maintaining a 4.5 per cent 
growth differential over the United States over coming decades. Under this scenario, China 
would catch up with average incomes in the US within about 50 years. Note, however, that 
China's attainment of developed country status does not require catching up fully with the 
US; a number of countries have somewhat lower per capita incomes than the US but are 
also classified as 'developed'. 
6 Percentages calculated from various data entries in SSB (2001a: 157-162, 402) and SSB 
(1996a: 412). 
7 In 2000, average net income per capita (that is, net of business expenditures, purchases of 
fixed assets and taxes) of rural households was 2253 yuan, while the average disposable 
income per capita of urban households was 6280 yuan, approximately 2.8 times higher. 
8 A number of publications discuss the various socio-economic problems mentioned in this 
paragraph. They include Lardy (1998: 187-193) and various specific studies published by 
the World Bank. 
9 For specific comment on the Soviet Union and China respectively, see McKinnon (1993), 
p. 120 and Chapter 13. 
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2 
Enterprise reform in review 
China's state-owned enterprises have been undergoing various processes of 
change and reform almost continuously since the commencement of the 
reform period in 1978. As a result of these reforms, the Chinese SOE sector 
by 1994 differed starkly from that of the standard Stalinist-style command 
economy, while remaining distinct from the industrial sectors of market 
economies. This chapter provides background for subsequent chapters by 
reviewing the reforms that occurred in the sector and in key aspects of its 
external environment, focusing on the period from 1978 to 1994. 
The chapter begins with a description of the centrally planned system that 
prevailed prior to reform, identifying the various systemic weaknesses that 
the reforms sought to address. Reforms carried out from 1978 are then 
reviewed under the following categories in Sections 2.2 to 2. 7: general 
directions, incentives and autonomy, price reform and the dual-track system, 
capital and investment, labour, and the development of competition both 
within the SOE sector and from the non-state sector. Section 2.8 spotlights 
two closely related issues that arose as unintended consequences of the 
reform process. I refer to these as the 'behavioural issue' and the 'over-
compensation issue' and they form the key focus of the later chapters of the 
thesis. Section 2.9 summarises the chapter. 
In this chapter as with the thesis overall, the primary concern is with events 
over the period from 1978 until approximately 1994. Over this period as the 
chapter will show, reform was a roughly linear process characterised by 
increasing incentives and autonomy, gradual domination by market 
mechanisms over planning mechanisms, and exposure of SOEs to 
competition from the non-state sector. The commitment to state ownership 
remained a constant, and budget constraints remained 'soft' in several 
respects, despite efforts to harden them. From around 1994, a number of 
new reform initiatives arose, some of which were radical departures from 
the policies that prevailed in the 1980s and early 1990s. Measures included 
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corporatisation, diluted public ownership and a more ready acceptance of 
bankruptcy and labour redundancy. While these more recent developments 
are clearly important, there remain (as Chapter 3 shows) unresolved 
questions regarding SOE conduct and performance up to the mid-1990s. 
This thesis seeks to make its contribution by providing more evidence on 
these questions. We will then briefly consider events post-1994 in the 
concluding chapter in light of the insights thus generated. 
Table 2.1 presents a chronological summary of major reform measures 
affecting the SOE sector up to 1994. The various developments referred to 
in that table are mentioned within the text of this chapter. 
2.1 The pre-reform SOE system 
Prior to 1978, China shared with other socialist countries the centrally 
planned system of economic organisation patterned after that in the USSR. 
The construction of this system commenced shortly after the establishment 
of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and was essentially completed by 
the early 1950s. Under the Stalinist system, state planners sought to control 
the allocation of resources directly so as to build up a modem heavy 
industrial sector as quickly as possible. In other words, the state imposed its 
own strong preference for the development of heavy industry, as this was 
regarded both as the hallmark of a developed socialist economy, and as the 
basis for the military power that would support the attainment of China's 
geopolitical goals (Naughton 1995: 28). The Stalinist approach to economic 
development contrasts with the neoclassical or market-based approach, 
which relies on market prices to allocate resources on the basis of relative 
scarcity, thus allowing the country's comparative advantage to determine the 
industrial structure. 
In China's case, a strategy based on comparative advantage would not have 
' · 
satisfied the Communist Party's preference for the early development of 
heavy industry, since the country was labour-abundant and capital-poor. 
Natural comparative advantages would have favoured the growth of labour-
intensive light industries rather than capital-intensive heavy industry. 
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Therefore, a comprehensive set of controls was established over all aspects 
of the economy so as to push development in the desired direction. All 
manufacturing industry was nationalised to give the state direct control over 
all significant productive resources. Production was predominantly carried 
out on the basis of the central state plan, which stipulated what each firm 
was to produce, what productive inputs it was to employ, who it was to buy 
from and sell to, and at what prices. The qualifier 'predominantly' is used 
here because China, being less developed including in institutional capacity, 
never achieved the degree of planning control that was attained in Eastern 
Europe (Naughton 1995: 41). The prices set by the planning mechanism for 
all commodities were designed to tax the agricultural and light industrial 
sectors in effect and to stimulate the growth of heavy industry (Lin et al. 
1996). Low prices were set for industrial raw materials and fuels, grain and 
other basic agricultural products, and interest rates and urban wages were 
repressed. Prices for manufactured consumer goods on the other hand were 
set artificially high. Heavy industry was therefore able to generate large 
surpluses; according to Naughton (1992) total profit and taxes generated by 
the sector amounted to 25 per cent of GDP in 1978. These surpluses were 
remitted to the central government as its primary source of budget revenue, . 
and then largely returned to the manufacturing sector as budgetary grants for 
capital investment. The state-owned manufacturing sector thus formed the 
main locus of material balance between savings and investment in the 
economy (Naughton 1995). 
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Table 2.1 Chronology of reform measures 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Measures 
• (October) First experiments in SOE incentives and autonomy, Sichuan. 
• Worker bonus system reintroduced, virtually universal by 1979. 
Preliminary price reform commenced - administrative prices adjusted in 
favour of agriculture. 
• 'Monobank' system ends with creation of Bank of China, Agricultural Bank 
of China and People's Construction Bank of China, creating competition in · 
banking. 
• (August) Official press announces profit-sharing scheme or 'economic 
responsibility system' to become the new national model, to be adopted in 
all firms by end of 1981. 
• Tax-for-profit scheme (li gai shui) introduced. 
• People's Bank of China's commercial banking functions transferred to the 
new Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. 
• Labour contracts for regular employees first introduced in SOEs. 
• (May) Enterprise 'Bill of Rights' introduced, specifying areas of furn 
autonomy. 
• (Oct) Adjustment tax introduced to address anomalies in Tax-for-Profit 
scheme. 
• First experiment in shareholding. 
• Above-quota output prices allowed to float to 20 per cent above plan prices. 
• Above-quota output allowed to be sold at market prices - commencement 
of the dual price system. 
• Experiments with 'Floating Wage' system commenced. 
• Approximate commencement of the Contract Management Responsibility 
System. 
• First issuance of corporate bonds. 
• (October) Labour reforms: new SOE hires to be on contract, free SOE . 
labour recruitment, regulations on dismissal issued, social security and 
unemployment funds. 
• Coverage of the Contract Management Responsibility System reaches 90 
per cent. 
• Price controls temporarily tightened in response to inflationary outburst. 
• (Nov) '39 Points' issued, signalling the conservative ascendancy post-
Tiananmen. 
• Consensus turns against the conservative faction. 
• (Dec) Shanghai Stock Exchange opened. 
• (Apr) Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened. 
• Price controls again temporarily imposed in response to inflationary 
outburst. 
• Deng tours Southern China, signaling post-Tiananmen victory of the reform 
faction. 
• Production and allocation plan coverage cut back for the frrst time. 
• Corporate tax rates unified at 3 3 % . 
• Grain prices substantially de-controlled. Controls now cover only 5% of 
retail sales and 15% of industrial goods sales. 
Note: See the text of this chapter for further details and references on these various reform 
measures. 
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The system could be argued as a success in terms of its original goals. The 
economy did grow; net material product for the economy overall grew by 6 
per cent annually between 1952 and 1978, equating to 4 per cent growth in 
per capita terms. Moreover, industrial output expanded even more rapidly, 
by 9.7 per cent annually between 1957 and 1978 according to official 
statistics (Naughton 1995: 52). Moreover, social welfare increased by a 
number of measures. Life expectancy increased to 65 years by 1978, and 
literacy and health levels were high by developing country standards. In 
terms of its military development goals the PRC was fairly successful, 
building the world's largest military force by numbers of personnel and 
equipping it by the late 1970s with approximately 10,000 tanks, roughly the 
same number as maintained by the United States, although far short of the 
50,000 possessed by the Soviet Union (Chant 1979; see Table 2.2 for more 
details). However, living standards as measured by household consumption 
spending hardly rose, as much of the increase in production was channelled 
into heavy industrial, capital and military goods rather than consumer goods. 
As in other command economies, there was considerable misallocation and 
waste of resources via the excess accumulation of inventories, incomplete 
investment projects, and misallocated labour. Total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth was low; the growth in output was predominantly achieved 
extensively, via the quantitative expansion of inputs, notably labour and 
capital. Under standard neoclassical growth theory, extensive growth with 
static TFP levels cannot achieve sustained growth in per capita output and 
incomes since the marginal return to capital declines as the capital/labour 
ratio increases (Wells 1995: Chapter 14). Therefore the rate of per capita 
growth achieved solely by capital accumulation perpetually diminishes 
unless there is efficiency improvement or technical advancement that raises 
factor returns. The realisation by the late 1970s that growth in output and 
especially in living standards was lagging badly behind the export-oriented 
'Asian tigers', encouraged new approaches to development strategy. In the 
military sphere also there was concern that the People's Liberation Army, 
despite its size, was falling behind technologically and becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to the then perceived Soviet threat (Bonds 1979a). 
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This military factor can only have added to the policy imperative to improve 
efficiency, technological progress and economic growth. 
Table 2.2 Comparison of major armaments, 1979 
China USSR USA 
Tanks 10,000 50,000 10,500 
medium, 
1,600 light 
Armoured personnel 3,500 22,000 
earners 
Artillery pieces 18,000 20,000 5,500 
Mortars 20,000 7,200 3,000 
Combat aircraft 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Source: Chant ( 1979). 
The poor efficiency performance of the pre-reform economy can be traced to 
the organisation of production and distribution at the micro level (Huang 
and Duncan 1998, Hay et al. 1994, Zhao 1994). Under the centrally planned 
system, firms had almost no autonomy to make decisions, and little 
incentive to improve performance. Moreover, facing a heavily distorted 
price structure, they also lacked information in the form of prices to make 
economically efficient decisions. Production and distribution were governed 
not by the market but by the central plan. The plan mandated what outputs 
each firm was to produce and where that output was to be distributed, what 
inputs they were to use, and the prices of all goods. Firm managers had 
virtually no important decisions to make; they were merely required to 
achieve the output quotas set for them· by the central plan. All profits were 
remitted to the state as the representative of the whole people, and any losses 
were compensated for by the state. Profitability could serve no real function 
as an indicator of the performance of firms. So long as firms' production 
activity adhered to the plan's input and output quotas, their profits were 
predetermined by the artificial plan prices. These prices often bore little 
relation to the relative scarcity of goods. 
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Capital was distributed to each enterprise primarily in the form of state 
grants. The banking system served as little more than a conduit for 
budgetary outlays. Indeed, until 1979 there was only one bank, the People's 
Bank of China. Its largely passive role in credit allocation mirrored the role 
of SOEs in the industrial sectors; it mechanically distributed capital grants 
and working capital in accordance with the central credit plan much as 
industrial firms obeyed production plans, without the mandate, the incentive 
or the autonomy to raise efficiency or maximise profits. Credit responded to 
material flows, not the other way around (Naughton 1995). A feature of the 
standard command economy capital allocation system is that it encouraged 
what Komai (1980) refers to as 'investment drive' behaviour. Since the 
capacity to invest generated prestige, power and other benefits upon 
enterprise managers and yet imposed no real costs, the natural tendency of 
enterprises, if unconstrained, was to invest without limit. This tended to lead 
to a situation of chronic scarcity of goods, the 'shortage economy'. 
The labour 'market' was similarly tightly controlled, with state labour 
bureaus allocating labour directly to enterprises, and most workers 
effectively on lifetime contracts. Naughton (1992: 44) reports that during 
1979 only 22,000 employees in the state system were fired or quit their jobs, 
only 0.03 per cent of the labour force, with death accounting for seven times 
as many departures from the work force. Restrictions on labour mobility 
were extreme. Internal migration was virtually prohibited via a system of 
household registration. 1 The 'iron rice bowl' philosophy in which work units · 
effectively guaranteed the basic necessities of employees, provided 
considerable economic security to those in the urban industrial sector. 
However, it provided little else; wage and salary scales were very flat, 
implying little material reward for achievement or advancement. There was 
also very little penalty for shirking or poor performance, as workers were 
almost impossible to dismiss for any reason short of criminal conviction. 
Workers' bonus systems, common in other socialist economies, were a 
feature in the 1950s and early 1960s but were abolished in 1966 amid the 
radicalism of the Cultural Revolution period. The labour system in China 
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was markedly more rigid even than that in the USSR, where a labour market 
existed, job transfer was not infrequent, and 88 per cent of workers received 
bonuses and/or piece rates. 
The appointment, monitoring and reward of managers was governed at least 
as much by political considerations as by their performance, which in any 
case was judged by the attainment of output targets rather than profitability. 
The Communist Party Secretary at each firm was typically as influential if 
not more so than the actual manager of the enterprise. Party organisations 
would directly assume many of the responsibilities of managing factories, 
and retained formal powers to interfere in the management of the firm 
(Walder 1989). Industrial management formed part of the party hierarchy, 
and successful managers could aspire to other political or bureaucratic 
postings as part of their careers. 2 
SOEs in China, as in other command economies, suffered from what Komai 
(1980) identifies as the 'soft budget constraint' syndrome. In basic terms, a 
firm's budget constraint is regarded as 'soft' if the firm is not strictly 
required to cover the cost of its inputs from the proceeds of its sales. Firms 
that face hard budget constraints hold the ex ante expectation that failure to 
operate within the budget constraint will lead to severe consequences such 
as bankruptcy. Firms facing soft budget constraints by contrast hold the 
expectation that loss-making would not imperil the survival of the firm, for 
example because the state can be expected to step in and provide subsidies. 
Komai (page 306-308) lists the following five characteristic conditions and 
five consequences pertaining to soft budget constraints (Komai's own 
wording abridged): 
Condition 1: Price-making. The majority of firms are not price-
takers but price-makers. Price is not exogenous for most firms. 
Condition 2: The tax system is soft. For example, (a) the formulation 
of tax rules may be influenced by the firm, (b) the firm may be 
granted exemption or postponement as an individual favour, or (c) 
taxes may not be gathered strictly. 
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Condition 3: Free state grants. These may take the form of (a) free 
contributions to investment expenditures, (b) regular subsidies to 
compensate for recurring losses or to encourage a particular activity 
over a long period, or ( c) ad hoc subsidies to cover an occasional 
loss or encourage a special activity. 
Condition 4: The credit system is soft. Credit is not extended on a 
commercial basis. The firm is granted credit even if there is no 
guarantee of repayment from earnings. The firm is permitted to fail 
to fulfil its contracted repayment obligations. Moreover, when_ 
purchasing inputs, the firm is allowed arbitrarily to postpone 
payment without previous agreement with the seller. 
Condition 5: External financial investment at soft conditions. Komai 
notes that for state-owned firms, this condition is indistinguishable 
from free state grants. However, for private firms it is instanced by 
owners investing money from their own resources to help the firm 
out of financial difficulties. 
Consequence 1: Survival. Survival of the firm does not depend on its 
capacity to fund inputs from the proceeds of its sales. Losses may be 
covered by tax exemptions, grants, soft credit, etc. Profit is 'not a 
question of life and death' for the firm ( emphasis by Komai 1980). 
Consequence 2: Growth. The growth of the firm need not depend on 
investments funded by the firms own earnings ( either accumulated 
past earnings or hard credit to be repaid from future earnings). The 
needed resources can be provided by the state in the form of grants 
and soft credit. 
Consequence 3: Adjustment to prices. The firm is not necessarily 
compelled to adjust to prices (by which Komai seems to mean 
changes in the relative prices of inputs), for two reasons. First, the 
firm may be a price-taker and able to pass on any cost increases. 
Second, even if it disregards prices and suffers losses as a 
consequence, these may be compensated for as noted above. 
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Consequence 4: Uncertainty. The firm does not bear risk alone but 
shares it with the state. If circumstances were to develop favourably, 
the additional profit would likely be 'skimmed off' by state agencies. 
However, if the firm were to suffer from 'bad luck' of some kind, it 
would probably be able to shift the consequences onto someone else: 
perhaps buyers or creditors, but primarily the state. 
Consequence 5: Demand of the firm. As· a result of the other 
consequences, the demand of the firm for inputs is almost insatiable. 
It is not constrained by the price of inputs or the income of the firm. 
At the macro level, this consequence manifests itself in the chronic 
shortage condition typical of command economies. Firms in an 
economy marked by soft budget constraints also exhibit chronic 
disposition towards investment since they have much to gain from 
expansion but need not fear the consequences of unprofitable 
investments. 
One of the inevitable effects of the soft budget syndrome was the erosion of 
incentives, especially what might be called 'negative incentives'. By this 
term is meant the fear of adverse consequences for poor performance. Since 
a state firm was unlikely ever to face bankruptcy, managers faced only weak 
penalties for poor financial performance. This poor incentive structure 
filtered down to the labour force, who faced little disincentive for inefficient 
or counterproductive work practices. As has already been noted, positive 
incentives for both managers and workers, such as via bonuses and wage 
and salary rises, were also weak or non-existent. 
Another consequence of soft budgets is the undermining of the financial 
system as a means for controlling and monitoring the allocation of 
resources. Under a market system, capital is allocated (in the form of debt or 
equity) in the expectation that it will generate positive returns. If a recipient 
of capital consistently fails to make profits, such returns will not be 
forthcoming and further capital will not be allocated. In a soft-budget 
economy however, capital continues to be allocated even if resources are 
wasted and economic losses are chronic. The ref ore, the financial system 
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essentially does not serve to maintain the efficiency of economic activity by 
seeking out the most profitable investments and terminating enterprises 
whose economic outputs are of lesser value than the inputs burnt up in their 
production. 
Attempts at reform of the economic system prior to 1978 were limited to 
programs of decentralisation in which some responsibilities were devolved 
from the central government organs to the regions. The most recent of these 
was in the 1970s. These programs did not alter the basic fact of rigid official 
control over resource allocation and prices (Lin et al. 1996). A relative 
degree of decentralisation was appropriate for China's circumstances, being 
a large, diverse country with a lower level of development and larger rural 
sector than other socialist countries. However, due to poor and incomplete 
implementation, one of the main lasting effects of Chinese decentralisation 
was to confuse the boundaries between central and lower-level authorities, 
such that enterprises often had to report to multiple agencies at different 
levels of government (Naughton 1995: Ch 1). Naughton (1992: 47) goes so 
far as to assert that 'no stable or effective system for dividing responsibility 
between governmental levels was ever developed'. 
2.2 SOE reform - general directions 
SOE reform commenced without a clearly identifiable strategy as to how to 
proceed. There was at the outset little more than a general aim to improve 
the efficiency and performance of enterprises. Reform unfolded as an ad hoc 
process in which various initiatives were experimented with, and the 
seemingly more successful ones were implemented more broadly. 
Implementation of initiatives across the SOE sector was often far from even 
however, with the result that different firms were operating under quite 
different systems at any one point in time. Key reform policies would be 
officially announced, but effective implementation might not occur until 
some years later. Some of the significant developments in the process arose 
as unintended consequences of policy measures and of firms' reactions to 
those measures. There were setbacks, failures, instances of backtracking, 
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and conflicts between authorities at different levels of government. Across 
this overall landscape of considerable flux, a number of overarching themes 
can be identified that characterised the general direction of the reform 
process. 
First, the overall process of SOE reform can be described as one of 
transformation from the command economy, characterised by public 
ownership with planned allocation of resources at state-determined prices, to 
a 'socialist market economy', characterised by public ownership with market 
allocation of resources at market-determined prices. Reforms sought to 
transform the internal conditions of firms by improving incentives, 
increasing firm autonomy, and by making firms responsible for their own 
performance. External conditions were transformed by making transactions 
subject to market allocation and prices rather than the planning process, and 
by making firms subject to greater competition. Over time, it was accepted 
that not only factory outputs but also productive factors such as capital and 
labour should be allocated via markets, although the process of developing 
such markets has proved more challenging. The overall objective, to this 
point at least, has never been to replace the previous system with an 
orthodox market economy dominated by private ownership. The reason is 
political and obvious; such a significant departure from Marxist orthodoxy 
would have been ideologically unacceptable and would have called into 
question the legitimacy of a political system dominated by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). There exists a significant debate as to whether the 
socialist market economy formula is tenable in the long run, that is, whether 
enterprise reform and economic reform more broadly can succeed without 
privatisation. This broad debate is one that this thesis seeks in part to 
inform, and is taken up in the concluding chapter. 
The second theme of reform has been gradualism. In this respect, the 
Chinese approach to SOE reform, and to economic reform in general, has 
frequently been contrasted with the approach taken in the former Soviet 
Union and other eastern European transitional economies. The contrast 
made has often been favourable to the Chinese approach (for example 
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McKinnon 1993). The gradualist approach involved initial retention of some 
of the features of the planned economy while market institutions were 
introduced and allowed to develop. This tended to imply a period of 
simultaneous coexistence of new and old mechanisms. For example, the 
system of plan prices was not immediately done away with, but retained for 
transactions carried out under the central plan, while firms were permitted to 
sell above-quota output at market prices (see Section 2.4). But the scope of 
the plan was not expanded during the reform period; rather it was frozen in 
place until 1993 when its coverage began to be cut back. Over time, growth 
in non-plan outputs plus shrinking plan coverage after 1993 combined to 
ensure that market prices eventually came to govern the majority of SOE 
transactions, a process that Naughton (1995) refers to as 'growing out of the 
plan'. 
The third identifiable theme concerns the interrelated dynamics of reform 
changes. Rarely could any reform measure be considered in isolation. 
Reforms in one area generally led to significant pressures for further reforms 
in other areas. Over time this meant that the entire reform process gathered 
substantial momentum as the planned-economy system unraveled like 
tightly woven yarn. At times policymakers responded by attempting to slow 
or wind back reforms, most notably in 1989 when conservative leaders 
seized the ascendancy following, the Tiananmen Square protests. However, 
such attempts to re-regulate the economy inevitably failed to achieve their · 
goals and were followed by reinvigorated reform. Reform events also 
interacted with cycles of economic activity. Liberalisation typically led to 
accelerated growth and investment, but also to disorder and outbursts of 
inflation, such as in 1980, 1985, 1988 and 1994. In such instances, the 
contractionary monetary policy response was sometimes accompanied by a 
tightening of the reform leash, again most notably in 1989. 
Specific aspects of reform are now examined in some detail, commencing in 
the following section with initiatives to improve incentives and autonomy. 
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2.3 Incentives and autonomy 
The lack of positive incentives for firms, their managers and employees in 
the pre-reform period was identified from the outset of reform as a prime 
deficiency of the existing SOE system. A series of initiatives was therefore 
implemented to provide firms with the opportunity to retain a greater 
percentage of the returns from their operations, and in conjunction with this, 
to increase their decision-making autonomy. At least for the first decade or 
so of the reform period, such initiatives, along with price reform, set the 
pattern of SOE reform. The success of the household responsibility system 
in agriculture gave early encouragement and impetus to reform in SOE 
incentives. This system shifted the focus of production responsibility in 
agriculture from the collective level to the household level, allowed rural 
households to retain all the proceeds from their production after payment of 
a fixed land rent, and resulted in dramatic productivity improvements 
(Findlay et al. 1993). However, the introduction of effective incentive 
structures in large industrial firms was to prove a much more difficult and 
complex process than was the case for the agricultural sector. Indeed, by the 
late 1980s a policy consensus would emerge to the effect that improved 
incentives alone would not be sufficient to revive the SOE sector, and that a 
complex mix of interrelated reform measures, many of them highly 
challenging, would be necessary (Byrd 1992: 11, Hay et al. 1994: 10). 
The most significant developments in incentive-autonomy reform over the 
first decade and a half of reform can be classified into three stages; (1) 
profit-sharing schemes, (2) the Tax-for-Profit reform, and (3) the Contract 
Responsibility System (CRS). Profit-sharing schemes, referred to by some 
as the Economic Responsibility System (Chen 1995), began on ah 
experimental basis with six firms in Sichuan in October 1978. The initial 
experiment was steadily expanded, the central government extending it in 
May 1979 to eight selected SOEs in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. Around 
4,200 enterprises were participating by the end of 1979 and -6,600 by June 
1980. These experiments typically included an incentive element in which 
firms retained a portion of plan and above plan profit (the profit retention 
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rate typically being higher for above-plan profit) and an autonomy element 
in which firms were permitted to independently sell above-quota output and 
internally appoint middle-level management. The profit retention rates were 
quite modest in these early experiments. In the initial six pilot enterprises 
retention rates were 3 to 5 per cent on quota output and 15 to 25 per cent on 
above-quota output, and conditional on fulfilling a range of economic and 
technical goals (Zhao 1994). Byrd (1992: 3) reports the retention rates as 10 
to 30 per cent of above-quota profits in the case of the national system. The 
retention rates set were not at all uniform but were determined in a form of 
negotiation between the -firms and state agencies. This was because, after . 
decades under a system in which profitability was virtually irrelevant, it was 
quickly found that under the existing policy environment, SOEs differed 
very widely in their opportunities to make profits. State plan prices for 
inputs and outputs either advantaged or disadvantaged particular firms, and 
firms' endowments of capital as of the implementation of the scheme also 
varied considerably. Profitability could also naturally be expected to vary 
across regions and industrial sectors. State agencies therefore sought to 
'handicap' firms, setting higher retention rates for less favourably placed 
firms and lower rates for more readily profitable firms. Chen ( 1995) notes 
that the system had sought to establish profit as the basic indicator of 
performance from the beginning, but additional indicators had to be 
employed in the early period, since price controls made profit an inefficient 
indicator. The profit-sharing scheme effectively became the standard SOE 
model with the National People's Congress's announcement that the scheme 
would be adopted in all SOEs by the end of 1981 (Renmin Ribao 20 August 
1980, page 1). 
Some writers describe the profit-sharing schemes as having evolved by 1981 
into an early form of the contract system (variously labeled the Profit 
Contract System (Otsuka et al. 1998), and the Economic Responsibility 
System (Byrd 1992), a term that other writers reserve to describe the round 
of initiatives from 1986. From 1981 to 1983 when the system was 
widespread, it had become heavily based on negotiation. Firms were often 
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able to raise their marginal retention rates substantially. For example, they 
could negotiate to pay a lump-sum profit 'target', with retention rates on 
above-target profits set high, sometimes even 100 per cent. The system 
became somewhat chaotic, with contracts being adjusted from year to year 
or even within a year. Revenue-maximising state agencies might seek to 
adjust the terms in their favour as profits grew (the ratchet effect), or in the 
case of regional government agencies to collude with firms to reduce the 
share accruing to central state revenue. The terms of profit retention became 
dependent on firm bargaining power and skill rather than any rational 
economic basis, and incentives arose for firms to devote managerial 
resources towards bargaining efforts rather than productive operations. It 
appears that in these bargaining contests, SOE firms had the upper hand, as 
central government revenue declined significantly. 
While profit-sharing was an important step forward in that it gave SOE 
management and employees some positive incentives for improving their 
performance, the system carried a number of serious weaknesses. First, the 
retention rates were typically modest, even miniscule, proportions of the 
residuals of firms (Zhao 1994: Chapter 4 ). Second, the setting of retention 
rates via negotiation rather than on the basis of consistent rules weakened 
the positive incentive effects and became a new manifestation of the soft 
budget constraint problem. Firm managers could often improve their 
circumstances more readily by bargaining with authorities to increase their 
retention rates than by putting the same effort into improving their firms ' 
operations. Third, although managerial autonomy was increased to some 
extent, most notably by the freedom to market above-plan output 
independently, managers still faced considerable constraints over their 
operations and were subject to extensive interference by officials. 
The second major phase of incentive reform dates from around 1983 with 
the introduction of the Tax-for-Profit scheme (li gai shui). This was an 
attempt to regularise the financial relationship between enterprises and the 
state by replacing the system of profit remittances with a system of 
enterprise incon1e taxes. It sought to restore order to the situation and to 
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stem the haemorrhaging of state revenues that had occurred under the profit-
sharing system (see the fiscal data presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
Experiments with a tax-based system had begun in 1979 in Hubei province 
and by 1982 over 400 enterprises were subject to the system (Zhao 1994 ). 
The establishment of the tax system as the standard for the SOE sector was 
advocated in the official press at the end of 1982 and implemented in July 
1983. 
The system initially featured a uniform 55 per cent tax on enterprise profits, 
in addition to the industrial-commercial tax which continued in place. 
However, the system soon ran afoul of the same problem that had 
confronted the profit-sharing system - divergent profitability among 
enterprises. The response was to again make the parameters of the system 
flexible and negotiable on a firm-by-firm basis. This was done in October 
1984 by the introduction of an adjustment tax. This tax was intended to take 
account of factors that might give any firm an unfair advantage, such as 
favourable price settings, capital or resource endowments, or location. 
In practice however, it was difficult for state agencies to distinguish 
objectively between good performance and unfair advantage. As a result the 
system again degenerated into one based upon negotiation between firms 
and agencies as had been the case under the profit-sharing phase, except that 
this time the focus of negotiation was on the rates of adjustment tax instead 
of profit retention rates. A uniform enterprise tax regime was not 
successfully introduced until 1994. 
Another shortcoming of the tax-for-profit reform is that it led to very high 
effective marginal tax rates, since rates of adjustment tax were ·set higher for 
the more profitable firms (Otsuka et al. 1998: 32). In other words, the 
'ratchet effect' was still endemic. Proper data on marginal tax rates is 
difficult to obtain, as most Chinese data surveys collect only enough 
information to compute average tax rates. Even if firm-level data on 
marginal rates were available, by its nature it wo'uld be difficult to aggregate 
from, since each firm's tax rates were calculated by a different formula. A 
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1985 survey estimated that enterprises retained an average of 22 per cent of 
gross profits, and distributed 37 per cent of this in the form of bonuses 
(Walder 1989: 243 quoting Xia and Li 1987). This suggests an average tax 
rate as high as 78 per cent, if we treat profits remitted to the state as being 
analogous to taxes. Since tax rates were progressive, marginal rates are 
likely to have been even higher. 
The period of the Tax-for-Profit reform coincided with a major step in the 
expansion of SOE autonomy. May 1984 saw the promulgation by the State 
Council of the 'Provisional Regulations on Further Extending the Decision-
Making Power of the State Industrial Enterprises', a document described by 
Naughton (1995) as an enterprise 'Bill of Rights', also referred to as the 
'Ten Articles'. This document, in theory at least, conferred the following 
autonomous rights upon enterprises (the following wording is reproduced 
from Laaksonen (1988): 
l. Production: Businesses have the right to produce whatever is needed or 
is in short supply, after fulfilling their state plans and orders. 
2. Sales: With certain exceptions, firms have the right to sell products thy 
retain for themselves, products in excess of state quotas, their own trial-
produced or overstocked items, and those refused by state purchasing 
agencies. They must keep special accounts for the products they sell 
themselves and pay tax according to regulations. 
3. Pricing: For the means of industrial production which they sell 
themselves and the products exceeding state quotas, businesses have the 
right to set prices within a 20 per cent range of the state price, or to 
negotiate the prices with buyers. They must abide by the state prices for 
the means of Ii velihood and the means of farm production. 
4. Purchase of materials: Businesses have the right to choose their 
suppliers when they order state-distributed raw materials. Businesses 
may also obtain raw materials directly from producers without going 
through state monopoly suppliers. 
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5. Use of funds: Enterprises have the right to decide whether their share of 
profits goes into expanding production, trial production of new products, 
a reserve fund, the workers' welfare fund, or bonuses. They also have 
the right to use other funds for the first three items, together with funds 
for depreciation and large-scale repair. 
6. Handling of assets: Businesses have the right to lease or transfer with 
compensation unneeded machinery or other fixed assets, but the income 
must be used to upgrade or renew their own facilities. 
7. Structural establishment: Businesses have the right to decide on the 
setting-up of organisations and to assign their staff according to their 
needs as long as they stay within their authorised size. 
8. Personnel and labour: The factory manager or director has the right to 
appoint or dismiss cadres under him. His deputies, however, are subject 
to approval from above. The director or manager and the party secretary 
are to be appointed by the higher competent departments concerned. The 
factory director has the right to reward or punish his workers and staff, 
with promotions, wage hikes, or even disciplinary dismissal. Directors 
have the right to employ workers on the basis of examinations under the 
guidance of the state labour-recruiting agencies. They also have the right 
to reject forced assignment from higher agencies or individuals. 
9. Wages and bonuses: Businesses have the right to adopt any wage 
system, in line with state standards. Factory directors may promote 3 per 
cent of their workers each year, with the increased wages counted as a 
cost of production. 
10. Inter-unit operations: Enterprises have the right to enter into joint 
projects which cut across official divisions, as long as they maintain 
their present system of ownership, finances, and subordinate 
relationships. 
In practice firms did not immediately enjoy full autonomy in all these areas 
but moved in that direction over time. The 'Bill of Rights' indicated the 
overall intentions of policy, the actual transfer of genuine autonomy took 
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place over a number of years. Naughton (1995) identifies 1984 as a year in 
which the pace and determination of reform was significantly stepped up, 
and notes four particular measures that were important in cementing 
enterprise autonomy. These four are (1) the Factory Manager Responsibility 
System; (2) the authority to draw up the overall production plan within the 
enterprises; (3) the system that linked total wage bill to profit; and (4) long-
term contracting over profit remittances between firms and their supervisory 
agencies. The first three of these were introduced in 1984 and the fourth in 
1986, but it was not until 1988 that all four had been adopted in a majority 
of enterprises. Also commencing in 1984, the remuneration of enterprise 
managers began to be linked to enterprise profits (Groves et al. 1994 ). 
The Factory Management Responsibility System was intended to separate 
industrial management from politics. As noted by Walder (1989), factory-
level Party secretaries held considerable power over enterprise activities 
under the pre-reform system and in the early part of the reform period. 
Walder adds that rank and file workers also had considerable power to 
influence managers, since their lack of effective disciplinary tools left 
managers vulnerable to campaigns of non-cooperation by workers. 
Furthermore, disgruntled workers could make common cause with 
antagonistic Party secretaries. Under the new system, the Party committee 
no longer held the dominant position over SOE managers, and in the case of 
disagreement between the two, firm management was empowered to 
override the committee (Zhao 1994). An earlier attempt to institute a Factory 
Manager Responsibility System had been made in 1980 but was temporarily 
abandoned. The system was introduced again on an experimental basis in 
May 1984 and the October Reform declaration later that year called for 
nationwide adoption. Some reformers saw the development of a strong 
managerial class as a positive development that would help to resist 
excessive worker demands, although this viewpoint was opposed by 
conservatives and also by a particular group of reformers. Such political 
resistance was overcome and the system had become nearly universal by 
1988 (Naughton 1995: 206). One can perceive the Factory Management 
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Responsibility System as driving a long-term process whereby managers' 
personal welfare came to be dependent increasingly on their own 
management performance rather than on the interests and influences of their 
employees, government officials and enterprise Party secretaries. 
The failure of the tax-for-profit scheme to achieve its objective of 
regularising financial relations between SOEs and the state led to the third 
major phase in incentive reform. This commenced in approximately 1986 
with the implementation of the Contract Management Responsibility System 
(CMRS). Experiments with this system had begun in 1984, and by 1988 it 
was being used by over 90 per cent of large and medium-sized SOEs (Zhao 
1994: 84 ). The development of this system owed something to the 
Household Responsibility System in agriculture, which in tum echoed the 
contract-based tax-farming systems that were used during the Five Dynasties 
and Yuan dynasty periods (Chen 1995: 57). The CMRS was based on the 
signing of individual contracts between enterprises and state supervisory 
agencies. These contracts typically ran between three and five years and 
sought to define clearly the respective rights and responsibilities of 
enterprises and state bodies, including the terms of profit retention by firms . 
One of the intentions behind the CMRS reform was that this clear 
delineation of rights and responsibilities should act against arbitrary 
bureaucratic interference in firm operations and improve firm autonomy. It 
was also expected-that by fixing retention rates for a number of years in the 
contracts, the 'ratchet effect' would be greatly ameliorated. 
The contracts stipulated profit and other objectives as well as the 
distribution of earnings between the firm and the state. Typically, the 
amount remitted to the state in the year prior to the creation of the contract 
served as the benchmark or target for remittances under the contract, with 
the contract then specifying the distribution of profits achieved in excess of 
the target. The most common format for profit distribution specified a fixed 
profit target for each year of the contract, with above-target profits shared in 
an agreed ratio, the government's share typically being less than 55 per cent. 
Another method, effectively a variation of the first, entitled the enterprises to 
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100 per cent of profits earned above the fixed target. A third method 
involved a stepped target, which would increase in specified amounts over 
the life of the contract, with the firms retaining 100 per cent of profits in 
excess of the target for each year. Miscellaneous other formulae were also 
used. According to guidelines, 60 per cent of retained profits were to be 
spent on capital investment, 20 per cent on employee welfare services, and 
20 per cent on bonuses and other employee benefits. In practice however, 
the majority portion of retained profit came to be allocated to bonuses 
(Otsuka et al. 1998). 
As a response to the challenges facing incentive reform at the time, and 
given the difficulties inherent in adopting a uniform regime for all SOEs the 
CMRS was a coherent forward step, and appears to have functioned fairly 
well in its first few years of operation. Effective marginal retention rates 
were higher than they had been under the tax-for-profit reform (Otsuka et al. 
1998: 32) and the ratchet effect was less prevalent. One drawback however 
was a tendency towards short-termism, as managers tended to be 
unconcerned about the welfare of their firms beyond the lifetimes of their 
own contracts (Parker and Pan 1995). 
The CMRS broke down in the policy environment that prevailed in the 
period from late 1989 (Naughton 1995: Chapter 8). After Tiananmen, the 
conservative faction in the CCP gained control not only of the political 
apparatus but also of economic policy. This faction sought for a time to 
reverse such policy trends as marketisation, SOE autonomy and the fostering 
of the non-state sector. In seeking to reassert the primacy of the central 
planning system, the conservatives fostered a significant increase in official 
interference in the commercial activities of SOEs. This coincided with a 
policy of macroeconomic austerity to rein in inflation. SOEs in capital 
goods-producing sectors for example were forced to maintain production 
even as investment demand fell sharply. As a result, SOE profitability 
deteriorated significantly. In the majority of state firms, long-term contracts 
expired at the end of 1990 and had to be renegotiated. However, the 
circumstances were highly unfavourable. The incumbent conservatives had 
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been stressing increased contributions to government, while SOE managers 
had their own incentives to understate profits ahead of the contracting 
negotiations. Extensive state interference had undermined the integrity of 
the contract system, and the morale of SOE managers with it. Managers' 
willingness to honestly report profits and comply with regulations 
accordingly deteriorated. Derong Chen (1995: 124) relates a 1991 interview 
with an SOE director who declared: 'My job, to some extent, can be 
interpreted as struggling with government policy. If they [the government] 
increase sales tax and add other taxes in such an arbitrary way, we would try 
to reduce the gross profits before income tax as much as possible'. This firm 
admitted to under-reporting 1990 profit by over one-third. While in the 
immediate term there was little alternative but to proceed with a new round 
of contract renegotiations, when the political pendulum swung in due course 
back to the reformists, a fresh drive towards more thoroughgoing market-
oriented reforms commenced including the achievement finally of a uniform 
profit tax rate of 33 per cent at the end of 1993. This next set of reforms 
· dates from around 1994 and is briefly discussed in the concluding chapter. 
Over the 1978 to 1994 period with which this thesis is chiefly concerned, the 
overall assessment of enterprise reform with respect to incentives and 
autonomy is somewhat mixed. Certainly the reforms were successful in 
installing profit maximisation as a primary goal of SOE management, in 
place of the previous goals of plan fulfillment and output maximisation. 
Byrd and Tidrick, writing in 1987 when the reforms were less than a decade 
old, identified five main motives of SOEs: (1) family (maximising family 
income and benefits), (2) expansion (through investment and sometimes 
mergers), (3) engineering (the drive to produce highly-regarded products and 
win product-quality awards), (4) compliance (the desire to be a good 
bureaucratic citizen), and (5) profit. These writers argue that the right of 
profit retention gave all firms an incentive to increase profits whatever their 
other motives may have been. Firms that sought to maximise family benefits 
could do so by earning profits and distributing them as bonuses. 
Engineering-minded managers would not be able to indulge the engineering 
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motive if poor market conditions threatened profits. It is likely that the 
importance of the profit motive strengthened over time as the reforms 
progressed. Zhao ( 1994: 100) reports 1989 survey data in which SOE 
managers were asked to rank the importance of six managerial objectives: 
raising output, increasing profit, increasing workers' incomes, expanding 
production, developing new products, and upgrading technology. Overall, 
increasing profit rated as the most important objective, ranked as the number 
one priority of 49 .5 per cent of managers, and as number two or three 
priority by another 39 .4 per cent. 
On the negative side, the manner in which incentive and autonomy-related 
reforms were carried out was somewhat chaotic and led to inconsistent 
treatment of firms. At the heart of the problem was the difficulty of 
objectively evaluating the earnings performance of individual firms in a 
system in which profitability traditionally did not much matter and in which 
true earnings performance was masked by a range of 'handicapping' factors. 
In both the original profit-sharing schemes and the tax-for-profit scheme, 
ref armers' original designs degenerated into systems dominated by 
bargaining between firms and their state overseers. Bargaining-based 
systems by their nature encouraged rent-seeking activity and perpetuated 
soft budgets, as firms that under-performed could seek to redress their losses 
by bargaining over tax or profit retention rates. The Contract Management 
Responsibility System was largely successful in replacing the bargaining 
process with more consistent treatment, until the CMRS itself was 
undermined by the policy regime of 1989 and 1990. 
Although China's Bankruptcy Law was enacted in 1986, for the first eight 
years of its existence barely 100 bankruptcies were implemented, due to 
inadequacies in the legislation and official reticence over redundancies. The 
number of bankruptcies gradually increased from 1994 but as of 1997 was 
still only a few thousand out of 100,000 SOEs. It was possible nonetheless 
to shut down firms by means other than formal bankruptcy~ Reform (1992: 
228) reports that in 1991 just over 1000 SOEs were closed through managed 
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proceedings or taken over by other firms, of which only two cases involved 
declarations of bankruptcy. 
The progress made in improving positive incentives for firms, their 
managers and employees was marred by relatively slow progress in 
strengthening negative incentives such as implementation of the Bankruptcy 
Law, and in otherwise firming up soft budget constraints. Autonomy 
reforms, while slow to enjoy full implementation, no doubt raised the 
efficiency of the SOE sector. However, they also may have led to an 
excessive weakening of control in areas where official control was still 
needed. For example, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that poor 
monitoring of the activities and accounts of SOEs enabled them to 
manipulate their results and retain much of the profits that they were 
formally required to remit to the state. 3 
2.4 Price reform 
Price reform proved to be one of the most successful aspects of the 
industrial reform process in the first decade and a half of reform. By the 
mid-1990s the transition from plan-determined to market-determined prices 
was complete in most sectors . . 
There was a clear appreciation from the beginning of reforms in 1978 that 
rationalisation of the distorted price structure must form one o~ the main 
objectives of reform. In the first few years however, price reform followed a 
rather conservative path, with the staged adjustment of administrative prices. 
In other words, authorities sought to realign prices within the familiar 
framework of central planning. In this- period, the distortions against 
agriculture and consumption goods in the economy started to be alleviated. 
Among those goods whose prices were raised significantly by the early 
1980s were electronic goods, iron ore, and semi-finished steel products. An 
indication of the early attachment to administrative prices was the setting up 
of the Price Research Center in 1981 to calculate 'optimal' prices for 
planning authorities. This body laboured for two years, pr-0duced a 253-
sector input-output table and delivered several variant sets of prices in mid-
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1983. However, ultimately it was not able to convincingly argue for any of 
the variant prices it had computed and the project was disbanded (Naughton 
1995). 
By the mid-1980s, the early successes of reform, notably in stimulating the 
growth of agriculture and rural industry, had engendered support for further 
price reform on a more market-oriented basis. Amidst a general view that 
price realignment had not made sufficient progress, reformists were split 
into two camps, identified by Naughton ( 1995) as the 'price reformers' and 
the 'enterprise reformers'. The price reform camp advocated the rapid 
rationalisation of prices and taxes. Enterprise reformers, partly on political 
grounds, argued for more gradual reform via a 'dual-track' system in which 
plan prices were retained but above-quota output could be sold at market 
prices. This group argued that the dual-track system could gradually 
accustom enterprise managers to operating under market prices, and would 
create among the urban managerial class a further constituency in favour of 
reform (in addition to peasant smallholders and rural entrepreneurs. Premier 
Zhao Ziyang ultimately endorsed the view of the enterprise reform group, 
and the dual-track system was implemented. Zhao himself saw price reform 
as part of a transition to 'primarily indirect management' in which 'the state 
adjusts the market, and the market guides the enterprise' (Naughton 1995: 
203). 
The gradualist strategy that underlay the dual-track approach to price reform 
is well illustrated by the following quote from the 'Suggestions of the Party 
Center on Drawing up the Seventh Five Year Plan' (CCP 1985): 
State management of enterprises should be gradually converted from direct 
control to indirect control as the main form, primarily employing economic 
and legal measures - while retaining necessary administrative measures -
to control and regulate economic activity .... As for the price of consumer 
goods, except for an extremely small minority of crucial products that will 
remain under state price controls, the price of ordinary products will be 
gradually decontrolled as market conditions permit. The proportion of 
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producer goods for which the central government determines the price will 
progressively shrink, and the proportion determined by the market will 
increase. At the same time, we will gradually adjust planned prices, in order 
to shrink the gap between plan and market prices. 
From May 1984, above-quota output was permitted to be sold at prices up to 
20 per cent above plan prices. In February 1985, this restriction was 
abolished and ex-plan prices became essentially market-determined. The 
coverage of market prices relative to plan prices steadily rose as growth 
expanded the non-plan portion of production while the scope of the plan was 
held frozen, and as various commodities were progressively removed from 
the central planning system. The number of commodities subject to planned 
allocation fell from 256 to 23 in 1986, and the portion of retail sales 
transacted at plan prices fell from 97 per cent in 1979 to 4 7 per cent in 1986. 
Plan prices themselves were progressively adjusted in the direction of 
market prices. Price reform was temporarily halted by the inflationary 
outbursts of 1988 and 1992, each of which led to the tightening of price 
controls as an anti-inflationary measure. Nevertheless, price reform and the 
rolling back of planned allocation resumed in earnest in 1993, by the end of 
which only eighteen industrial commodities remained on the plan, and much 
of their production was being transacted at market prices. The areas where 
price reform tended to lag was largely in commodities that were unusually 
politically sensitive such as coal and grain, but even these were being 
tackled seriously by the mid-1990s (Naughton 1995: 290-291). By the end 
of the 1990s, the State Planning and Development Commission) was able to 
report in its List of State-Priced Commodities that fewer than 20 
commodities and services were still subject to central government prices 
(ChinaOnline.com, 9 October 2000). The same report noted that by the end 
of 1998, market prices governed 94.7 per cent of retail goods, 83.8 per cent 
of agricultural products and 86 per cent of production inputs. Even the 
prices of such strategic and public-type goods and services as electric power, 
petroleum, medicine and rail transport had become market-determined. 
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The dual-track strategy of price reform held a number of advantages, and 
also a number of drawbacks. It allowed immediate efficiency gains to be 
generated, since market prices served as the effective marginal prices and 
therefore directed production decisions. (Byrd 1992) This facilitated the 
resolution of shortages in the Chinese economy, providing incentives for 
producers to expand the production of goods in demand and to economise 
on the use of inputs. Moreover, these gains could be had while minimising 
the risks of reform by allowing gradual adjustment over a period of time. As 
McKinnon (1993) notes, China's gradual price adjustment allowed the 
inflationary pressure arising from monetary overhang to be released slowly, 
allowing a relatively stable price level for most of the reform period. In 
Russia by contrast, the sudden decontrol of prices in the presence of 
monetary overhang triggered a hyperinflation; consumer prices rose 874 per 
cent in 1993 ( the first year for which the IMF' s International Financial 
Statistics published Russian data). 
The negative features of the dual-track strategy included the inducement that 
it gave to corruption, speculation and dishonesty. Since market prices 
typically exceeded plan prices, managers and officials were frequently able 
to exploit their positions to acquire goods at plan prices and sell them at 
market prices. In some reported cases firms even derived the bulk of their 
revenues from the re-sale of state-supplied inputs. Public resentment against 
such corrupt behaviour was a significant motivation of the 1989 protests. 
The system also had the effect of favouring those firms that were granted 
relatively large input quotas and small output quotas. This created a further 
incentive for bureaucratic bargaining and rent-seeking behaviour, and also 
led to some allocative inefficiencies in cases where more technically 
efficient producers were treated relatively unfavourably. For example, the 
most modem large-scale plants sometimes stood idle while less efficient 
small-scale enterprises with the freedom to charge market prices were able 
to continue production. The system was also somewhat chaotic. As Hay et 
al. (1994) report, there was frequently not a single plan price but mandatory, 
indicative, regional, protective, break-even, and negotiated prices. 
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2.5 Capital and investment 
Reforms in the area of capital and investment sought to replace the 
allocation of free capital grants via the budgetary system, with the 
distribution of credit via interest-bearing bank loans. This transformation 
was intended to create a sense of the economic cost of capital and to 'raise 
the efficiency of capital utilisation by introducing more caution and cost 
consciousness into managers' calculations about the acquisition and use of 
capital' (White 1988: 11 ). The general intention complemented, at least in 
theory, the other arms of reform that took economic activity out of the realm 
of central planning and placed it in an environment characterised by 
markets. While the specific transformation from state grants to bank credit 
represented a substantial institutional change and was, over a period of time, 
essentially carried out, capital market reform by the mid-1990s was far from 
complete in that credit continued to be allocated on a 'soft' rather than a 
commercial basis. As a result, by the mid-1990s the level of non-performing 
loans to SOEs in the state bank sector had risen to such levels that, as Lardy 
( 1998) asserts, the net worth of each of the four main state banks would 
probably come to a negative figure under accurate accounting. 
Bank sector reform 
At the eve of reform in 1978 China still operated a standard command 
economy 'monobank' system with the People's Bank of China (PBOC) 
serving as both the central bank and the main commercial bank. While the 
financial landscape also featured the Bank of China, the People's 
Construction Bank of China, and rural credit cooperatives, none of these 
functioned as an independent commercial bank (Lardy 1998: 61). The Bank 
of China was subordinate to the PBOC, the Construction Bank was a 
subsidiary of the Ministry of Finance on behalf of whom it distributed state 
budgetary investment funds, and rural credit cooperatives collected deposits 
from rural residents but had no significant lending role. As banking reform 
proceeded, lending arms of the PBOC and MOF were split away to create 
four new state-owned 'commercial' banks, each with its own specialised 
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business domain. The Bank of China was separated from the PBOC in 
March 1979 and was allowed to expand upon its traditional role as a 
specialised bank for foreign exchange and international payments. The 
Construction Bank was made independent of the MOF in November 1979 
and specialised in long-term capital and construction lending for new 
investment projects, including in the SOE sector. Two new state banks were 
formed out of the rural and urban branch networks of the PBOC. These were 
respectively the Agricultural Bank of China in February 1979 and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in January 1984. The Agricultural 
Bank was to specialise in rural deposits and lending. The Industrial and 
Commercial Bank, which upon its formation was immediately the largest of 
the commercial banks, collected the deposits of urban residents and 
undertook working capital and medium-term loans to SOEs. With the 
separation of the four specialised state commercial banks, the role of the 
PBOC evolved into one more resembling a market-economy central bank, 
managing the macroeconomy and supervising the operations of the 
commercial banks. 
In the early to mid-1980s the four specialised state banks exercised virtually 
monopolistic dominance of their respective core businesses. However as 
time progressed financial competition gradually increased, in two ways. 
First, the boundaries between the big four blurred, and they started to 
compete with each other in their respective core businesses. Second, various 
other new banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFis) entered the 
financial sector. The new banks included five national commercial banks 
and a number of regional banks (see Table 2.3 for detail of some of these 
institutions). Foreign banks entered the Chinese market predominantly 
servicing foreign-invested enterprises and conducting foreign-currency 
business, but were heavily restricted in both business and geographic scope. 
In particular, they were excluded from RMB business. However, their 
market access will expand substantially under the terms of China's WTO 
accession. Trust and investment corporations (TI Cs), free of some of the 
regulative restrictions on state banks, offered higher interest rates and lent to 
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a variety of enterprises. The first TIC, China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC), was formed in 1979 and by 1989 TICs 
accounted for 6.3 per cent of total financial assets (Hasenstab 1999). Rural 
credit cooperatives initially implemented lending programmes of the 
Agricultural Bank of China, also engaging in their own deposit-taking and 
lending. There were 55,000 of these in 1996 when they were released from 
the guidance of the ABC. This NBFI sector had its counterpart in the urban 
credit cooperatives, although these only emerged in 1987 and had a smaller 
presence. Two other small categories of NBFI were finance companies and 
financial leasing companies. Finance companies emerged from 1987, and in 
most cases were formed to carry out financial transactions within the 
member companies of industrial groups. Financial leasing companies 
emerged from the early 1980s, usually in the form of joint ventures with 
foreign banks. In 1994 the State Council approved the formation of three 
policy banks, whose role would be to take over policy-directed lending from 
the specialised banks and thus assist their development into true commercial 
institutions. Over time, the growth of the new financial institutions exerted 
considerable competitive pressure and forced the government to liberalise 
the state bank sector (Hasenstab 1999). Nevertheless, the big four 
specialised state banks, with the advantages of vast branch networks and an 
implicit guarantee of state support, continued to dominate the sector. Their 
collective share of assets of the financial sector (including the PBOC, policy 
banks, other commercial banks, credit cooperatives, TICs, finance 
companies and domestic insurance companies, but excluding foreign 
institutions) stood at 71.2 per cent in 1986, and by 1994 and 1995 had 
declined only to 63 .6 per cent and 61.0 per cent, respectively 
(Lardy 1998: 224). 
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Table 2.3 New Chinese banks formed after 1978 
Name Opened Details 
China Investment Bank 1981 Initially created to administer disbursement of 
World Bank funds to China. Converted to a 
commercial bank in 1994. Operates as a subsidiary 
of Construction Bank. 
Bank of 1987 Originally a private bank, taken over by PBOC in 
Communications 1958, remaining independent in Hong Kong. 
Reestablished on mainland as a national joint stock 
bank with majority state equity. A pioneer in 
modern banking methods in China. 
China International 1987 Banking arm of the CITIC group. Operates 
Trust and Investment nationally. 
Company (CITIC) 
Industrial Bank 
Everbright Bank 1992 National bank. Initially owned by China Everbright 
(Group) Co .. Gained approval in 1995 to become a 
joint stock bank. First Chinese bank to take a 
foreign shareholder (Asian Development Bank). 
Huaxia Bank 1992 Initially owned by Capital Iron and Steel Works 
(Shougang). Converted to a joint stock commercial 
bank in 1995. 
China Minsheng Bank 1996 The first officially designated private bank in 
China. Formed under All-China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce to lend to collective and 
private small businesses. 
Shenzhen Approved Regional bank listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Development Bank 1987 Two-thirds owned by individuals, with the 
provincial and municipal governments also major 
shareholders. 
Guangdong Approved Regional commercial bank. 
Development Bank 1988 
Source: Lardy (1988). 
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China's system of monetary control 
Girardin ( 1997) has described China's system of monetary control, even in 
the reform period, as a system of directed credit, with its overall orientation 
being one of directing credit to priority uses in the state sector rather than of 
profit maximisation. The system comprises both direct instruments (the 
credit plan and the cash plan) and potentially at least, the indirect 
instruments including interest rates, reserve requirements and PBC lending 
to specialised banks. In the pre-reform period, the state budget, the credit 
plan and the cash plan formed the three complementary parts of the financial 
plan, which mirrored the physical plan. Monetary flows were fairly clearly 
segmented, with households relying on cash and credit being the preserve of 
enterprises, so that in effect the task of monetary control comprised two 
separate tasks. Although the physical plan has steadily eroded in importance 
in the reform period, as of the mid-1990s the credit and cash plans remained 
in force and to some extent had supplanted the physical plan. 
The credit plan is constructed in two stages; a top-down phase followed by a 
bottom-up phase. The PBOC sets a money supply target based on 
macroeconomic criteria, and allocates it to banks, which in tum allocate 
their quotas among their branches. In the bottom-up phase, provincial 
branches of the PBOC assemble credit plans from the branches of banks in 
Table 2.4 Sources of annual investment funds, 1980 to 1989 
(percentage shares) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Total (mil. yuan) 892 648 756. 741 1,006 1,197 1,644 2,074 2,478. 3,069 
Fiscal grants 
- Central 57.4 19.8 13.4 23.8 28.2 24.1 22.5 16.1 14.3 12.3 
- Regional 11.9 20.6 20.4 16.0 13.5 12.4 8.6 7.5 9.5 4.6 
Bank credit 
- Domestic 5.6 23.2 30.1 15.2 21.3 24.9 32.4 36.3 34.0 35.1 
- Foreign 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 4.0 1.0 4.6 
Equity fundraising 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bonds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1 0.7 
Inter-firm debt 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
lnv't by other firms 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 
Own funds 25.0 35.2 34.5 44.0 36.9 37.8 34.4 33.9 40.3 41.8 
Note: 439 firms in sample after deletion of 330 firms for accounting inconsistency. 
Source: Sample data drawn from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 800 Firm Database. 
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Table 2.5 Sources of Annual Investment Funds, 1990 to 1994 
(percentage shares) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total (million yuan) 3,143 3,466 5,006 4,493 
Fiscal grants 9.0 4.0 1.7 2.0 
Domestic loans 37.6 38.6 54.0 46.8 
Bonds 0.2 0.3 1.0 2.1 
Foreign funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Own funds 53.2 57.1 43.3 49.1 
Notes: Data from CASS 800 Firm Database. Sample is not identical to that for years 1980 to 1989. 
657 firms in sample after deletion of 95 firms for accounting inconsistency. 
1994 
4,583 
1.7 
37.3 
1.8 
4.1 
55.1 
CASS' categorisation of funding sources does not precisely match that for the 1980-1989 survey data. 
For example, in 1990-1994, funds from equity issuance are included in firms' own funds. 
each province. These are fed back to the PBOC, which revises its plan and 
issues the final credit plan. In 1988 the coverage of the credit plan was 
extended to include NBFis. The cash plan seeks to regulate the growth of 
cash in circulation based on various measures of consumption activity. 
The transformation in SOE financing arrangements towards a predominantly 
bank-oriented system is chronicled in Tables 2.3a and 2.3b. These show the 
proportions of investment funds raised from various sources for a sample of 
state enterprises from 1980 to 1994. The importance of funding from 
budgetary grants declined steadily over this time, from 69 .3 per cent in 1980 
to only 1.7 per cent in 1994. By the 1990s, over ninety per cent of 
investment funds were sourced from domestic loans and enterprises' own 
funds (from retained earnings, depreciation and n1aintenance funds, etc.). 
While the transformation of SOE capital financing arrangements from a 
regime based on budgetary allocation to one based on bank finance had 
basically occurred by the mid-1990s, capital sector reform was far from an 
unqualified success. This was essentially because bank credit continued to 
be allocated on a 'soft' rather than a commercial basis. As a result the 
ultimate financial reform objective raising allocative efficiency, appears not 
to have been realised. There are several grounds on which the allocation of 
credit could be described as soft. 
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First, interest rates have continued to be set by the PBOC in the manner of 
central plan prices, at levels below the rates that would have cleared the 
market for loanable funds. As Hay et al. (1994) explain, '[interest-charging] 
mechanisms have generally proved to be ineffective [in restraining 
investment], because the benefits which decision-makers at all levels can 
extract from investments substantially exceed the financing costs'. As a 
result, the investment drive behaviour described by Kornai as characteristic 
of a command economy, has not been overcome; firms' demand for 
investment funds has consistently exceeded supply. As must inevitably 
occur under such a situation, credit therefore has effectively had to be 
rationed among borrowers, and there is no evidence to suggest that the 
rationing methods used were able to identify and prioritise those projects 
with the highest potential returns. The existence of substantial unmet 
demand for funds for potentially profitable projects is attested to by the 
emergence of various unauthorised banks that were able to charge interest 
rates well in excess of rates charged in the official system (Lardy 1988: 
126). 
Second, policy considerations played a considerable role in the allocation of 
bank credit. 'Policy loans' (zhengce daikuan) is the term used to describe 
loans extended by banks on the direction of central and local government 
authorities rather than on the basis of straight commercial considerations. 
Some policy lending took the form of 'relending' of funds lent by the PBOC 
to state banks for projects specified by the State Planning Commission. 
Lardy (1998) estimates that fully one-third of all state bank loans in 1993 
were of this category. Even this estimate excludes loans advanced under the 
advice of local government officials. Lou (1993) reported overall estimates 
of policy lending by the four specialised state banks at the end of 1991 as 67 
per cent for the Bank of China, 51.2 per cent for the Agricultural Bank, 58 
per cent for the Construction bank, and 25 per cent for the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank. It may even be asserted that in the artificially low interest 
rate environment, all lending is policy lending. One of the consequences of 
the heavy hand of policy in lending matters was that SOEs received the vast 
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majority of allocated credit despite the dynamic growth performance 
exhibited by the non-state sector. Another noted trend was that the workings 
of the credit quota system effectively redistributed credit from the fastest-
growing regions of China, to some of the slowest-growing regions where 
industry was dominated by state ownership (Lardy 1998: 86-87). 
Third, state banks did not play the disciplinary role on non-performing 
borrowers that banks exercise in market economies. It has already been 
noted that China's Bankruptcy Law, enacted in 1986, was rarely applied. 
When this law was applied, it was at the direction of central and local 
government officials, not the lending banks. When borrowing firms fell 
behind in interest payments, typical bank behaviour was to extend additional 
loans to those firms. Moreover, the accounting treatment of such loan 
rollovers or extensions was highly questionable. The interest due would be 
regarded as having been collected out of the new loans disbursed, and 
recorded as income for the bank. A loan would not be classified as non-
performing at least until the borrower failed to make a principal payment 
(Lardy 1998: Chapter 3). The lax enforcement of credit obligations lowers 
even further the effective interest rate on investment finance for SOEs. Poor 
enforcement of credit also meant that firms retained their investment drive 
behaviour and were unresponsive to variations in interest rates. Fan and 
Woo (1996: 216) quote responses from a 1984-1989 survey of 300 SOEs 
indicating that 85 per cent of firms would not adjust their investment 
spending in the face of a 5 per cent rise in interest rates and 65 per cent 
would not react to a 10 per cent rise. 
The inefficiency of the prevalent methods of credit allocation was further 
exacerbated during periods of monetary tightening, such as in 1985 and 
1988. On those occasions when tightening was necessary to slow the 
economy, the relatively crude quantitative system based on the credit plan 
performed relatively poorly in rationing the reduced pool of funds in favour 
of the most productive uses. Blanket tightening led to partially completed 
projects being suspended in large numbers, without regard to the individual 
merit of projects (Hay 1994: 11-13). By contrast, under an interest rate 
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based system firms could potentially pay an interest premium in order to 
continue projects with high marginal values of completion. 
2.6 Labour 
As outlined in Section 2.1, the pre-reform labour system suffered from two 
main defects; (1) a very poor motivational level of the labour force, due to 
an almost complete lack of positive incentives for effort and of sanctions 
against shirking and counterproductive behaviour; and (2) an extreme degree 
of immobility and inflexibility, which gave rise to considerable allocative 
inefficiencies and compounded the problem of poor motivation. Although 
reforms carried out in the domain of labour sought to address both these 
defects, such reforms faced the significant obstacle of socialist ideology, 
which held that workers were the true owners of enterprises and could not 
be dismissed. Genuine progress was therefore slow. 
Remuneration and worker incentives 
The formal remuneration of SOE employees consists of three main 
components; basic wages, incentive wages (incorporating bonuses, piece 
rates and sundry allowances) and access to various welfare services directly 
from the work unit.4 Basic wages continued initially to be subject to a 
considerable degree of control from the central and local authorities. Bonus 
payments were reintroduced early in the reform period and were intended as 
a primary instrument to improve incentive and the correlation between 
remuneration and productivity, but the effectiveness of bonus payments in 
this regard was blunted by the egalitarian bonus-setting procedures of most 
firms. The 'floating wage' system introduced from the mid-1980s took a 
variety of forms and linked both basic wages and bonuses to firm financial 
performance. Many welfare services, including housing, education, health 
and retirement pensions continued well into the 1990s to be provided 
predominantly by the work unit rather than by government agencies and 
represented a considerable fraction of employees' real income. By the mid-
1990s this was still true of most social services, although de-linking reforms 
had commenced, starting with retirement and unemployment insurance. 
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Some writers have pointed to these non-monetary social services as a 
particular area in which a rational relationship between productivity and 
remuneration was not successfully established (Walder 1989, Meng and 
Perkins 1999). 
The setting of basic wages essentially followed the system that was 
established in 1956, and the changes that have occurred during the reform 
period can be seen as adjustments to this system rather than replacements of 
it. In its original form, the basic wage comprised standard wage scales plus 
wage allowances that allowed for inflation and introduced differentials 
across industries and regions. Both central and regional government 
agencies had an influence on the setting of rates. In addition to facing 
controls at the level of wage rates, firms faced the additional constraint that 
the total wage bill must not exceed the plan quota approved by the local 
labour bureau. Each local labour bureau in turn was obliged to allocate firm-
level plan quotas to firms out of its allocation from the total plan quota of 
the wage bill set by the Central Labour Bureau. The setting of each firm's 
plan quota was effectively negotiated between the firm and the local labour 
bureau. A prime motive of the government in administering this system was 
to regulate the strength of consumption spending (Hay et al. 1994 ). 
The first and perhaps most significant change to the wage system came from 
the reintroduction of bonuses. Despite being commonplace in other centrally 
planned economies, bonuses and piece-rates had been abolished in 1966 
during the ideological fervour of the Cultural Revolution. Reintroduction of 
bonus systems commenced in 1978 and they had again become almost 
universal by 1979 (Byrd 1992: 9). Bythe mid to late 1980s the standard 
upper limit for total bonus payments was the equivalent of four months' 
basic wages, or one-third of the total wage bill. If bonus payments exceeded 
this level, the exceeding portion was taxable at increasing rates; 30 per cent 
up to five months, 100 per cent up to six months, and 300 per cent for 
payments exceeding six months' basic wages. This constraint applied 
officially only at the aggregate level - firms were permitted to-distribute 
bonuses among employees in discriminating fashion so as to reward good 
51 
performance. However, it became the usual practice to pay the maximum 
permissible amount of total bonuses and to distribute them individually on 
an equal basis regardless of performance. Hay et al. ( 1994) referred to 'the 
strong egalitarian tradition in the state-owned sector, leading to payment of 
the same absolute level of bonus to all participants in the exercise' (p. 156). 
Naughton ( 1995: 105) argues that two factors limited the usefulness of 
bonuses. First, under soft budget constraints firms had no incentive to 
constrain bonuses, and the ref ore would seek to set them at the highest level 
possible, even exceeding the official ceilings where regulatory enforcement 
was weak. Second, once bonuses were at the upper limit, workers could see 
that genuinely competing with each other for portions of the bonus pool was 
a zero-sum game; the workers collectively could be no better off in financial 
terms but would have to expend greater effort. They therefore would collude 
and pressure management to follow an egalitarian bonus policy. Such 
pressure was usually effective in the early reform years due to the permanent 
employment system; management was highly vulnerable to the possibility of 
disruption campaigns by workers who could not be dismissed. This 
vulnerability seems to have decreased through the 1990s as the position of 
managers strengthened. Although bonuses were meant in theory to be paid 
out of retained profits, in practice even loss-making firms tended to pay full 
bonuses. Walder (1989) noted that 'even enterprises whose profit figures 
fall, or that run a temporary financial deficit are still entitled to four months ' 
wage bonus if the losses are due to "objective factors" like price changes, 
rises in material costs, and changes in exchange rates or overseas markets'. 
Another type of incentive wage was piece rates, which were used to 
considerable effect in some manufacturing industries and by foreign-
invested firms. The feasibility of using a piece rate system depends on the 
technological characteristics of the workplace, in that management must be 
able to gauge the output of each individual worker objectively. In a non-
academic publication, Purves ( 1991) describes the effectiveness of piece 
rates in raising both productivity and worker incomes in a foreign joint-
venture cast iron foundry that had only recently been converted fr-om full 
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state ownership. In this firm in which Purves himself served as General 
Manager, the majority of workers were paid by the piece, with exceptions 
for some types of workers such as clerical staff. Purves reports that even the 
most recalcitrant employees in the foundry could be effectively managed by 
transferring them to the most arduous furnace jobs that attracted the highest 
piece rates. Tellingly, workers typically preferred non-piece rate positions 
where they could earn similar average incomes to piece rate positions 
without their output being so closely monitored. 
In the reform period, a significant proportion of SOE employees' real 
incomes continued to be provided in the form of in-kind benefits and social 
services. These included housing provided by the enterprise, health and 
education services, old age pensions, collective dining facilities and 
recreational facilities. In some of these categories, firms were officially 
obliged to meet certain objective service standards. For instance, Purves 
( 1991) reports having to meet a housing standard of 10 square metres of 
accommodation per employee. 5 At the outset of the -reform period, and in the 
wake of the economic disruption of the Cultural Revolution, housing and 
other social services appear to have been in serious under-supply. As a 
result, the early reform years saw a boom in housing investment. Annual 
urban housing construction had averaged only 30 million square metres 
before 1978, but by 1981 had risen to 100 million square metres, and 
remained at that level through the 1980s (Fixed Investment l 950~ 1985, 
reported by Naughton 1995: 103). Of this expenditure, 60 per cent was 
financed from enterprise retained funds (Economic 1982: V-42, reported by 
Naughton 1995). Some writers such as Lin et al. (1996) have described the 
welfare obligations of SO Es as 'policy burdens' that have made it difficult 
for them to compete on an equal basis with the non-state sector. However, 
an alternative view is that SOEs exploited soft budget constraints and the 
looseness of official controls to aggressively expand welfare spending for 
their employees, to an extent beyond what was required under official 
service standards (Walder 1989, Meng and Perkins 1999). One category of 
social services that indisputably did create an increasing burden for many 
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enterprises was that of aged pensions. With a retirement age set at 55 and a 
rapidly aging population, the requirement upon firms to provide pensions 
worth 60 per cent of full-time wages created a growing and unavoidable 
impost. The number of retirees supported by state-owned urban) economic 
units ballooned from 6.38 million in 1980 to 24.01 million in 1995 and 
27 .83 million in 1998. The ratio of actively employed to retired workers in 
the urban sector as a whole (including collectives etc.) fell from 12.8 to 4.8 
and 4.0 in the same period (China Labour Statistics Yearbook 1999: page 
541). Indeed in some firms, the point was reached where the total bill for 
retirement pensions was higher than the total wage cost of active workers. 
While social security funds had been established to cope with the expanding 
retiree population, since the system was based on pooling firm contributions 
at the city level, the effect would have been merely to spread pension costs 
evenly over all SOEs in each city. 
Until 1984 despite the reintroduction of bonuses, basic wages continued to 
be set in the traditional manner. Around 1985 the system started to gradually 
loosen as enterprises were permitted to experiment with different formulae 
for what were variously called 'floating wages', 'efficiency wages' or the 
'internal wage system'. The essence of the floating wage reform was to link 
the total wage bill (incorporating bonuses as well as base wages) of the 
enterprise to some measure of firm performance. The most common 
measure was total .remitted profit and tax, but other measures were allowed, 
such as profit ( or losses in the case of firms operating under 'planned 
losses'), output, or sales revenue. The elasticity of the permitted wage bill 
with respect to the productivity indicator was typically around 0.7 
(Naughton 1995: 208). The floating wage system brought with it the right to 
determine the distribution of wages within the enterprise, a move to alter the 
excessively flat official wage scales. Official wage scales continued to be set 
as before but were of less relevance as firms moved to the new system. 
However as Meng and Kidd ( 1997) show, wage-setting behaviors adjusted 
only slowly and continued to emphasise worker endowment factors such as 
seniority and formal education qualifications more than individual work 
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achievement. Because of the way it operated, the floating wage system 
influenced bonus payments and profit retention as well as basic wages. For 
example, some firms reclassified their bonus payments as wages so that they 
could be accounted for as costs and reduce the firm's taxable profits, rather 
than draw bonus funds from retained profits. 
With the numerous variations of the floating wage system operating and 
given the vagaries of accounting practices used in China, enterprises were 
increasingly able to frustrate strict control by official agencies. It is most 
unlikely for example that all firms reduced their wage bills as required in 
years when their profits declined. Naughton ( 1995: 209) notes that officials 
intervened extensively in 1988 seeking to adjust for the effects of high 
inflation in that year, but while such efforts had little net effect on wage 
increases, the integrity of the system was compromised by a proliferation of 
bargaining activity between firms and officials. Kornai ( 1990: 143 and 145) 
criticises China's administration of SOE wage bills so severely as to imply 
that no controls even existed.6 Walder (1989) argues that the true objectives 
of SOE managers were ( 1) to maximise retained profit and (2) to distribute it 
without restraint to workers, by illegal means if necessary. If we accept this 
characterisation, it follows that managers would seek to implement the 
floating wage system in such a way as to maximise wage growth. Thus, 
while wage system reforms were positive in the sense of improving 
incentives, like other reforms they came at a cost in terms of officials' 
capacity to monitor and control firm activity. The result, according to a 
number of economists, was widespread overcompensation of SOE 
employees beyond what was justified by productivity growth. The issue of 
overcompensation is debated in Chapter 3 and comprises the core focus for 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
Labour force flexibility 
At the outset of the reform period, authorities set the employment levels of 
SOEs in analogous fashion to wages. The Central Labour Bureau would set 
the overall employment level for the state-owned sector, and allocate it 
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among the labour bureaus at lower levels, which would in turn allocate their 
employment quotas among the SOEs under their purview. As with profit 
retention and tax rates, there was scope for some bargaining between firms 
and local bureaus over quotas, within the constraints that the bureaus 
themselves faced. The employees assigned under the traditional system were 
permanent. They could not be dismissed except for serious misconduct. The 
officially sanctioned practice of occupational inheritance (dingti) whereby a 
retiring worker could nominate a close relative as a replacement, was a 
further source of inflexibility and over-manning (Korzec 1992). The 
inflexibility of the traditional employment system created costs for both 
individual employees and for firms. Individuals had no say in the firms and 
jobs to which they were allocated and found it very difficult to quit or be 
transferred to more satisfying work, leading to considerable demotivation. 
Firms could not easily dismiss or otherwise deal with unsuitable or non-
performing employees, nor reduce their labour costs if overstaffed. 
The principal reform measure that sought to address the problem of 
inflexibility was the introduction of individual contracts between employees 
and firms. The term 'contract employment' actually refers to a number of 
different arrangements in China, and it is appropriate here to clarify the 
terms we will use for various categories of industrial workers in order to 
avoid confusion. Korzec ( 1992: 30) distinguishes the categories as follows: 
1. Permanent employees (guding zhigong) 
This group predominated SOEs and urban collectives in the pre-reform 
period and well into the 1990s. Recruitment, assignment, transfer and 
dismissal were subject to the approval -of the relevant state labour personnel 
departments under the state labour control plan. In the reform period, the 
regulations governing inter-firm transfer were loosened. 
2. Contract Workers (hetong zhigong) 
This term was used in the pre-reform system to refer to urban workers 
assigned under temporary contracts while awaiting job allocation on a 
permanent basis. The renewal of contracts was virtually automatic and there 
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was virtually no difference in treatment between these workers and 
permanent employees. The term now refers to workers employed under the 
new style of fixed-term contracts. Two key differences between the new-
style contract workers and permanent employees are the explicit lack of any 
commitment to renew contracts, and the contract workers' entitlement to 
unemployment insurance. Official urban resident status is a mandatory 
requirement for appointment to an SOE as a contract worker, as it is for a 
permanent employee. 
Terms such as 'real', 'regular' or 'official' workers are used to refer to both 
permanent employees and old- and new-style contract workers. The term 
'temporary workers' ('casual workers' would also be accurate) is used to 
refer to the following three categories. 
3. Seasonal Workers (jijie gong) 
These are workers employed during seasonal peaks in food agricultural 
product processing industries. They may be either rural or urban residents. 
4. Peasant Workers (yi gong yi nong) 
This term is applied to four different groups: 
(a) Rural residents working in township and village enterprises. 
(b) Rural residents employed by county-run enterprises or enterprises leased 
to peasant collectives. 
( c) Peasants employed directly by SO Es, typically for harsh or dangerous 
work unpopular among regular SOE employees. 
(d) Other temporary rural workers, such as individuals or members of rural 
collectives to whom SOEs increasingly sub-contract production work. 
(Such contracting had previously been illegal.) 
5. Workers Contracted from the Countryside (nongcun xieyi gong) 
Contracts of this kind, most common in the mining sector but increasingly 
prevalent elsewhere, were concluded between enterprises and rural 
communities. At the expiry of an individual worker's term another worker 
from the same community would replace him. 
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To illustrate the possible confusion over taxonomy, state publications 
sometimes use the term 'contract system employees' to refer to employees 
under category 2 above, and 'contract employees' to ref er to most workers in 
categories 3, 4 and 5. In this thesis I will consistently use the following 
terms: 
permanent employees ( or workers) to ref er to category 1; 
contract ( or contracted) workers to refer to category 2; 
regular workers to refer to categories 1 and 2 collectively; 
casual workers to refer to SOE employees from categories 3, 4 and 5; 
rural migrant workers to specify casual workers who have rural 
residency; 
regular contracts and casual contracts to distinguish the contracts of 
regular workers and casual workers. 
The terms 'workers' and 'employees' are used interchangeably. As the 
subject of the thesis is SOE reform, the context is usually confined to that of 
SOE employees. 
The employment by SOEs of rural migrant workers pre-dated the reform 
period and as such does not reflect a revolutionary policy reform, with the 
exception of sub-contracting (part of category 4(d)) which opened up a new 
avenue for access to the rural workforce. In the pre-reform period, control 
over rural-urban migration was maintained via the household registration 
(hukou) system, the commune system and food rationing. Although the latter 
two of these mechanisms ceased to function in the reform period, the 
household registration system remains in place. It effectively creates an 
official caste system whereby the opportunities of rural residents within . the 
urban economy are restricted. The barriers thus maintained are not totally 
impermeable however, and urban economic growth since 1978 (especially in 
the non-state sector) has led to greatly expanded rural migration. The 
number of rural migrant workers in the nation's cities at any ·one time was 
estimated at 39 million in 1993 (RDI, CASS, 1994), which figure includes a 
substantial illegal component. These workers appear to be discriminated 
against not only by official policy but also by those SOEs that en1ploy them; 
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they tend to be engaged for those jobs that urban residents do not desire and 
are remunerated differently. Knight et al. (1999) find that whereas 
permanent SOE employees are paid wages in excess of their marginal 
product, rural migrants are paid less than their marginal product ( this paper 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). It appears therefore that SOEs tend 
to treat their rural and urban workers more as complements than as 
substitutes. As part of the analysis of Chapter 4 we consider an Insider-
Outsider framework to represent this situation. 
From the viewpoint of SOEs, the change from pre-reform to the reform 
period labour market arrangements essentially meant that the broad types of 
available labour had expanded from two (permanent employees and rural 
migrant workers) to three (to include urban-resident contract workers, in the 
new sense). The old-style contract employees can be effectively classed as 
permanent employees. 
The introduction of regular contracts for urban workers commenced in the 
familiar experimental fashion in 1983. Those workers who were permanent 
employees at the time of the introduction of contracts were retained on the 
existing basis, so that the contract system applied only to newly hired 
workers. 1986 marked a cluster of initiatives directed at labour flexibility. 
From 1 October of that year firms were required to hire all new employees 
on a contract basis, the standard term being five years, although the 
regulations did not explicitly rule out the upgrading of contracted workers to 
permanent status (Korzec 1992: 29). In conjunction, firms acquired the right 
of open recruitment~ labour would no longer be administratively allocated 
but firms could choose new hires freely within the overall constraints of 
their hiring quotas. Occupational inheritance (dingti) began to be phased out 
at this time~ the regulations permitting it were not repealed but authorities 
expressed consistent disapproval of dingti arrangements that went beyond 
what the regulations permitted. Such efforts had reduced the phenomenon 
substantially by 1989 according to Korzec (1992: 25). Social security and 
unemployment funds were established, funded by enterprise and employee 
contributions and administered at the city level. These funds were mainly 
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intended for the protection of contract workers given that permanent 
workers were only expected to be made redundant in cases of firm 
bankruptcy, which would remain rare. 
The labour contract reform was clearly implemented on a gradualist basis. 
As of 1995, 39 per cent of SOE employees were on contracts (Meng 2000) 
and contracted employees were not expected to constitute the majority until 
the tum of the century. 7 However, Naughton (1995: 211) notes that a 
number of firms did succeed in fully contractualising their work forces. 
While permanent employment would continue to characterise most of the 
SOE labour force for well over a decade, the existence of a significant 
contracted component at least gave firms the option of adjusting their labour 
forces at the margin. 
The administrative measures introduced in 1986 were reinforced by a policy 
campaign beginning in 1988 to reduce, retrain and reallocate redundant 
labour, an initiative that was referred to as the 'reoptimisation' of the labour 
force. Almost no workers were actually dismissed in this process, the more 
common practice being to 'stand-down' (xiagang) employees identified as 
surplus. Such workers would be placed on reduced wages and retain access 
to enterprise social services. Naughton (1995) reports that firms engaged in 
'reoptimisation' covered 20 per cent of SOE employees in 1988 and 27 per 
cent in 1989. The majority of affected workers were re-employed elsewhere 
in the state sector. This particular reform drive, like a number of others, was 
suspended during the post-Tiananmen period of conservative ascendancy 
around 1990, as state policy and press organs again stressed the maintenance 
of the 'iron rice bowl'. However, the -drive resumed from 1991, in which 
year 980,000 workers were made redundant and 880,000 of these 
reassigned, and similar numbers were recorded in 1992. Naughton ( 1995: 
297) adds that 'large numbers' of workers were simply laid off in 1992 and 
1993 but that little information on this was forthcoming from the official 
press. Korzec cites the early 1990s (the time of this second reoptimisation 
drive) as marking the first time that workers could be dismissed outright on 
the .grounds of cost-cutting. 
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In quantifiable terms, the introduction of contracts had only a modest impact 
on employment flexibility in the first decade-plus of reform, as firms tended 
to treat contracted employees as if they were permanent employees. 
Turnover rates increased, but only slowly. Only 1.3 per cent of 99.8 million 
regular SOE workers left their jobs in 1988 (China Labour and Wage 
Statistics Yearbook 1989). Meng (2000: Chapter 6) describes SOE 
management in those years as being in fact reluctant to exercise their what 
formal rights they had in regard to dismissal. One of the sets of regulations 
issued in 1986 listed the following grounds for which firms could dismiss 
workers under the labour contract system (sourced from Korzec 1992: 40): 
1. Seriously violating labour discipline, disturbing production and 
interfering with work order; 
2. Violating operating regulations, destroying or damaging equipment, 
tools, wasting raw and semi ..:finished materials or energy resources, 
causing economic losses; 
3. Giving poor service, constantly quarreling with customers or harming 
the consumers' interests; 
4. Not obeying normal instructions; 
5. Taking bribes, stealing, gambling, practising graft in a way not 
warranting criminal charges; 
6. Stirring up trouble for no reason, fighting, thereby disrupting public 
order; 
7. Committing other grave errors. 
The salient feature of this list is that it omits the possibility of dismissing 
staff on the grounds of overstaffing; managers did not acquire this 
prerogative until around 1991. Korzec argues that the above list is in fact 
indistinguishable from a 1982 set of regulations and that it differs from the 
rules in force from 1957 only by the reference to customer service. 
Naughton's (1995) reading however is that the new regulations permitted 
dismissal for more minor offences than had been the case in the past. Firn1s 
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did acquire the option of reducing excess labour through the non-renewal of 
contracts. D.Chen (1995: 125) relates an interview in 1991 with the 
management of an SOE who had determined a policy of reducing their 
workforce numbers, but were forced to resort mainly to the non-replacement 
of retirees as it was 'still difficult to dismiss people'. 
In immediately effective terms then, only limited progress was made in 
terms of increasing labour flexibility up to the mid-1990s, especially in 
comparison with most other aspects of reform. The prime reason for slow 
progress was official sensitivity to unemployment. This sensitivity was 
reinforced by the initial institutional arrangements whereby the social 
security and welfare system was organised at the level of the work unit, and 
to a large extent progress in increasing flexibility was required to follow 
progress in building a new social infrastructure. The gradualist approach to 
expanding the contract system created long lags until the coverage of 
contract arrangements was sufficient to enable increased labour turnover. 
The lag that was required to effect cultural change in favour of flexible 
labour market practices also appears to have been considerable, as evidenced 
by the noted reluctance of managers to exercise their formal powers over 
employees. The sensitivity to unemployment concerns and the related threat 
to social instability reached its peak in the post-Tiananmen period of policy 
conservatism. So great were the apparent political and cultural obstacles to 
reform at this point that in 1992 Korzec, while focusing on labour issues, 
was writing of the 'failure of reform'. Nevertheless, .the measures introduced 
in the 1980s created at least some initial momentum and laid the foundation 
for more substantial progress from the mid-1990s, by which time a more 
favourable environment for meaningful labour reform existed. 
The limited progress on labour flexibility is likely to have enhanced the 
potential for overcompensation of SOE employees in two respects. First, it 
was difficult for firms plagued by overstaffing to reduce their labour forces 
to levels in accord with the demand for their output. The boundary between 
overstaffing and overcompensation is a blurry one; when measured at the 
firm level the two phenomena can be indistinguishable. Second, by 
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depriving managers of effective sanctions ('negative incentives') to 
discipline unproductive employees, the existing arrangements may have 
forced managers to rely on pay increases even more as a tool to manage 
employee behaviour. 
2.7 Competition with the non-state sector 
On the eve of reform, as noted in Chapter 1, the only other significant 
ownership type of firm that existed in Chinese industry besides SOEs was 
the collective sector, including both urban and rural collectively owned 
firms (COEs). Within a few short years however, while existing COEs grew 
rapidly and were joined by new COE entrants, foreign-invested and 
privately-owned firms also established themselves in significant numbers. 
Whereas state-owned firms are nominally the property of the entire Chinese 
people, COEs are established and owned by the local government authority 
in their local domains. Where the local authority is a rural township or 
village, these enterprises are also known as Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs). COE profits are shared between the relevant local 
government and their own employees. While the casual observer may argue 
that such firms merely constitute another type of state-owned firm, their 
economic characteristics are crucially different in that COEs do not enjoy 
the soft budget constraints of true SOEs. Being established only under the 
authority of local and not the central government, they can only be 
subsidised to the extent of the limited financial resources of the local 
authority (including its local credit cooperative). Moreover, the smaller the 
local government district, the more limited are its resources and the more 
'hard-budget' are the conditions faced by the firm. In rural areas, it is not 
unusual for a single COE to serve as the main source of tax revenue for a 
township or village. Unlike SOEs, COEs do not enjoy the ultimate support 
of the central fiscal, taxation and monetary authorities. As such, it has 
always been the case that COEs can be and frequently are sent into 
bankruptcy. Woo (1994) notes that in the recession of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the number of industrial TVEs fell from 7. 7 million to 7 .2 
63 
million from 1988 to 1990, while the number of industrial SOEs increased 
from 99,000 to 104,000. 
Rural CO Es, especially the township and village enterprises (TVEs) enjoyed 
rapid growth from the beginning of the reform period. TVEs tend to be 
active in the light industrial sectors, for instance in processing the 
agricultural products of their own local areas. Therefore the early reforms 
created ample profitable opportunities for them as price reform shifted the 
terms of trade in favour of agriculture and light industry. Capital flowed into 
the sector via both increased profits and the savings of peasants recycled 
through the rural credit cooperatives. In addition, COEs were able to tap the 
new markets created by the reforms in the SOE sector, by supplying non-
plan inputs to SOEs. The corporate governance mechanisms of COEs were 
many and varied; some, known as 'red hat' firms, found it convenient to be 
officially designated as COEs while being managed in practice as private 
firms. A common practice is the leasing out of management rights over 
COEs to private individuals. Woo (1994: 301) observes that efforts in 
Jiangsu province to run TVEs along tight lines of control in accordance with 
traditional socialist principles ('the Jiangsu Model') led to poor financial 
results and pseudo-privatisation by 1992. 
Foreign-invested enterprises (FlEs) started entering the Chinese market in 
1979. Aware of the extent to which it had slipped behind the market 
economies, the Chinese government encouraged FlEs in order to attract 
western technology and additional capital into its industrial sector. Specific 
legislation was passed to provide a legal framework for the operation of 
FlEs. The first of these was the Equity Joint Venture Law enacted in August 
1979. This established Chinese-foreign joint ventures as limited liability 
legal entities, set down rules for equity contribution, permitted the overseas 
remittance of profits and foreign employees' earnings, and included 
provisions tax exemption on the first two or three years of profitable 
operation. The Foreign Capital Enterprise Law enacted in April 1986 made 
provision for wholly foreign funded enterprises, aiming in patticular to 
attract large investments from major multinational firms. As with the Equity 
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Joint Venture Law, firms were encouraged to employ advanced technology 
and to predominantly serve the export market. The Chinese-Foreign 
Cooperative Joint-Venture Law was enacted in April 1988 (although 
approvals were already being issued pursuant to it in the previous year) and 
contained more flexible provisions regarding such matters as capital 
contributions, profit distribution. Joint venture FIEs dominated the scene in 
the early years as foreign managers relied on local partners to navigate the 
Chinese business and legal environment, but wholly-owned FIEs became 
more commonplace over time as confidence in that environment grew. 
Throughout the reform period, the bulk of investment into China has come 
from Overseas Chinese sources, although an unknown proportion of this is 
thought to consist of 'round-tripping'; Chinese capital re-entering in foreign 
guise. Particularly to attract investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, 
four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in 1980 in 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces in the southeast. This experiment was later 
expanded to other regions and 'open cities'. China's efforts to attract foreign 
investment were highly successful; the country became the developing 
world's leading recipient of FDI, and the second largest recipient in the 
world after the United States. FIEs played a particularly important role in the 
internationally traded sector, carrying out 39.1 per cent of China's total trade 
in 1995. As such their competitive impact on the SOE sector would have 
been primarily felt by firms that were significant exporters. 
Private enterprises, after being suppressed during the pre-reform period, 
grew rapidly from 1978. This is despite an economic environment that was 
designed to be conducive to state sector dominance. Private firms faced and 
still face significant discrimination in areas such as local government 
taxation, access to finance particularly from the state banks, and access to 
government resources. However, the importance and further growth 
potential of the private sector began to be seriously recognized by the 
authorities during the late 1990s. The 1999 sessions of the National People's 
Congress gave substance to this, providing a legal basis for private 
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enterprise and allowing individual enterprises to remove their 'red hats' 
(Garnaut et al. 2001). 
2.8 Some unintended consequences: the behavioural issue 
and the compensation issue 
The way in which reform proceeded appears to have had important 
unintended consequences in terms of the behaviour exhibited by state firms. 
Prior to the economic reforms, the operational objectives of SOEs could 
have been defined as 'to achieve or exceed the output quotas specified by 
the central plan, subject to the various directions of state authorities'. Profit 
was not an objective of primary concern to firm management; profitability 
was essentially predetermined by official prices and quotas and thus outside 
the firm's control. At a formal level, the reforms established profit as the 
official objective of SOEs, or at least as the dominant element in a 'basket' 
of different objectives. By instituting profit retention and employee bonuses, 
the authorities had sought to make profitability compatible with the self-
interest of firm managers and employees. However, the extent to which such 
compatibility was achieved is questionable. A number of scholars have put 
forward the hypothesis that SOEs sought in practice to maximise the income 
and benefits of their own managers and employees, even at the expense of 
profitability and to the extent of falsifying their accounts to convert profits 
into extra wages and benefits. I shall refer to the debate over this hypothesis 
as the 'behavioural issue'. It is intimately related to the 'compensation 
issue', which raises the empirical question as to whether SOEs have paid the 
workforces more than is merited by their productivity. I regard these two 
issues are separable because, depending on institutional arrangements in an 
economy, it is possible for one of them to operate without the other. For 
example, in China under central planning, some .managers may have pursued 
employee income maximization, but wage and other controls were so tight 
that in fact workers were massively under-compensated across the SOE 
sector. As such, the 'behavioural issue' would have been operative but not 
the 'compensation issue'. Alternatively, in some economies, because of 
strong trade unions, workers may be over-compensated even though their 
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managers may in fact be pursuing profit maximization. In such situations, 
the 'compensation issue' would be operative but not the 'behavioural issue'. 
It is likely that SOE managers, even in the pre-reform era, had always sought 
to advantage their own employees and their families wherever possible. In 
economics it is fundamental to assume that individuals and groups of people 
seek to maximise their own income and utility. But SOE managers are the 
agents of the state; they are charged with maximising the utility of an entity 
other than themselves. Without effective monitoring and control of their 
activities, they may be free to pursue other objectives; a classic principal-
agent problem. A number of other factors may have intensified the tendency 
to maximise employee benefits, some of them longstanding, others being 
products of the reform period. We noted in Section 2.6 Walder' s observation 
that workers exercised disproportionate implicit industrial power relative to 
their managers. This power would have been reinforced by the socialist 
concept of workers as the ultimate owners and intended beneficiaries of 
state enterprises, a concept that was by then entrenched by thirty years of 
official publicity. The drive to maximise family benefits was also reinforced 
by the strong family emphasis of Chinese culture. The materialist instinct of 
traditional China, after being suppressed in the militant pre-reform years, re-
emerged with official sanction as exemplified in reform-era slogans such as 
'to become rich is glorious'. Finally, the growth and success of non-state 
enterprises, particularly foreign-invested enterprises that tended to pay 
higher wages than SOEs, is likely to have created an 'envy effect' raising the 
material aspirations of SOE employees. 
Under the old centrally planned system, by controlling virtually all inputs 
and outputs and their prices on both the buying and the selling side, the state 
employed strong, redundant and overlapping controls to minimise the scope 
for profit-shifting behaviour. As a result of the various reforms of the 1980s 
such state controls broke down. Moreover, effective market-based controls 
such as bankruptcy mechanisms were not immediately available to replace 
them; the persistence of soft budget constraints nullified the disciplines that 
ensure profit-maximising behaviour in market economies. In the absence of 
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either effective state control mechanisms or effective market control 
mechanisms, the scope for diverting resources from the state's purposes may 
have expanded considerably. 
While the state nominally retained a variety of controls over SOE activity 
through the reform process, its capacity to implement these controls suffered 
from a dwindling capacity to accurately observe firm activity and 
performance; the state cannot control what it cannot clearly observe. In the 
pre-reform period, most transactions could be easily observed-by state 
agencies, since they were carried out by state-owned entities at each end and 
were required to conform to the central plan. The introduction of above-plan 
or non-plan production created scope for transactions under the initiative of 
SOEs themselves, often with non-state suppliers or customers at the other 
end. Price reform, and especially the dual-track phase of price reform, 
created confusion as to what prices actually prevailed. SOEs could 
potentially exploit this confusion by transacting at one price and recording 
another price in the accounts. If the true prices of inputs and outputs could 
be masked, true profits would be masked as well. The determination of 
taxes, interest payments, wages and bonuses all came to be influenced by if 
not based upon some form of firm-level bargaining, and all such bargaining 
processes hinged in some way on the perceived profitability of the firm. 
Moreover, the plethora of bargain-based formulae made the state's 
monitoring task far more complicated than had been the case in the past. 
Accounting standards were still based upon planned-economy practices, and 
were not thoroughly standardised or modem. 8 State banks, although now 
supplying the bulk of external capital, played no real role in the monitoring 
of enterprise activity. 
Specific state controls over employee wages and benefits essentially 
concentrated on cash wages and bonuses. Even in these areas wage-fixing 
formulae were subject to firm-level bargaining and were typically based 
upon some relationship with firm profits, which makes them problematic for 
reasons that we have just noted. Benefits outside of cash wages and bonuses, 
68 
such as welfare payments, the services from welfare facilities and informal 
distributions, would have been even more difficult to monitor. 
The breakdown of state monitoring and control would not have been an 
intractable problem if market mechanisms had been able to take their place. 
Even in a market economy various means both legitimate and illegitimate 
can be used to 'fungify' profit results, but a firm that consistently diverts 
profits to other uses ultimately finds that it cannot make payments for 
interest, dividends or taxes. In a 'hard-budget' environment, disciplining 
mechanisms are available such as bankruptcy or 'main bank reorganisation' 
(in Japan). But Chinese SOEs in the reform period continued to face soft 
· budgets, although the way in which the soft budget operated changed. As 
Section 2.5 shows, the extent of free state grants and explicit subsidies was 
cut back substantially (Komai' s Condition 3). Also, increasing product 
market competition reduced the capacity of firms to pass on price increases 
(Condition 3). But the progress made on these two counts was undone by 
'softening' in regard to Komai's Conditions 2 and 4; soft credit and soft 
taxes. 
A prime reason for the continuation of soft budgets was that the authorities 
found that profitability, as difficult as it was to report accurately, did not 
provide a full basis fort the objective comparison of individual firm 
performance. Some firms were net beneficiaries of plan prices and quotas 
whilst others were disadvantaged. Firms were burdened to varying degrees 
by surplus capital and labour that could not be disposed of. Comprehensive 
social welfare services had to be provided to employees, both active and 
retired, and their dependents. Some firms were disadvantaged by their 
geographical locations, away from attractive markets and sources of supply. 
Managers could take advantage of all these factors in their dealings with 
supervisory agencies and state banks to rationalise below-par profit 
performance, and to justify soft tax and credit treatment. Presumably, such 
rationalisations could be employed even where the true cause of poor 
performance lay elsewhere, such the conversion of potential profits into 
extra benefits for employees. 
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2.9 Summary: directions and progress of reform, 1978 to 
1994 
The SOE reforms that were begun in the early 1980s took the sector away 
from planned allocation of resources under state ownership and in the 
direction of competitive market allocation, still under state ownership. The 
philosophy of reform was gradualist, seeking to maintain existing economic 
institutions in place while new ones were constructed or experimented with. 
In general, faster progress was made in the reform of SOE output markets 
than in the reform of their input markets. By the mid-1990s, the majority of 
commodities were traded free of price controls, in markets where SOEs 
competed with each other, with domestic and foreign non-state firms, and 
with imports. On the other hand, the development of markets for financial 
capital and for labour was limited. While bank lending had supplanted fiscal 
grants as the main source of investment funds, lending decisions were not 
being made on a commercial basis, interest rate structures were 
discriminatory and did not reflect the social cost of funds. Although a 
contract system of labour recruitment had been introduced, employment in 
the SOE sector was still seen as essentially a lifelong tenure. The bonus 
system as it was introduced succeeded only weakly in relating employee 
compensation to firm performance, and in general did not serve to reward 
outstanding individual performance. The problem of soft budget constraints 
remained, with firms now being subsidised predominantly via soft bank 
credit rather than fiscal subsidies. Redundant labour and capital was not 
being removed from firms, and financially unviable firms were not being 
removed from the system. It would have been reasonable to expect that the 
net impact of this mixed package of reforms on productive efficiency would 
have been positive, but modestly so. Non-state firms, enjoying substantially 
free markets for both inputs and outputs ( except for discrimination in access 
to bank finance) might have been expected to show higher Total Factor 
Productivity growth than the SOE sector (Chapter 3 examines the evidence 
as to whether this was in fact the case). 
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The dynamics of the reform process appear to have given rise to some 
unintended consequences, two of which are of particular interest to this 
thesis. These I refer to as 'the behavioural issue' and 'the over-compensation 
issue'. The behavioural issue refers to the contention that SOEs in the 
reform period may have been seeking to maximise employee remuneration 
in preference to their official objective of profit maximisation. The over-
compensation issue relates to the claim that, perhaps as a result of such 
remuneration maximising behaviour, the compensation of SOE employees, 
broadly measured, grew well beyond the extent that would be justified by 
labour productivity in the sector. The behavioural issue and the 
overcompensation issue will both have prominence in the discussion of SOE 
performance that fallows in Chapter 3. 
Endnotes 
1 Notoriously, even husbands and wives assigned to work units in different, distant cities 
might take years to obtain permission for a work transfer to reunite them. 
2 Current Chinese President Jiang Zemin is just such an example. He began his career as an 
engineer at one of China's largest SOEs; First Autoworks in Changchun, Jilin Province. An 
article on this furn appears in the magazine Asia Inc, July 2002. 
3 One answer to the puzzle as to why incentive reform was so much more problematic in 
industry than in agriculture is that in agriculture it is relatively simple to design a uniform 
'tax' ( e.g. in bushels of grain per acre) that can be applied consistently to farmers, and to 
allow them to retain the residual surplus. 
4 Fan and Woo (1996) describe several kinds of 'informal remuneration'. I briefly discuss 
these in Chapter 3. 
5 This rule was quite inflexible in principle; strictly speaking the same space was to be 
provided whether to a single person or an employee supporting a large extended family, 
while a husband and wife both employed at the same factory would be entitled to 20 square 
metres between them. 
6 In fact Kornai accuses Chinese authorities of ignoring advice directly given by himself, 
James Tobin and Otmar Emminger (former Bundesbank president) in 1986 to restrain 
wages administratively. 
7 In fact contracts did comprise the majority (50.7 per cent) of SOE workers just one year 
later in 1996 (SSB 1998a). In manufacturing the percentage was even higher at 76.0 per 
cent in 1996 and 77 .0 per cent the following year. Chapter 6 briefly discusses the 
acceleration of labour reform that occurred in the late 1990s. 
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8 For example, a common shortcoming of socialist accounting is in its treatment of unsold 
output. The traditional practice was to credit all finished goods toward the firm' s annual 
production target, no matter how long they subsequently remained unsold. Purves (1991) 
tells of his difficulties in disposing of rusting, unsold cast-iron products against the 
resistance of his local-partner colleagues. Common sense demanded that they be melted 
down to produce new products, but in so doing the firm would be required to charge the 
difference between the inventory value and the scrap value as 'waste'. 
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3 
State-owned enterprise performance over the reform 
period 
This chapter commences with an evaluation of the performance of the 
Chinese SOE sector during the reform period. For the purposes of the 
chapter, 'performance' encompasses three criteria, namely output growth, 
productivity and efficiency, and profitability performance. Of particular 
interest for the thesis is the poor profit performance of the SOE sector. 
Following this review of performance is a discussion of the literature that 
carries the extant debate over SOE performance. This literature features 
interconnected debates over the evaluation of performance in general, over 
the specific reasons proffered for SO Es' poor profit performance, and over 
overall SOE reform strategy looking forward. This thesis seeks in particular 
to inform the debate over the reasons for poor SOE profitability. Following 
a review of the literature in this area, I outline the empirical work of the 
subsequent chapters and its contribution to the debate. 
3.1 Output growth 
In absolute terms, the SOE sector would appear to have achieved impressive 
output growth since 1978. However, this growth is less impressive when 
considered relative to the growth rates achieved by the non-state sectors of 
the economy. Moreover, it has been extensive in nature, having been 
achieved on the back of similarly rapid growth in inputs. 
The usual statistic used to measure output growth in China's industrial 
sectors is gross industrial output, published by the State Statistical Bureau. 
In nominal terms, this measure grew from RMB328.9 billion in 1978 to 
RMB3362. l billion in 1998. When deflated by the ex-factory price index of 
industrial products (general index), this amounts to real growth by a factor 
of 3.06 times, or an annual geometric average of 5.7 per cent. In the pre-
reform period from 1952 to 1978 noniinal gross industrial output of SOEs 
grew by an annual average of 12.8 per cent. 1 Figure 3.1 depicts trends in 
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real gross industrial output of the SOE sector in constant 1980 prices. 
Temporary dips in growth resulting from the recessions of 1989 
(Tiananmen) and 1997 (the Asian Crisis) are apparent. Another factor 
affecting the growth rate, especially in the latter 1990s, has been the 
rationalisation of the sector and the re-classification of some (usually the 
best-performing) SOEs into foreign joint ventures, COEs or joint stock 
enterprises (see Chapter 6). 
Figure 3.1 SOE real gross industrial output 
(RMB billion, 1980 prices) 
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Note: Gross output value deflated using Ex-Factory Price Index of Industrial Products (General Index). 
Source: SSB, China Statistical Yearbook (Zhongguo tongji nianjian), various years. 
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Viewed in comparison with other own~rship forms however, output growth 
was less impressive. As Figure 3.2 shows, most of the growth in China's 
industrial output over the reform period is attributable to the collective 
(COE), individual, and 'other' ownership sectors. The data contained in this 
figure is also presented in Table 1. 1 and Table 3.1. Table 3.1 presents the 
growth rates of real output for the SOE, COE and other ownership 
categories, and the shares of each category in output, number of employees 
and gross fixed assets. This table illustrates two points; the superior growth 
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rates of the non-state sectors relative to SOEs, and the extensive nature of 
SOE growth. With its slower rate of output growth, the SOE sector's share 
of urban output declined from close to 80 per cent in 1978 to under 30 per 
cent in 1999. However, the state sector's shares of labour and fixed asset 
usage declined much more slowly, both starting the reform period also at 
around 80 per cent but remaining above 50 per cent as of 1999. It follows 
that the state sector's growth was more extensive in character than that of 
the non-state sectors, being driven largely by the accumulation of inputs 
rather than by improvements in the efficient use of those inputs. 
Figure 3.2 Real gross industrial output by ownership form 
(RMB billion, 1980 prices) 
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Table 3.1 Urban output growth and factor usage by ownership type 
(percentage growth rates, percen~age shares) 
Output growth Shares of Shares of Shares of fixed 
output labour force assets 
SOE COE Other SOE COE Other SOE COE Other SOE COE Other 
1978 14.4 10.6 77.6 22.4 0.0 78.4 27.5 0.0 
- - -
1979 8.9 8.6 78.5 21.5 0.0 77.2 29.6 0.0 
- - -
1980 5.6 19.2 76.0 23.5 0.5 76.8 30.2 0.0 81.9 5.0 13.1 
1981 2.5 9.0 34.1 74.8 24.6 0.6 76.5 30.7 0.0 69.5 12.0 18.6 
1982 7.1 9.5 30.2 74.4 24.8 0.7 76.5 30.7 0.0 68.7 14.2 17.1 · 
1983 9.4 15.5 39.3 73.4 25.7 0.9 76.2 31.3 0.0 66.6 10.9 22.5 
1984 8.9 34.9 61.6 69.1 29.7 1.2 72.6 37.2 1.2 64.7 13.0 22.3 
1985 12.9 32.7 46.6 64.9 32.1 3.1 68.7 30.7 0.7 66.1 12.9 21.0 
1986 6.2 18.0 53.5 62.3 33.5 4.2 68.3 30.9 0.8 66.6 12.6 20.8 
1987 11.3 23.2 59.9 59.7 34.6 5.7 68.4 30.6 1.0 64.6 14.4 21.0 
1988 12.6 28.2 52.3 56.8 36.1 7.1 68.7 30.0 1.3 63.5 15.0 21.5 
1989 3.9 10.5 30.7 56.1 35.7 8.2 68.6 29.6 1.8 63.7 12.9 23.4 
1990 3.0 9.0 28.4 54.6 35.6 9.8 68.4 29.4 2.1 66.1 11.7 22.2 
1991 8.6 18.4 35.9 56.2 33.0 10.8 68.3 29.0 2.8 66.4 12.5 21.1 
1992 12.4 33.3 56.6 51.5 35.1 13.4 68.3 28.1 3.6 68.1 16.8 15.1 
1993 5.7 35.0 80.7 47.0 34.0 19.0 67.9 25.5 6.6 60.6 17.7 21.6 
1994 6.5 24.9 66.5 37.3 37.7 24.9 66.4 24.4 9.2 56.4 16.2 27.4 
1995 8.2 15.2 42.8 34.0 36.6 29.4 66.5 22.7 10.7 54.4 16.4 29.1 
1996 5.1 20.9 22.1 36.3 39.4 32.1 66.3 22.2 11.5 52.4 15.9 31.7 
1997 1.0 10.2 22.8 31.6 38.1 36.4 65 .0 21.4 13.6 52.5 15.4 32.1 
1998 0.1 9.1 20.0 28.2 38.4 40.0 57.2 16.9 25.9 54.1 14.8 31.1 
1999 8.8 6.0 21.8 28.2 35.4 44.3 54.5 15.2 30.3 53.4 14.5 32.0 
Notes: Data for SOEs include State-Controlled Shareholding Enterprises. 
'Other' ownership types include individual ownership, private, foreign invested and joint 
venture firms. 
Figures for labour force share represent total employees in all urban sectors up to 1984 and 
staff and workers (a narrower definition) in urban industrial sectors from 1985 onward. The 
latter series is preferred in that it correlates more closely with the gross output data, but is 
not available prior to 1985. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various years to 2000. 
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3.2 Productivity and efficiency 
Trends in output do not in themselves provide a full picture of the 
performance of enterprises. Output expansion can be achieved through any 
combination of expansion in the amount of productive inputs and increases 
in productivity. In the pre-reform period, for example, Chinese SOEs had 
the advantage of a fiscal saving and investment mechanism that guaranteed 
rapid accumulation of capital, so that substantial output growth was virtually 
assured. However, this growth obscured poor productivity performance. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) analysis seeks to evaluate economic 
performance by measuring output growth relative to growth in all types of 
productive inputs. TFP is a better measure of overall performance than 
single-factor measures of productivity such as labour productivity, since 
such single-factor measures are affected by changes in the levels of other 
factors. For example, labour productivity may be raised by increased 
allocations of capital, without significant changes in workers' skills, effort 
or work practices. Productivity studies, especially those seeking to measure 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth, have been one of the most active 
areas of scholarship on the Chinese SOE sector, and also an area of 
considerable contention. This section reviews the Chinese TFP literature 
with a view to extracting from among its various conflicting claims a clear 
verdict on the SOE sector's productivity performance, both in absolute 
terms and relative to the non-state sectors. 
A standard method of estimating TFP is as follows, based on a two-factor 
translog production function: 
In Q = a0 + arT + aK In K + aL In L + GJaKK (In K) 2 + GJau (In L) 2 
where Q denotes value added, T denotes time, and Kand L denote inputs of 
capital and labour, respectively. The coefficient ar is the rate of TFP 
growth. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas specification, aKK = aLL = aKL = 0, 
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and the output elasticities are simply aK and aL, An alternative approach is 
to obtain measures of the output elasticities and calculate the following: 
(3.2) 
where SK and SL denote the output elasticities of capital and labour 
respectively and the dots denote proportionate rates of change2 In some 
cases (as is noted below) researchers assign values to the output elasticities 
arbitrarily rather than estimating them from a regression. 
Another variation is to regress data for intermediate materials Mas well as 
capital and labour against gross output rather than value added (which 
equals gross output minus intermediate materials). Regressing only capital 
and labour on gross output is not a sound technique as it gives rise to a 
missing explanatory variable problem. All of the input and output data ought 
to be expressed in real terms, therefore one of the challenges of this type of 
empirical work lies in obtaining or constructing appropriate deflators. 
Another source of variation in methodologies in the case of studies on 
Chinese industry concerns the appropriate treatment of non-industrial 
inputs, such as the capital and labour devoted to social welfare facilities run 
by enterprises. 
Measurements of TFP and related measures (such as output elasticity of 
labour, which will be a key focus elsewhere in this thesis) depend on the 
availability of accurate data for inputs, outputs and their deflators. For 
enterprise-level studies in China, the reliability of available data has tended 
to be problematic. Firms may lack the statistical capacity to maintain 
accurate records, or may perceive an incentive to over- or under-report 
certain figures. Unsurprisingly therefore, the results obtained by different 
scholars have shown considerable variations. On some occasions, some of 
the sources of disagreement can be plausibly conjectured; see for example 
the discussion below of Woo et al. (1994a). On other occasions, we must 
interpret empirical results with some caution. Fortunately, there is now a 
considerable body of work from which to draw judgment. 
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The earliest English-language studies of TFP in SOEs indicated flat or even 
downward TFP growth in the pre-reform era, with no significant upward 
change in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Such studies included Chow 
(1985), World Bank (1983, 1985), Rawski (1980, 1983, 1986), Tidrick 
(1986), and Lardy (1987), some of which were not published widely. 
Similar work undertaken in China at the same time, however, painted a 
more mixed picture. Studies by Shi et al. (1984, 1985, 1986) and Qin et al. 
(1986) showed significant TFP growth, while Chen and Sang (1986), Chen 
(1986) and Pan (1986) presented contrary evidence. The methodologies of 
all these early studies tended to be relatively unsophisticated. One common 
practice was to use aggregate output data that covered all of state industry, 
but to use input data that covered on] y independent accounting units. 3 
Another was the construction of capital stock measures using undeflated 
annual investment data. Also, some authors used ad hoc weights for capital 
and labour inputs instead of directly estimating output elasticities. World 
Bank (1983, 1985), Tidrick (1986), Lardy (1987) and Shi et al. (1986) 
arbitrarily assigned weights for labour ranging from 0.4 to 0.8. Rawski 
(1980, 1983) and Zheng and Chen (1987) derived weights from the income 
shares accruing to capital and labour. As Chen et al. (1988) argued, such a 
procedure is only truly valid where perfect competition can be reasonably 
assumed. As I will show later in this chapter, the question as to whether or 
not income shares have been closely aligned with output elasticities in 
China is in itself controversial. 
Chen, Wang, Zheng, Jefferson and Rawski (Chen et al. 1988) marked the 
beginning of a significant effort by various researchers to improve upon the 
methodologies of the earlier studies. This study obtained weights for labour 
and capital directly from a production function estimation with net industrial 
output at 1952 prices as the dependent variable. Aggregated data was used 
covering all independent accounting units in the SOE sector over the period 
1953 to 1985. Data for capital stock at constant prices was constructed from 
official statistics in which each year's fixed asset investment in current 
prices is added to the previous year's capital stock. These statistics 
categorised industrial investment as machinery and equipment, non-
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residential construction, residential construction and other expenditures. The 
authors removed residential investment in order to capture purely industrial 
activity. They also adjusted the data for labour by subtracting from each 
year's figure a proportion equal to the proportion of residential investment 
within the capital stock, a relatively crude attempt to proxy the proportion of 
SOE labour engaged in delivering social services. The dependent variable 
being net output, a two-factor production was estimated. From the results of 
the initial translog estimation, the hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas technology 
could not be rejected. Cobb-Douglas estimation carried out on the adjusted 
data indicated that the level of TFP rose by 32.2 per cent from 1953 to 1978, 
an annual geometric average of only 1.1 per cent, with two-thirds of this 
improvement occurring between 1953 and 1957. During the early reform 
years from 1978 to 1985 however, TFP was found to have grown a further 
39.8 per cent, an annual average of 4.8 per cent. The same analysis carried 
out on the original data would yield annual TFP growth in the reform years 
of only 2.9 per cent, indicating the sensitivity of such analysis to different 
methodologies. 
Jefferson et al. (1992) differed from Chen et al. in the use of gross output as 
the dependent variable, thus accounting for changes in the use and 
efficiency of industrial materials (including energy inputs). This is an 
important improvement since shortages of materials have been frequently 
observed to constrain Chinese industrial output. The authors use aggregated 
data for the SOE and COE sectors over the years 1979 to 1988, thus 
enabling a comparison of TFP growth rates in the two sectors. Capital is 
deflated using separate deflators for buildings and for equipment, weighted 
separately for the SOE and COE sectors. Material inputs are deflated using 
separate series for the shares of plan-sourced and market-sourced materials , 
ex-factory prices and market price markups. As the available time series was 
too short for production function estimation, the authors calculated output 
elasticities from city and county level cross-section data from 1984 and 
1987 (just 1984 and 1987 for COEs). They were not able to exclude non-
productive inputs, but seek to minimise the impact of this and other 
potential errors-in-variables problems by carrying out the estimation in 
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intensive form, dividing all inputs and output by labour, and using an 
instrumental variable for output. TFP growth in SOEs was found to have 
averaged 2.40 per cent per annum over 1980-1988; 1.80 per cent up to 1984 
and 3.01 per cent thereafter. This acceleration is not surprising as Chapter 2 
shows that reforms in general accelerated in the latter 1980s. TFP growth in 
COE sector was higher; 4.63 per cent for the whole period, 4.63 per cent up 
to 1984 and 5.86 per cent from 1984-1988. For both sectors, factor 
accumulation was found to have accounted for almost three-quarters of 
output growth. 
Jefferson et al. (1996) used similarly methodologies to the authors ' earlier 
paper, but with a data set extended to 1992. TFP growth in SOEs was found 
to average 2.50 over 1980-1992; 2.24 per cent to 1984, 3.68 per cent from 
1984-1988, and 1.58 from 1988-1992. Thus the estimates were broadly of a 
range with the 1992 paper, with a marked deceleration in TFP growth found 
from 1988. COEs were again found to demonstrate higher TFP growth than 
SOEs, but by a lesser margin; average TFP growth for COEs was 3.43 per 
cent over the full period. This number represents a revised calculation using 
the price deflators published for the SOE sector rather than the COE sector. 
The original calculation was 7 .15 per cent, but the authors suspected that 
COE output was being drastically under-deflated. This paper goes on to take 
up the debate with Woo et al., discussing various methodological 
controversies, and also considers the sources of declining TFP growth. 
Woo, Hai, Jin and Fan (Woo et al. 1994a) challenged the findings of 
Jefferson et al., generating an ongoing debate that has loomed large in the 
literature on Chinese TFP. Using survey data on 300 large and medium-
sized SOEs over the years 1984-1988, Woo et al. carried out their baseline 
production estimation in two-factor form with gross output as the dependent 
variable. They argued that the other authors ' approach of excluding non-
productive capital and labour is inappropriate since, in the absence of 
markets for housing, medical services etc. , the firms could not have operated 
without providing these services directly to workers. The results of the 
baseline estimation show TFP growth of negative 4.0 per cent over 1984-88 
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Table 3.2 TFP estimation results: Woo et al. (1994a) (percentage 
growth) 
Method Food Textiles Materials Machinery Total 
Processing 
I. Baseline: Two-input -9.6 -10.0 -2.7 1.4 -4.0 
translog. 
II. Non-productive inputs -8.1 -8.0 -0.8 2.3 -2.0 
excluded. 
III. Period end capital -8.9 -8.5 -1.4 1.9 -2.5 
stock. 
IV. Cobb-Douglas. -6.8 -7.7 -0.7 2.0 -1.6 
V. Three input Cobb- 0.18 2.0 2.5 3.4 2.4 
Douglas. 
Note: Further details of estimation methods as follows. 
I. Two inputs (capital and labour), all inputs included, period average capital 
stock, modified translog functional form. 
II. Two inputs, non-productive inputs excluded, period average capital stock, 
modified translog. 
III. Two inputs, non-productive inputs excluded, period end capital stock, 
modified translog. 
IV. Two inputs , non-productive inputs excluded, period average capital stock, 
Cobb-Douglas. 
V. Three inputs (capital , labour and materials) , materials deflated as per Jefferson 
et al. (1992), Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
Source: Woo et al. (1994a). 
for the total sample~ Results were also generated for four specific sectors of 
industry, with TFP declining more severely in the light manufacturing 
sectors of textiles and food processing than in the materials and machinery 
industries (see Table 3.2). Excluding n_on-productive inputs in the manner of 
Jefferson et al. improved the measured estimate of total TFP to 2.0 per cent 
(Method II in Table 3.2). The robustness of this estimate was tested by using 
period end capital stock and Cobb-Douglas functional form (Methods ill 
and IV in Table 3.2), with the result little altered at -2.5 and -1.6 per cent. 
The estimates under Methods II, ill and IV were all insignificantly different 
from zero. Finally, the authors tested a three-input estimation with material 
inputs deflated using the same deflator as in Jefferson et al. The TFP 
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estimate of positive 2.4 per cent thus obtained is remarkably similar to the 
results obtained by the other authors, although for a non-identical time 
period. 
Woo et al. argue that the relatively flattering TFP estimates obtained by 
Jefferson et al. and in their own 'Method V' estimation are due to the choice 
of deflators used, which they assert both overdeflate output and underdeflate 
material inputs. Their principal argument in this regard is that the net effect 
of such a choice of deflators is to imply that the price index of industrial 
value-added declined during the 1980s, a surprising phenomenon during a 
period of considerable general inflation. Over the years 1980 to 1988, 
Jefferson et al.'s deflator of value added declined by 3.3 per cent, while the 
consumer price index rose by 59.7 per cent. Woo et al. allege two particular 
anomalies regarding this apparent decline in the value added deflator: (1) 
that it conflicts with what is known about the sequencing of price reforms, 
particularly in the years 1980 to 1983 when output prices were freed more 
rapidly than input prices, and (2) that it conflicts with experience in other 
transforming economies in Eastern Europe, notably Poland and Hungary 
whose price data they cite. What Woo et al. appear to overlook however is 
the overall structure of price distortions under the centrally planned system 
prior to 1978. As has already been discussed in Chapter 2 and by writers 
such as Lin et al. (1998) pre-reform structures systematically suppressed 
raw materials and other industrial input prices while artificially supporting 
the relative prices of industrial outputs, thus channeling the bulk of the 
economy's savings into SOE profits. It is therefore not surprising that price 
decontrol should lead to deflation of industrial value added. This includes 
the 1980 to 1983 period, which saw the liberalisation of prices for many 
agricultural commodities (inputs for the food processing, textile and timber 
processing industries). Moreover, experience in Eastern Europe is not 
relevant to China since those countries, being more industrialised than 
China at the onset of socialism, did not need to create a price structure that 
discriminated so heavily against agriculture. It can be noted that Woo et al., 
despite their criticism of the deflators used by Jefferson et al., are unable to 
point to any truly satisfactory data series for material input prices. They do 
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mention the official industrial value added deflator, which rose 26.1 per cent 
from 1980 to 1988, but they criticise this also since in the absence of a 
reliable intermediate-input price index it simply deflates nominal value 
added with the gross-output price index. The difficulty of obtaining better 
deflators, particularly ones that account for the mix of intermediate inputs 
obtained at plan and market prices, makes this debate an awkward one to 
resolve. 
Woo et al. also repeated their analysis on a data set covering 200 TVEs in 
ten provinces over the years 1984 to 1987. TFP growth for these firms over 
1984-1987 was estimated at 9.5 per cent when using Jefferson et al.'s 
intermediate deflator (corresponding to Method V for the SOE data set), 
confirming Jefferson et al.'s · results of superior TFP performance in COEs. 
In fact the growth differential as measured by Woo et al. is even greater 
than that found by Jefferson et al., probably because Woo et al.'s data solely 
included the dynamic TVEs, whereas Jefferson et al.'s sample included 
urban collectives. 
Lau and Brada (1990) estimated TFP for the SOE sector from 1953 to 1985, 
using the same national data as Chen et al. (1988), revised to remove 
residential construction and non-productive labour. These authors employed 
a frontier production function approach, which allows the disaggregation of 
TFP estimates into technological progress ( outward movement of the 
production possibilities frontier) and technical efficiency (the closeness of 
firms' actual output to potential output as defined by the estimated frontier). 
Total TFP growth was found to have risen significantly following the early 
reforms, from 2.1 per cent in the 1953-1977 period, to 7 .2 per cent over 
1977-1985. This latter figure comprised annual technological progress of 
3.4 per cent and technical efficiency improvement of 3.7 per cent. But 
whereas annual technological progress remained in a steady narrow of 3.2 to 
3.6 per cent, technical efficiency fluctuated dramatically in a range of -4.4 
to 12.2 per cent. 
Raiser (1997a) measures the TFP of SOEs in three interior provinces as part 
of a study designed to compare the extent and success of reforms in the 
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interior with those of the coastal regions. He finds negative TFP growth in 
his sample over the 1990-1994 period, for both SOEs and non-SOEs. He 
also finds evidence of significantly greater restrictions on the operations of 
interior SOEs, particularly with respect to labour. 
Li (1997) employs the first (1980-1989) section of the China Academy of 
Social Science (CASS) 800 firm database covering 769 enterprises, the 
same database as is used in this thesis. In a very technically thorough paper, 
he investigates the impact of changes in incentives, factor allocation and 
product market competition on changes in TFP. Li takes advantage of the 
price information contained in the database to measure the value of both 
output and intermediate in market prices rather than mixed market and plan 
prices. Li's relatively high TFP estimate of 4.68 per cent over 1980-1989 is 
not surprising when considered in this light. The consistent use of market 
prices even for goods that were not transacted at those prices should produce 
a set of price series that shows even greater inflation of intermediate input 
prices relative to output prices than would the use of mixed prices. The 
result should be to exaggerate the effect of declining value-added prices that 
emerged in Jefferson et al.'s analysis. The question as to which approach is 
superior is subjective. I would favour the use of mixed prices as these were 
the prices that actually confronted SOE managers at the time. A truly 
consistent study would use market prices to deflate all inputs including 
capital, but this would be totally unfeasible for China in this period. Li also 
found that TFP accounted for 73 per cent of output growth over the period, a 
figure that seems excessively high in the light of rapid capital accumulation 
and other studies and also leads one to doubt his TFP estimate. It is not 
likely that his high TFP estimate was due to a biased sample of relatively 
high-performing firms, as Huang et al. (1998) found that the same total 
sample firms began to record net losses in 1994, two years earlier than was 
the case nationally. Li also measured changes in marginal returns to factors. 
Marginal product of labour was found to have risen by 54 per cent over the 
period and the marginal product of capital to have also risen substantially, 
while the marginal product of materials changed little. The analysis also 
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incorporated measurement of price markups, through which market power 
was estimated to have declined by 15 per cent over the period. 
Groves et al. (1994) use the same CASS database to analyse the effects of 
increased enterprise autonomy and incentives on labour productivity and 
find that productivity increased with increases in bonus payments and use of 
the contract employment system. 
Perkins ( 1995) estimated the TFP growth of a sample of 300 enterprises in 
four ownership categories from Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shanghai and Fujian. 
Her study used gross output as the dependent variable and labour, capital 
and materials as the explanatory variables. She used capital and materials 
deflators specially developed by Zheng Yuxin of CASS. Average annual 
TFP growth over 1980-1992 was found to be 2.72 per cent for SOEs, 4.09 
per cent for (urban) COEs, 3.17 per cent for TVEs and 6.14 per cent for 
foreign-invested enterprises. This is in line with the findings of Jefferson et 
al. both with respect to the magnitude of SOE TFP growth and the superior 
TFP growth of non-state ownership categories. Nevertheless, this sample 
may actually bias upward the productivity estimates as it consists entirely of 
firms from the more progressive coastal areas. TFP growth in SOEs was 
found to average 2.6 per cent over 1980-1984, accelerating to 4.6 per cent 
over 1984-1988, and then slowing to 1.1 per cent over 1988-1992, again 
confirming the pattern found by Jefferson et al .. 
Huang et al. (1998) uses a stochastic varying coefficient production frontier 
framework to measure TFP growth over 1980-1994 and to decompose it 
into growth in inputs, technological progress and technical efficiency. They 
employed both (1980-1989 and 1990~1994) sections of the CASS '800 
firm' database employed in this thesis, covering 681 firms in six industries 
after deletions. Their results are summarised in Table 3.3. Annual TFP 
growth for the overall sample was estimated at 0.3 per cent. No sector's TFP 
grew more than 1.3 per cent on an annual average, and two of the four 
sectors were negative. The table also shows clearly that factor input growth 
was the dominant driver of output growth. A correlation can be seen 
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between output growth and TFP growth at the sectoral level; the fastest-
growing sectors also evidenced the highest TFP growth. 
Table 3.3 Decomposition of output growth: Huang et al. (1998) 
(percentage growth) 
Sector Output Due to changes in Implied 
increase annual TFP 
1980-94 growth 
= Factor inputs+ Technical + Technol. 
efficiency Progress 
Food processing 38.2 31.0 7.2 0.0 0.5 
Textiles 27.8 43.4 -15.6 0.0 -1.2 
Chemicals 140.5 120.7 11.1 8.7 1.3 
Building materials 19 33.3 -14.3 0.0 -1.1 
Machinery 110.5 106.2 1.0 3.3 0.3 
Electronics 156.8 143.4 13.4 0.0 0.9 
Note: Calculations based on frontier coefficient estimates and industrial variable means, 
imposing the restriction that technological progress is non-negative. The change rates 
reported in this table are all relative to year 1980 output. 
Source: Huang et al. ( 1998). 
Huang and Meng (1997) took the innovative and revealing approach of 
treating skilled and unskilled labour as two separate inputs in their 
comparison of SOE and TVE productivity between 1986 and 1990. They 
found TFP growth of -2.2 per cent in SOEs and 5.2 per cent in TVEs. 
Kong, Marks and Wan ( 1999) estimate stochastic production functions for 
SO Es in four industrial sectors over the period 1990 to 1994. Average 
annual TFP growth is estimated at -0.6 per cent in building materials, -3.3 
per cent in chemicals and -3.8 per cent_ in textiles. Only the machinery 
industry shows positive growth at 1.5 per cent. As the authors noted, their 
findings reinforce the impression from a number of studies that TFP 
performance deteriorated in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. Other stochastic 
production function studies in this literature include Kalirajan and Cao 
(1993), Wu (1993, 1996), Chen (1994) and Liu and Liu (1996). As Kong et 
al. (1991) note, all of these studies were based on data prior to 1990. They 
all find very low efficiency levels in the early 1980s and continuing 
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improvement throughout the 1980s, with a number of reform measures 
found to be significant in raising efficiency. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 summarise the findings of a number of studies on 
Chinese TFP. Besides those already mentioned here, these include Xiao 
(1991), Dollar (1990) and McGuckin et al. (1992). 
Summary 
Published estimates of TFP growth in Chinese SOEs under reform show a 
considerable range, from negative 2.2 per cent in the case of Huang and 
Meng (1997) to positive 7.2 per cent in the case of Lau and Brada (1990). 
Some of the variation in results across these studies can be attributed to 
specific causes such as sample bias, the time period to which the data 
pertains, or choice of statistical method. However, as noted above, problems 
in obtaining reliable data are also likely to have contributed to the variability 
of results. On balance, the bulk of the evidence seems to indicate that TFP 
growth was positive, at least during the 1980s, but only modestly so. This 
conclusion is based on the following considerations: 
1. The number of studies that indicate TFP growth in excess of zero 
appears to exceed the number indicating zero or negative growth. 
2. A low positive figure would lie approximately in the middle of the range 
of published estimates. Jefferson and Rawski (1994) identified some 
thirteen studies dating through the 1980s, finding that the n1ajority of 
them (nine) showed TFP growth of between 2 and 4 per cent. My own 
more updated list of studies suggests a lower consensus band of between 
zero and 2 per cent (Table 3.4). 
3. Those studies that find negative TFP growth tend to use the gross-output 
approach, which probably understates TFP growth via the inappropriate 
deflation of intern1ediate inputs. 
4. Those studies that compare the pre-reform and post-reform periods all 
find an improvement in TFP from 1978 onwards, and there is no strong 
evidence that TFP growth was negative in the pre-reform period as a 
whole (as distinct from certain periods of economic dislocation). 
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5. Those studies that have econometrically measured the direct effects of 
enterprise reforms on TFP have consistently found positive effects. 
6. Some of the studies that have found negative overall TFP growth, have 
nevertheless found positive growth in particular sectors. 
Table 3.4 Selected studies on TFP growth in China's SOEs 
Study Period Data Set 
Lau and Brada (1990) 1977-85 . National industry aggregate 
Chen et al. ( 1988) 
·1978-85 National industry aggregate 
Li (1997) 1980-89 272 SOEs survey data 
Perkins (1995) 1980-92 ·300 enterprises survey data 
Jefferson et al. (1992) 1980-88 SOE/COE aggregate data 
Jefferson et al. (1996) 1980-92 SOE/COE aggregate data 
Raiser (1997 a) 1990-94 3 interior provinces 
Dollar (1990) 1979-82 20 SOEs survey data 
Huang et al. (1998) 1980-94 800 SOEs survey data 
Xiao (1991) 1985-87 City aggregate data 
McGuckin et al. (1992) 1980-84 National industrial census 
Woo et al. (1994a) 1984-88 300 SOEs survey data 
Huang and Meng (1997) 1986-90 967 SOEs survey data 
Source: Adapted from Huang ( 1999). 
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TFP growth 
(per cent) 
7.2 
4.8 
4.7 
2.7 
2.4 
2.5 
<0 
1.2 
0.3 
0.0 
-0.45 (1980-84) 
0.44 (1984-85 
-1.6 to -4.0 
-2.2 
Table 3.5 Comparative studies of state and non-state sector TFP 
(annual percentage growth) 
Study Period SOE TFP NSE estimate(s) 
Perkins (1995) 1980-92 2.7 4.1 (COE), 3.2 (TVE), 6.1 (FIE) 
Jefferson et al. (1992) 1980-88 2.4 4.6 (COE) 
Jefferson et al. (1996) 1980-92 2.5 3.4 (COE) 
Xiao (1991) 1985-87 0.0 4.5 (COE) 
Woo et al. (1994a) 1984-88 2.4a 9.5 (TVEt 
Raiser (1997a) 1990-94 <0 <0 
McGuckin et al. (1992) 1980-84 -0.45 0.78 (COE);0.12 (Other) 
1984-85 0.44 2.14 (COE);3.39 (Other) 
Huang and Meng ( 1997) 1986-90 -2.2 . 5.2 (TVE) 
Note: 3These two estimates both use an approach similar to Jefferson et al. (1992). Woo et al. actually prefer a 
different method. 
It should be stressed that this is a very weak acclamation of SOE 
performance, bearing in mind the following factors: 
1. There have been enough studies finding zero or negative TFP growth to 
keep the issue in some doubt. 
2. A number of the studies finding positive TFP growth exclude 'non-
productive' inputs from the analysis. This is a valid technique from one 
viewpoint as it shows the efficiency off actors actually employed. From 
another viewpoint however it is more desirable to include all inputs. In 
particular, if we are to assess productivity performance and financial 
performance on a parallel basis, it is preferable to include all inputs for 
which the firm pays. 
3. Bearing the above point in mind, TFP growth in the 1980s is likely to 
have been quite modest, lower than 2 per cent. 
4. TFP growth appears to have fallen during the early 1990s, possibly to 
zero or even negative levels. 
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5. All studies comparing the TFP performance of state and non-state 
enterprises have consistently found NSEs to have superior performance 
(see Table 3.5). The extent of out-performance found ranges from 0.9 
growth percentage points (Jefferson et al. 1996) to 7 .1 percentage points 
(Woo et al. 1994a), leaving aside Raiser ( 1997 a) for its particular 
geographic focus. These comparative results are very useful in that they 
help to cut through the arguments over methodologies and data problems 
by applying the same methods to SOE and NSE data. 
Despite the clear divisions between the two principal sides in the debate 
over TFP in the state sector, there is degree of consensus. Sachs and Woo 
(1997) assert general agreement that (1) SOE productivity growth has been 
lower than non-state productivity growth, and (2) improvements in state 
sector TFP, if any, have been modest. They quote Walder (1995): 'the 
dispute so far appears to be inconclusive, especially given the small 
productivity increases under dispute'. Jefferson et al. (1996: 171) play down 
the importance of their findings of positive TFP, arguing that the TFP 
debate has 'diverted attention from more fundamental matters'. They 
continue: 'Even the highest estimates of TFP growth in China's state 
industry cannot obscure the presence of massive potential for additional 
productivity gains'. Bai et al. (1997) go a step further, constructing a model 
to show that in the case of firms who are not profit maximisers, higher 
productivity may actually lead to greater allocative distortion, lower profits 
and lower economic efficiency. 
For a clearer picture of SOE performance it is necessary also to examine 
financial performance and profitability. 
3.3 Profitability 
While the interpretation of SOE productivity results is subject to some 
dispute, there is essentially no argument over the fact that the SOE sector 
has suffered a very significant decline in profitability over the reform 
period. 
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The reporting and interpretation of SOE profit data require some care. Even 
leaving to one side the submission of inaccurate data by firms to statistical 
authorities, there are classification issues to be negotiated. What may be 
reported simply as 'SOE profits ' can be divided into a number of segments, 
most notably those profits remitted to the state, profits retained by the 
enterprise, and moneys from which income (profit) tax and adjustment tax 
must be paid. The boundaries between these categories have been blurred by 
the various institutional arrangements that have been introduced in the 
reform period. For example, some funds that would have been classified as 
remitted profits up to 1984 would have corresponded to funds classified as 
profit taxes after the tax-for-profit reform. Also, the mechanisms by which 
remitted profits are distinguished from retained profits have differed widely 
as firms negotiated firm-specific arrangements under the CMRS. In this 
section I basically regard the distinction between remitted profits and SOE 
profit taxes as merely definitional, and rely on pretax profits (lirun he 
shuijin zong 'e) as the preferred absolute measure of profitability. 
Table 3.6 shows trends in pre-tax and after-tax profits from 1978 to 1997, as 
well as profit to total assets (net fixed assets plus working capital) and 
profits to gross output. While pre-tax profit continued to grow on an 
absolute nominal basis over the reform period (with just one backward step , 
in 1995), this growth paled in comparison with the growth in output or the 
SOE capital stock. Accordingly, the State's rate of return on total assets has 
fallen by approximately three-quarters over the reform period, while the 
profit margin on SOE gross output has fallen by about 60 per cent. Some 
writers such as Keidel (1998) and Perkins (1998) have drawn attention to 
the fact that the rate of total after-tax p~ofits have fall en almost to zero , and 
to the fact that after-tax profits for the entire SOE sector did tum slightly 
negative on a quarterly basis during the first quarter of 1997. 4 While the 
decline in profitability was certainly significant, as I have alluded to above, 
a reliance upon the after-tax measures of profit overlooks the effective 
reclassification of some remitted profits into profit taxes , and therefore 
overstates the extent of the decline in state income from SOEs. 
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Table 3.6 SOE Financial Performance Indicators (RMB million, 
percentage shares) 
Year Pre-Tax Pre-Tax Pre-Tax After- After-Tax After-Tax Losses of 
Profit Profit/ Profit/ Tax Profit/ Profit/ Loss-
Fixed Gross Profit Fixed Gross Making 
Assets Output Assets Output SOEs 
1978 79,070 24.8 24.9 50,880 15.5 24.9 4,206 
1979 86,440 24.9 24.5 56,280 16.1 24.5 3,638 
1980 90,710 24.3 24.1 58,540 16.0 24.1 3,430 
1981 92,330 22.9 23.9 57,970 15.0 23.9 4,596 
1982 97,220 22.2 23.5 59,770 14.4 23.5 4,757 
1983 103,280 21.7 22.8 64,090 14.4 22.8 3,211 
1984 115,280 22.3 22.8 70,620 14.9 22.8 2,661 
1985 133,410 22.4 21.8 73,820 13.2 21.8 3,244 
1986 134,140 19.9 19.9 68,990 10.6 19.9 5,449 
1987 151,410 19.7 18.9 78,700 10.6 18.9 6,104 
1988 177,490 20.2 17.8 89,190 10.4 17.8 8,192 
1989 177,314 17.5 14.9 74,301 7.2 14.9 18,019 
1990 150,314 12.9 12.0 38,811 3.2 12.0 34,876 
1991 166,115 12.3 11.6 40,217 2.9 11.6 36,700 
1992 194,412 12.4 11.4 53,510 2.7 11.4 36,927 
1993 245,470 12.9 11.1 81,726 3.2 11.1 45,264 
1994 287,625 12.5 11.4 82,901 2.8 11.4 48,259 
1995 287,420 9.3 9.2 66,560 1.9 9.2 63,957 
1996 273,713 7.9 10.0 41,264 1.0 10.0 79,068 
1997 290,722 7.6 10.4 42,783 0.9 10.4 83,095 
Notes: The unit of measure for Pre-tax Profit and After-Tax Profit is RMB million. The figures in 
the other four columns are all percentage ratios. 
Fixed Asset data from which the above ratios are calculated, is in original value terms. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
Nevertheless the negative quarterly profit result of early 1997 provided an 
important 'wake-up call' to policy-makers as to the condition of the state 
sector. Considering the massive resources that the PRC had poured into the 
state sector since the 1950s, and the sacrifices that had been imposed upon 
industrial workers and the rural sector to generate those resources, it gave 
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great pause to reflect that the state's return from its SOE investments had 
dwindled to a negative, even if only on this inappropriate measure. 
The profit figures presented in Table 3.6 are net figures for the entire SOE 
sector. Within these totals, the profits of some firms offset the losses of 
others. Viewed in isolation, figures on SOE losses reveal another aspect of 
deterioration in financial performance. The right-hand column of Table 3.6 
shows that SOE losses multiplied more than ten-fold from the mid-1980s to 
the mid-1990s. 
As Raiser (1997b) has argued however, the decline in SOE profitability has 
not been without parallel in the non-state sector. Table 3.7 is reproduced 
from this paper. It shows that then profit rates ( defined as pre-tax profits / 
net fixed assets plus working capital) of state and urban collective firms 
trended quite closely together from 1985 to 1995. Moreover, while the profit 
rates of 'other' non-state enterprises (TVEs, joint ventures and individual-
owned firms) were generally higher than those for SOEs and urban COEs, 
these rates also declined by half over the same period. 
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Table 3.7 Selected indicators for SOEs, Urban COEs and other 
NSEs: 1983 to 1995 (percentages) 
Output Growth Profit Rate Share of Enterprises 
Making Losses 
Year SOEs Urban TVEs SOEs Urban Others SOEs Urban Others 
COEs COEs COEs 
1983 9.4 15.5 31.5 
1984 8.9 34.9 61.7 
1985 12.9 32.7 38.9 23.5 24.6 28.2 9.5 11.7 10.2 
1986 6.2 17.9 28.0 20.7 19.4 23.3 13.1 13.2 15.8 
1987 11.3 23.2 27.7 20.3 18.2 24.9 13.0 15.7 15.5 
1988 12.6 28.2 28.0 20.6 19.8 24.7 10.9 11.7 17.2 
1989 3.9 10.5 2.8 17.2 15.4 16.2 16.0 15.7 26.7 
1990 2.9 9.0 14.5 12.4 11.5 11.3 27.6 19.4 32.6 
1991 8.6 18.4 27.8 11.8 11.9 12.9 25.8 16.7 31.7 
1992 12.4 39.3 51.6 9.7 10.1 11.1 23.4 13.7 27.9 
1993 5.7 35.9 54.9 9.7 10.0 11.3 30.3 
1994 6.5 29.8 11.0 8.0 9.2 14.8 
1995 8.2 15.2 41.0 6.5 7.7 14.07 
Notes: Output growth calculated from State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook , 1994. 
Profit rate calculated as Pre-Tax Profits / (net fixed assets + working capital) 
Other NSEs include TVEs, joint ventures and individual businesses. 
Source: Reproduced from Raiser (1997b). Original sources: Zheng (1994), Morduch and Sicular 
(1994), State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
Even as the number of loss-making firms and the total of their losses 
mounted, the central government managed to keep its annual expenditures 
on direct fiscal subsidies to SOEs at roughly steady levels in nominal terms. 
This means that, expressed as ratios to budget expenditure or to GDP, the 
scale of spending on loss subsidies declined considerably (see Table 3.8). 
However, these trends are entirely misleading as an indicator of SOE 
financial performance. The reason is that explicit subsidisation of SOE 
losses via the fiscal system was replaced by implicit subsidisation via the 
predominantly state-owned banking system. The consequent deterioration in 
SOE balance sheets is best represented via liability to asset ratios. The right-
hand column of Table 3.8 presents some estin1ates of such ratios as 
compiled by Lardy ( 1998). At the outset of reform, liability to asset ratios 
were very low relative to the norm in market economies, as SOEs relied 
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primarily on fiscal capital grants with only limited recourse to bank loans. 
By around 1988 ratios had reached roughly half, which is typical in market 
economies, but continued to climb annually from there, to 85 per cent by 
1995. Moreover, Lardy identifies several factors to suggest that these figures 
are probably under-estimated. First, they do not include triangular debt; that 
is, debts owed by industrial SOEs to other firms, including those in the non-
state sector. (Debts owed by one SOE to another do not affect the liability to 
asset ratio of the SOE sector as a whole.) Second, assets are overstated 
because the depreciation rates typically charged by SOEs are too low. Third, 
assets are further overstated due to the practice of carrying unsold inventory 
on enterprise books at full price. 
In the light of the accumulation of SOE losses and debts, scholars such as 
Lardy and Woo have pointed to a significant weakening of China's financial 
system and macroeconomic fundamentals. Lardy ( 1998: 92) surmises that 
'all measures (of banking system soundness) confirm the view that the first 
two decades of economic transition have left China's financial institutions, 
particularly here of its four largest state-owned banks, in a precarious 
position'. Woo ( 1994: 278) asserts that 'the financial weakness of SO Es 
destabilised the economy by leading to excessive reserve money growth. 
The decline in SOE revenue and subsidisation through bank channels 
led to significant expansion of the consolidated budget deficit (measured as 
the open deficit plus the hidden deficit, that is the government borrowing 
requirement plus the expansion of reserve money in excess of the deficit 
lending to government) to over 10 per cent of GDP in 1990 and 1991.' This 
represents a dramatic turnaround from the pre-reform situation whereby 
SOE profits served as the mainstay of fiscal revenue. 
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Table 3.8 SOE Loss Subsidies and Liability-to-Asset Ratios (RMB 
millions, percentages) 
Year Loss Subsidies/ Subsidies/ Liabilities/ 
Subsidies Budget GDP Assets 
Expenditure 
1978 11 
1980 19 
1985 50,702 25.3 5.6 
1986 32,478 14.7 3.2 
1987 37,643 16.6 3.1 
1988 44,646 17.9 3.0 45 
1989 59,888 21.2 3.5 55 
1990 57,888 18.8 3.1 58 
1991 51,024 15.1 2.4 61 
1992 44,496 11.9 1.7 62 
1993 41,129 8.9 1.2 72 
1994 36,622 6.3 0.8 75 
1995 32,777 4.8 0.6 85 
Notes: Liability/ Asset ratios for 1978, 1980 and 1988 are for industrial SOEs only. Ratios for all 
other years are for all SOEs. 
Sources: Loss subsidy data from State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
Liability/ Asset ratios compiled by Lardy (1998) from various original sources. 
3.4 SOE performance and the policy debate 
There is a considerable and growing body of English-language literature that 
assesses the performance of China's SO Es and the implications of that 
performance for reform policy in China. Much of this literature can be 
identified into two leading schools, identified by Sachs and Woo (1997) as 
the experimentalists and the convergence school. Sachs and Woo 
themselves belong to the convergence school (the 'pessimists') while the 
experimental or 'optimistic' school include among their number Gary 
Jefferson, Thomas Rawski, Barry Naughton, and Peter Nolan. The 
experimentalists also claim to reflect the dominant view of Chinese 
economists and officials. 
Sachs and Woo (1997) represent the contrasting views of the two schools as 
follows. The optimistic group proposes that: 
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1. China's state enterprise reforms have improved productivity growth 
(particularly TFP growth) in the SOEs; 
2. China's state enterprise reforms have improved the sectoral allocation of 
production and investment; and 
3. China may be able to avoid privatisation of the SOEs in the future. 
The pessimistic school meanwhile holds that: 
1. China's state enterprise reforms have failed to improve productivity 
performance; 
2. China's state enterprise reforms have failed to improve the financial 
performance of the SOEs; 
3. China's state enterprise reforms have failed to improve the sectoral 
allocation of production and investment; and 
4. China will need to pursue a strategy of privatisation in the future, both 
for the purposes of fiscal balance and allocative efficiency. 
While the optimists also accept that the profitability and financial 
performance of SOEs has declined over the reform period, they differ with 
the pessimists in their evaluation of both the causes and the significance of 
profit decline. According to Sachs and Woo, debate over causes centre 
around the relative weights to be assigned to the following three principal 
explanations for profit underperformance: (1) intensifying competition and 
the entry of non-state firms into formerly quasi-monopolistic markets; (2) 
the failure (according to the convergence school) of SOEs to improve their 
efficiency despite the reforms; and (3) the over-compensation of SOE 
personnel and stripping of SOE assets by employees and managers. The 
convergence school stresses the second and third of these explanations. The 
experimentalist school places most emphasis on competition, disputes the 
failure to improve efficiency gains and tends to be sceptical of the case for 
over-compensation and asset-stripping. This concise characterisation of the 
experimentalist position by Sachs and Woo should not exclude the 
consideration by the experimentalists of other possible causes of financial 
underperformance. Jefferson and Singh (1999) for example list the 
following four explanations in addition to the competition factor (1) 
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limitations to the exit of the poorest-performing SOEs; (2) the conversion of 
the best SOE performers into non-state forms such as shareholding firms 
and foreign joint ventures; (3) the continued concentration of subsidised 
housing and social services in the SOE sector; and (4) over-investment in 
state industry due to low interest rates and poor financial discipline. 
A resolution of the debate between the 'convergence' and 'experimentalist' 
schools over the causes of SOE loss-making, is likely to be instructive in 
terms of the wider debate between the two schools over the assessment of 
SOE reform to date, and over the appropriate reform strategy going forward. 
-
Other assessments of SOE performance 
The East Asian Analytical Unit (1997) sides with the convergence school in 
this debate, attributing the poor profitability to inefficiency and over-
compensation. This publication also lists (p. 341) the principal causes of 
inefficiency as: (1) ambiguous property rights to SOE assets; (2) 
inappropriate incentives for enterprises including subsidies to loss makers 
and the absence of bankruptcy provisions; (3) barriers to non-state firms 
entering certain industries; ( 4) inappropriate incentives for managers and 
workers; (5) the expensive social benefits provided to SOE workers; (6) 
redundant labour; and (7) government interference in enterprise decision-
making, including some residual price controls. 
Chai (1994) also tends to side with the convergence ('pessimistic') school. 
He rejects the assertion that China's transition path has been superior to that 
taken by Eastern European transitional economies. He assesses the progress 
of reform up to the mid-1990s as only mixed, criticising the failure to 
establish indirect macroeconomic control measures, the failure to 'start 
comprehensive structural reforms' in the large and medium-sized SOE 
sector, and the failure to tighten SOE budget constraints. In other words, it is 
in areas related to SOE reform that he sees reform as inadequate. Although 
acknowledging that short-term transition costs had been less than in other 
transforming economies, he attributes this to slower progress and to 
favourable initial and international conditions. He argues that China had 
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merely postponed some of the transition costs of reform, and in the process 
undermined the conditions for long-run sustainable growth. 
The views of some other researchers on SOE performance do not fit neatly 
into either the convergence or the experimentalist camp. For example, Lin et 
al. ( 1996) argue that fair assessment of the performance of individual SO Es 
is obscured by three main factors: (1) continuing price controls; (2) policy 
burdens including interference and social welfare obligations; and (3) the 
interest costs on capital that had originally been granted on interest-free 
terms. They advocate the removal of these unequal policy burdens, the 
placing of SOEs on a level competitive playing field with NSEs and the 
creation of hard budget constraints including bankruptcy for loss-making 
firms. Lin et al. do not believe a priori that SOEs need be permanently 
uncompetitive (citing some examples of successful state-owned companies 
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in market economies, such as Singapore Airlines) and in this sense they side 
with the experimentalists. However, their policy proposals leave the fate of 
the SOE sector dependent on its own performance - if they were to make 
losses, they would be 'weeded out' of the economy. 
Steinfeld (1998) and Lardy (1998) tend to side with the convergence school 
in their assessment of performance, since they stress the danger of an 
impending financial collapse. Steinfeld (1998) however parts company with 
the convergence school somewhat in his policy prescription. He holds that 
the argument over state versus private ownership is not the crucial issue 
since the real problem is the absence of an effective system of ownership at 
all. Steinfeld's priority is the creation (through state intervention) of at least 
a rudimentary functioning system of ownership and property rights, 
including the commercialisation of er.edit practices. Steinfeld argues for 
more, not less, state control over SOE activities in order to establish such a 
system. He warns that rapid privatisation would be ineffective in the 
absence of such ownership-creating reform, since privatised SOEs would 
suffer from same basic inefficiencies as prevail currently. This argument 
seems to imply that even inefficient privatised firms could somehow 
perpetuate the soft budget constraint and evade bankruptcy. 
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Lardy (1998) points to the lack of a fundamental change in ownership and 
corporate governance as the underlying cause of declining financial 
performance. He claims that the lesson from other transitional economies is 
that without formal programs of privatisation, assets and earnings diversion 
into private hands becomes commonplace once the private economy has 
become legitimate. He sees over-investment and the over-compensation of 
employees as the predictable outcome of the environment in which SOEs 
operate. He sees the solutions - hard-budget wage determination, greater 
labour mobility and the alignment of managers' actions with the interests of 
owners - as almost certainly necessitating widespread privatisation. He 
also warns that the liability to asset ratios of both Chinese SOEs and 
Chinese state banks have built up to levels that threaten a financial crisis, or 
even if one can be avoided, threaten to deny the resources that China needs 
to address various physical constraints to its growth. 
3.5 Explanations of poor profitability 
This section critically considers the three possible explanations noted by 
Sachs and Woo for poor SOE profitability (con1petition, low productivity 
and over-compensation) as well as various other explanations that have been 
raised in the literature. We review the literature on the questions of 
competition and over-compensation, having already reviewed the 
productivity literature in Section 3.2. We go on to consider what type of 
empirical evidence would best serve to resolve the outstanding debate, and 
outline the analysis that the remainder of the thesis will carry out in order to 
generate such evidence. 
Competition 
Raiser (1997b) claims evidence to support the contention that increased 
competition contributed most to the decline in profitability, while finding 
evidence of income-shifting fron1 profits to wages only in certain sectors. · 
He argues that on a sectoral basis, the lowest profit rates among SOEs were 
returned by those relatively labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, 
garments, food processing and forest products. 
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Naughton ( 1995) reaches similar conclusions to Raiser after examining the 
sector-wide (average of SOEs and NSEs) rates of return to capital in 
different sectors of industry in 1980 and 1989. He notes that at the 
beginning of reform, profit rates were higher in labour-intensive light 
manufacturing sectors than elsewhere, yet by 1989 sectoral profit rates were 
comparatively uniform. He attributes the convergence to increased 
competition from non-state enterprises, which would have had the effect of 
competing down the profit rates of the labour-intensive light manufacturing 
sectors that were most exposed to non-state competition. 
Both Sachs and Woo (1997) and Lardy (1998) question this use of evidence. 
Sachs and Woo note that SOE profitability had shown a similar dramatic 
drop whether in sectors where NSE competition had been significant, or in 
sectors that had experienced little NSE entry. Lardy argues that price reform 
since 1980 had been disadvantageous to light manufacturing sectors, and 
that therefore competition could not be the sole explanation for their relative 
profit decline. He adds that SOE profitability had also declined rapidly in 
certain sectors such as petroleum and natural gas that had been protected 
from non-state competition. 
The evidence of Fan and Woo (1996) reinforces this critique. This study 
compares SOE profit rates across various sectors against the collective 
market shares of SOEs in those sectors in 1989 and 1992. SOE profitability 
declined in four of the five industries where the degree of market 
domination by SOEs was unchanged, and also declined in six of the seven 
sectors in which SOE market share declined by less than five percentage 
points. A regression estimation of the change in SOE profit rates on the 
change in SOE market share yields an insignificant negative relationship 
and an R2 of 0.3. 
Such critiques may be taking a too-narrow view of the intensification of 
competition. Even in sectors where there had been little or no NSE entry, 
the declining importance of planned allocation meant that SOEs in each 
sector at least were required to compete for sales against each other. Also, 
whereas in the pre-reform system SOEs tended to possess significant market 
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power in their own local areas, as transportation and trading infrastructure 
improved, the intensity of competition from distant regions increased. Yet 
another dimension of increased competition concerns competition in factor 
markets, especially in the labour market. As NSE entry to the broader 
economy raised growth rates and incomes, and as a measure of flexibility 
was introduced to labour markets, SOEs must have experienced some 
pressure to pass on wage rises comparable to those being enjoyed in the 
non-state sector. Such pressure is likely to have been felt in all sectors, 
regardless of the degree of competition in product markets. 
Singh, Ratha and Xiao (1993) analyse the impact of NSE competition on 
SOE performance on a regional basis. They find that SOE profitability rates 
tend to be lowest in those provinces where NSE output has grown most 
rapidly, while also finding that although greater NSE competition is 
associated with better TFP performance by SOEs. This link between 
competition and TFP performance is supported by the results reported by 
Huang and Woo ( 1998). 
Huang and Duncan (1999) employed a logit model and a profit model to 
examine the effects of various enterprise characteristics and reform 
measures on SOE profitability. Far from finding that competition drove 
down profitability, they report that competition was one of only two factors 
in their framework that had a positive influence on profitability, the other 
factor being the proportion of bonuses in the total wage bill. The database 
employed was the CASS 800 firm database. 
In summary, while it is clear that competition did increase and profitability 
did fall during the reform period, the existing research in this area is not yet 
strong enough to conclude that competition was the main driver of declining 
profitability, to the exclusion of all other explanations. 
Over-compensation · 
A fundamental assumption of econonucs is that economic agents will 
always seek to maximize the own utility, and therefore their income. During 
the era of central planning, Chinese SOE managers and workers had 
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relatively little opportunity to enhance their own incomes through their own 
behaviour, because of the comprehensive and overlapping nature of state 
controls. However, as controls were steadily lifted, it is possible that 
opportunities arose for SOE managers and employees to increase their 
incomes, not only by improving their firms' commercial performance, but 
also by diverting some of the profits that notionally belonged to the state. 
From as early as the mid- l 980s, studies emerged that noted the motivation 
of SOE managers to convert profits into higher wages and benefits for 
themselves and for SOE employees. One of the earliest was a report by the 
China Economic System Research Institute (Tigaisuo) in 1986, which noted 
an increasing tendency by SOEs to make use of dubious accounting 
methods so as to siphon resources into personal consumption and 
· investment activities. As noted in Chapter 2, Byrd and Tidrick (1987) list 
the maximisation of family income and benefits as one of the five main 
motives of SOE workers and hence of their managers. In this view, 
employees not only sought to maximise wage income, bonuses and job 
security for themselves, but tended to view their own firms as the best 
source of employment for their children. The practice of dingti 
(occupational inheritance) is well documented by Korzec (1992) and 
referred to in Chapter 2. Byrd and Tidrick comment that 'the desires of 
workers and managers sometimes coincide and sometimes conflict, but are 
seldom decisive because the allocation and payment of labour is the most 
tightly controlled aspect of enterprise operations. Nevertheless, there are 
some ways to evade these controls, and recent reforms have increased the 
flexibility somewhat.' Note that Byrd and Tidrick were writing just at the 
time that serious labour market reforn:is were commencing. As is noted in 
Chapter 2, by the 1990s these reforms had weakened state control over 
remuneration mechanisms to the point that Kamai (1990) regarded such 
controls as non-existent. 
Walder (1987 and 1989) described the Chinese enterprise as a socio-
political community in which 'managers are responsible not only for 
production and performance, but also for enhancing employee income and 
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for delivering a wide range of other benefits and services to their 
employees.' He stressed that rank-and-file workers have considerable 
leverage over their managers, arguing that 'if a manager is not a good one 
by his employees' estimate, the resulting lack of harmony can curb the 
performance of the firm and harm the manager's career'. Walder argues that 
a key goal of SO Es is prosperity for the community, and that pursuing this 
goal requires retaining the greatest possible proportion of the firm's 
revenues and exercising maximum discretion over the use of those funds, 
even if illegal means must be employed. He quotes an interview with an 
SOE manager: 
In recent years the factory benefits fund hasn't been enough, so we overspent our 
benefits every year, and took the difference out of the reserve fund. So the reserve 
fund has in reality has turned into a benefits fund. This is especially because of all 
the housing we are building for workers, and things like medicine are rising in price. 
We have to get the money from elsewhere. Sometimes we work the expenses into 
our costs of production, which is not really legal. ... The best managers are always 
one step ahead of the law. The state regulates the treatment of workers, but my 
superiors in the bureau won't be happy if workers' welfare doesn't improve. 
As suggested by the above quote from Byrd and Tidrick, the scope for 
diverting firm resources to employees and managers is likely to have 
widened from the mid-1980s as various reforms accelerated, including the 
internal wage system. The early 1990s saw the emergence of a number of 
quantitative studies seeking to gauge the extent of over-compensation. The 
framework used for most of these studies was income share analysis. This 
approach uses the standard result from the neoclassical theory of the firm, 
whereby a profit-maximising firm equates input prices with the marginal-
revenue products of factors. With a Cobb-Douglas production function this 
yields the convenient result that the respective income shares of wage and 
interest payments should equal the output elasticities of labour and capital 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.1). Over-compensation can therefore be measured 
as the positive difference between labour income share and the output 
elasticity of labour. Should this difference tum out to be negative, however, 
according to Raiser (1997b) the apparent under-compensation could be 
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interpreted as a measurement of excess profits, perhaps as a result of 
inadequate market compethion. 
Woo et al. (1994a), Woo (1994) and Fan and Woo (1996) employed various 
data sets to show that total SOE employee compensation, including direct 
income such as wages and bonuses and indirect income such as housing and 
medical benefits, grew faster than labour productivity. Woo et al. (1994a) 
used a survey sample of 300 large and medium-sized SOEs in which the 
share of total compensation (direct and indirect) within value added grew 
from 31.8 per cent in 1984 to 48.8 per cent in 1988. Over the same period, 
taxes and remitted profits fell from 31.5 per cent to 13.7 per cent of value 
added, while the share of retained profits rose slightly from 11.3 per cent to 
15.0 per cent. A parallel analysis of a survey of 200 TVEs from 1984 to 
1987 showed that total labour compensation in those firms fell from 39.1 
per cent of value added to 30.6 per cent. The authors did not explicitly 
compare estimates of labour income share with output elasticity, but in a 
separate section of the paper they reported the results of a two-factor Cobb-
Douglas production function regression on the SOE data with an estimated 
output elasticity of labour of 0.541. The paper also reports three modified 
translog estimations each with slightly higher estimates of labour output 
elasticity. According to these estimates then, the labour shares still fell short 
of labour output elasticity. It is therefore not entirely clear that the growing 
labour income share uncovered by the authors constituted over-
compensation; it may reflect instead a decline in excess profits. (This 1994 
paper essentially re-publishes the analysis of Woo et al. (1993)). 
Woo (1994) used nationwide data from the China Statistical Yearbook to 
calculate that real direct labour income in SOEs grew an average of 4.1 per 
cent annually over the period 1978 to 1990, while labour productivity grew 
by 4.4 per cent on a comparable basis. Incorporating Zhao' s ( 1992) 
estimates of indirect labour income however, he arrives at an estimate for 
average annual growth in total labour income of 5.4 per cent, well in excess 
of productivity growth. M·oreover, he contrasts these figures with 
corresponding figures for the co11ective sector, where labour productivity 
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grew 8.3 per cent annually and real direct wages 3.6 per cent. (The 
implication both here and in Woo et al. ( 1994a) is that indirect wages in the 
collective sector are small and can be ignored). Woo asserts the following 
set of inequalities: 
COE labour productivity growth > SOE real wage growth > SOE labour 
productivity growth > COE real wage growth. 
Fan and Woo ( 1996) also used data from the 300 firm SOE survey to show 
that the share of direct labour income in net output value (value added 
minus depreciation), after barely changing from 11.6 per cent in 1980 to 
11. 7 per cent in 1984, rose to 15. 9 per cent by 1988. Calculations of indirect 
income were not incorporated into these figures, but in a separate section 
several quantified observations regarding indirect income were made, all 
indicating rapid growth. The authors identified three main categories of 
indirect income; distribution of private consumer goods, collective 
consumption and housing. The distribution of consumer goods occurs at 
both the rank-and-file and elite levels. At the rank-and-file level it takes the 
form of goods from foodstuffs to furniture bought by the firm, distributed to 
employees and charged mostly to 'material costs' and 'non-production 
expenditure' to avoid tax. Fan and Woo partly attribute to such practices the 
respective 82 and 234 per cent rises in these two accounting items mateiials 
over 1984-1988, when net output value rose only 59 per cent. Consumption 
at the elite level took the form of banquets, travel, luxury official cars and 
other perquisites, and showed up in 'net management cost' and 'sales cost'. 
These two items rose by 165 per cent and 300 per cent respectively over 
1984-1988. Collective consumption encompassed services paid for out of 
the enterprise welfare fund such as kindergartens, hospitals, and dining and 
recreation facilities. The welfare fund was tied to the wage bill and retained 
profits. It grew by 240 per cent from 1984 to 1988 according to the survey 
data. Enterprise housing, including the physical structures for kindergartens 
and other social services, was accounted for as 'non-productive fixed asset 
expenditure'. The value of such assets grew by 160 per cent over 1980-
1988, a remarkable rate considering that this is a stock measure, not a flow. 
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The share of non-productive fixed assets in total fixed assets rose from 15.1 
per cent in 1980 to 19 .3 per cent in 1988. 
Minami and Hondai (1995) carry out an income share analysis measuring 
the labour share of output in the machine industry and explicitly comparing 
it with estimates of the output elasticity of labour. Their data includes a 
nationwide sample of 389 firms for the years 1980 and 1985 only and a 
sample of 129 firms in Tianjin from 1985 to 1990. The authors make a 
serious attempt to capture the non-monetary welfare services in their 
estimations of remuneration, by utilising data for the capital cost of welfare 
facilities and the wages of workers operating them. The labour share of 
income was found to have risen from less than 0.4 in 1985 when incentive 
and autonomy reforms were accelerated, to approximately 0.7 by 1990. It 
surpassed the estimated output elasticity of labour from 1988 onwards, 
which significantly reinforces the findings of the various studies above 
involving Woo and colleagues. Whereas the Woo papers do not show that 
the growth in labour income to 1988 was so great as to overtake labour 
productivity, Minami and Hondai's results suggest that this is only because 
Woo's data was not recent enough, and that expansion in labour income 
share has since continued unabated. 
Bouin (1998) reports that the marginal product of labour in industrial SOEs 
grew by 5 per cent from 1989 to 1993 but that wages grew faster. According 
to his data, real average wages in SOEs grew annually by 8.4 per cent in 
1990-1992 and 11.8 per cent in 1993-1994, following annual declines of 
1.3 per cent in 1987-1989. Thus real unit labour costs were rising by almost 
7 per cent in 1993-1994. This reinforces Minami and Hondai' s finding that 
expansion of labour income share continued past 1988. 
Raiser (1997b) as one part of his analysis also carries out an income share 
analysis, producing less consistent findings than Minami and Hondai. He 
uses enterprise level data for 180 state, collective and non-state firms for the 
years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991 and 1992. The data covers four coastal cities 
(Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen and Shenzhen) and four industrial sectors 
(textiles, garments, electrical appliances and iron and steel). Convincing 
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evidence of over-compensation only arose among the SOE group and only 
in the textile and garments sectors, and not until 1991 and 1992. 1992 
estimates of labour income share and output elasticity respectively were 
0.811 and 0.57 for textiles, 0.753 (0.909 in 1991) and 0.68 in garments, 0.24 
and 0.91 in electrical appliances and 0.400 and 0.60 in iron and steel. Thus 
over-compensation is suggested for the garments and textiles sectors but not 
for .electrical appliances or iron and steel. While conceding that the results 
could indicate that 'excessive worker remuneration particularly in light 
industry is becoming a serious problem', the overall conclusion of his paper 
is that 'growing competitive pressures on the domestic market are primarily 
responsible for the erosion of profit rates in Chinese industry'. He notes that 
this profit erosion has occurred consistently across all three ownership types 
featured in his study. 
Naughton (1994b) expressed scepticism at the over-compensation argument, 
noting that 'the wage bill, including all monetary subsidies, has remained 
unchanged at approximately 5 per cent of GNP since 1978'. Sachs and Woo 
( 1997) criticise this conclusion on two grounds. First, the appropriate 
denominator for evaluating the SOE wage bill is not GNP but total value 
added for the SOE sector (which as already noted has declined significantly 
relative to GNP). Second, this calculation does not take account of indirect 
labour income. Jefferson and Rawski ( 1994) also seek to rebut the over-
compensation argument, employing Yearbook data to note that the 252 per 
cent rise in monetary compensation of SOE industrial workers between 
1980 ad 1992 was almost matched by the 231 per cent rise in labour 
productivity over the same period. This yielded only a slight rise in the 
labour income share of gross output, from 7 .0 to 7 .5 per cent. They also 
assert that, even if non-monetary forms of compensation were to double the 
true estimate of labour income share to 15 per cent, this would be no higher 
than most estimates of the gross output elasticity of labour. 
Knight, Song and Jia (1999) focus on the employment and remuneration of 
rural migrant workers relative to regular employees. Their data sample 
comprises 118 urban enterprises in four cities; Beijing, Shenzhen, Wuhan 
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and Suzhou. The sample firms are of mixed ownership types; 54.7 per cent 
state-owned, 20.5 per cent collective and 24.8 per cent of other types, with a 
bias towards large firms hiring rural migrants. Estimating a production 
function in which migrant labour and non-migrant labour served as separate 
inputs (alongside capital), they calculate a marginal product of migrant 
labour of 20,706 yuan per annum at the mean values. This is considerably 
higher than the geometric mean wage of migrant labour (5,368 yuan per 
annum). Non-migrant labour on the other hand was found to have a 
marginal product of 5,597, below their mean wage of 6,956 yuan per 
annum. This indicates over-compensation of regular employees and 
constraints in the hiring of migrant employees. It may be the case that 
regular employees or 'insiders' act as de-facto owners of the firm, 
effectively sharing profits and maximising their own incomes but employing 
migrants or 'outsiders' on a quite different, profit-maximising basis. This 
question is taken up in detail in Chapter 4. 
Not all of the literature relevant to the over-compensation debate has 
followed the income share framework. Sicular ( 1995) produced a theoretical 
analysis that modeled the behaviour of SOEs as maximising internally 
retained funds, comprising retained profits, employee wages and benefits, 
and subsidies net of taxes. With the size of the firm's labour force 
exogenously set, the two choice variables for this type of firm are the 
quantity of capital employed and the wage rate (incorporating non-cash 
benefits). The model bears some similarity to models of labour-managed 
firms, such as those developed to describe firms in socialist Yugoslavia. 
Sicular did not include any empirical analysis but her paper contributes a 
behavioural explanation of the over-compensation argument. 
Meng and Perkins ( 1998) can be seen as an attempt to empirically test a 
model along similar lines to that of Sicular. They seek to test the hypothesis 
that SOEs and COEs behave as labour-managed firms, while foreign-
invested firms and TVEs exhibit profit-maximising behaviour. Their data set 
covers 193 firms from Shanghai, Xiamen, Guangzhou and Shenzhen; 117 
SOEs, 24 COEs, 13 TVEs and 38 foreign-invested enterprises. The TVEs 
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and FIEs were combined into one group. The following nested model was 
tested: 
Average conipensation = f (Labour productivity, Retained profits per 
employee) 
The hypothesis was that compensation in SOEs and COEs would be 
dominated by retained profits per employee and that compensation in FIEs 
and TVEs would be dominated by labour productivity. The regression 
results broadly supported these hypotheses. It does not necessarily follow 
however that these results, as interesting as they are, provide strong support 
to the over-compensation argument in the SOE debate. Chapter 2 has 
already related the formal and legitimate links between the total SOE wage 
bill and retained profits under the 'floating wage' system. These results 
could be interpreted as merely reflecting this relationship. Meng and 
Perkins' analysis supports the contention that SOE employees act as de-
facto owners, sharing out some of the profits of the firm. But it does not 
show the extent of any 'illicit profit sharing' , nor does it establish that the 
total compensation of employees under such a system is necessarily higher 
than the share that workers might receive under a profit-maximising regime. 
In another behavioural contribution to the literature, Gordon and Li ( 1999) 
construct an analytical framework incorporating a state sector with a 
compressed wage structure, competing with a non-state sector that is free of 
wage-compressing controls. Their paper purports to explain, among other 
phenomena, (1) the migration of the most skilled SOE workers to the non-
state sector, (2) higher productivity in the non-state sector, (3) accounting 
losses in the state sector reflecting the transfer of tax revenue to finance 
higher wage payments to unskilled state sector workers, and (4) 
restructuring within the state sector, to reduce the distortions to relative 
wages. The paper cites some empirical evidence backing up its assertions 
but is not an econometric work. It is notable in providing a single 
framework that theoretically supports the arguments of the pessimistic 
school, regarding both TFP performance and over-compensation, as well as 
intra-urban sector labour migration trends. 
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Groves et al. (1994), mentioned in Section 3.2, also produced some relevant 
insights for the over-compensation debate. They find that the productivity 
generated in SOEs by strengthened workers' incentives raised workers' 
incomes (but not those of their managers) and generated greater investment 
by the enterprises, but did not result in lower subsidies or increased profits. 
To summarise, the existing literature provides a number of pieces of 
evidence to support the over-compensation argument. However, more 
evidence is needed to form a strong conclusion. In particular, SOE data 
covering more recent years and more industrial sectors should be examined 
to confirm the income share trends reported by such authors as Woo et al. 
and Minami and Hondai. The analysis should explicitly compare labour 
income shares with estimates of labour output elasticity so as to distinguish 
whether the observed expansion of labour income share represents the 
competing down of excess profits or actual over-compensation. 
Such an analysis could usefully be extended by examining the evidence for 
overcompensation across firms of different sizes, and across light and heavy 
industrial sectors. If overcompensation is to be viewed as the result of a 
breakdown in state monitoring and control, then the evidence for it might 
indicate where that breakdown has been most severe. It could be that state 
monitoring is more difficult to conduct over a large number of small firms 
than a small number of large firms. Derong Chen ( 1995) has asserted that 
state controls were withdrawn more rapidly from light industrial sectors than 
from heavy industry. If this were the case, we could expect to see stronger 
evidence of overcompensation in light industry than in heavy industry. 
Other explanations 
Several other explanations for poor profitability or for poor overall 
performance by SOEs have been variously advanced in the literature. Some 
of these could be categorised within the three alternatives of competition, 
productivity and over-compensation discussed above. 
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Lin et al. (1996) discuss the 'policy burdens' imposed on SOEs by their 
state owners, referring to their duty to provide welfare services at a certain 
standard, the interest cost of capital previously acquired on apparently 
interest-free terms, and lingering price distortions. These writers argue that 
SOE performance cannot be properly judged until SOEs and NSEs compete 
with each other on an equal basis. It should be noted that NSEs face certain 
'policy burdens' of their own, such as inferior access to bank borrowings. 
Moreover, the policy burdens that Lin et al. cite could be considered as 
causes of poor productivity growth (which is the viewpoint of EAAU 1997), 
or in the case of welfare services, as possible manifestations of over-
compensation. 
Some writers have identified over-investment as a cause of poor 
performance. There is general acceptance of the proposition that many areas 
of Chinese industry suffered from over-investment during the reform period, 
and that this turned the markets for most commodities from a state of under-
supply to a state of over-supply ('buyer's markets'). If SOEs have suffered 
from over-investment at a sectoral level, so have NSEs who operate in the 
same markets. However, SOEs' lack of freedom to divest themselves of 
unneeded capital capacity is a particular obstacle faced by them. For that 
matter, the inability to divest themselves of substantial excess labour up to 
· ,. the mid-1990s can also be considered seriously as a cause of under-
performance. A special case of the problem of over-capacity is the 
'weeding-in' phenomenon' referred to for example by Jefferson and Singh 
(1997). 'Weeding-in' denotes the non-exit of poor-performing SOEs from 
the state-sector and the exit of some of the most profitable SOEs from the 
state sector to assume other forms such as foreign joint ventures. It is 
analogous to the over-capacity problem in the sense that some completely 
obsolescent firms may represent in their entirety bundles of idle capital and 
l_abour whose scrapping would raise the overall performance of the SOE 
sector. 
Finally, the persistent soft budget phenomenon can be thought of as a cause 
of poor performance, albeit one that works through a variety of channels 
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(see the discussion in Chapter 2). 'Soft' firms pay 'soft wages'; they tend to 
indulge in over-compensation. They tend not to exit the economy even when 
performing poorly, leading to a weeding-in effect. This in turn leaves more 
than the optimal level of capacity in the economy. A 'soft' economic 
environment would be associated with poor TFP performance. And in- such 
an environment, as Kornai noted (Chapter 2), responses to price signals are 
weak. 
3.6 Addressing the debate: the burden of proof 
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I will seek to advance the policy 
debate on the Chinese SOE sector by addressing the sub-debate on the 
causes of poor financial performance. How can this best be done? How 
should we best judge the plausibility o_f each of the three explanations? How 
could we decide whether to award the honours in the debate to either the 
optimistic camp or the pessimists? In order to answer these questions, first 
let us consider in turn each of the three proposed explanations -
competition, productivity and over-compensation- and what onus of proof 
ought to be placed upon either school before we can accept either case as 
proven. 
First consider the competition argument. It is very clear that the SOE sector 
prior to reform enjoyed very high profitability. It is also clear that each state 
firm operating under the old planned system generally did not need to 
consider the influence of competitors, since the plan guaranteed n1arkets and 
set output and input prices. Pre-reform SOEs enjoyed an environment 
sin1ilar to monopoly. By contrast, post-reform SOEs in most sectors must 
now contend with non-state sector competitors that continually expand in 
size and number. In addition, SOEs now compete with each other for 
customers (a point that is sometimes overlooked by researchers). In theory, 
perfect competition among homogeneous firms leads to zero economic 
profits, while in practice most market economies show positive economic 
profit rates in excess of interest rates, since firms are not homogeneous but 
are able to build market power through differentiated products. Let us use 
the term 'normal profits' to refer to the positive profits that prevail in typical 
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market economies. In China's case it would be surprising indeed if the 
expansion of competition had not led to the competing down of the super-
normal profits of the pre-reform era. Profit decline attributable to this cause 
would certainly, as the optimists argue, represent a beneficial and necessary 
transition to a competitive market economy. If that transition were 
appropriately managed with no other factor detracting from SOE 
performance, it could theoretically lead to an endpoint of stable equilibrium 
in which SOEs were left competing equally with NSEs, both sectors earning 
normal profits. Such a transition to equilibrium forms an 'optimistic 
paradigm' whereby all of the decline in profit is attributable to increased 
competition and where the decline ceases once 'normal' profits are reached 
in both the SOE and NSE sectors. The transition would presumably take a 
number of years to complete. 
How is profitability affected by poor productivity? Low or even zero TFP 
growth in the SOE sector need not in itself lead to poor profitability. It has 
already been shown that TFP growth in the pre-reform period was 
approximately zero, and yet the sector enjoyed high profitability. In the 
absence of inter-firm competition, growth was achieved through capital 
accumulation and input and output prices were set so as to guarantee 
profitability even without TFP growth. By contrast, in the reform-period 
environment characterised by mounting competitive pressure, TFP becomes 
very relevant to profitability. However, in this context it is not absolute TFP 
growth but the relative productivity of the SOE and NSE sectors that is 
important. If all firms were otherwise identical, particularly in the input 
prices that they face, an advantage in TFP held by NSEs over SOEs would 
enable NSEs to charge lower output prices than SOEs for any given profit 
margin. Therefore, an intersectoral TFP gap (higher TFP levels in the NSE 
sector than in the SOE sector) in the presence of intensifying competition 
would damage SOE profitability in two ways. It would speed up the rate at 
which new NSE entrants compete down SOE sector profit margins, and it 
can also leave SOEs earning less than normal profits at the end of the 
transition when NSE profit rates have fallen to 'normal' levels. If NSEs 
were still achieving higher TFP growth than SOEs at this endpoint, then the 
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gap in TFP levels would continue to expand, forcing SOE profit rates ever 
downward even after NSE profit rates had stabilised at normal levels. 
It has already been shown above in our review of the existing TFP literature 
that an intersectoral gap in TFP growth clearly exists. However, a point that 
many researchers have missed is that TFP levels have been found to be 
higher in the SOE sector than the NSE sector in most studies (for example, 
Woo et al. 1994, Huang and Meng 1997). The question therefore is whether 
NSEs are growing their TFP faster than SOEs simply because they are in a 
temporary 'catch-up' phase, or whether are they destined to surpass SOE 
TFP levels and keep going. If NSEs had merely held a temporary advantage 
in TFP growth during the transition to a competitive market environment, 
then the SOE sector may still have a future. If however at the end of the 
market transition the NSE sector were to hold a significant and growing TFP 
advantage in level terms, then the SOE sector would be doomed to 
chronically expanding losses making its continued existence impossible to 
support. 
What of over-compensation of employees? For any given degree of 
competition and any given TFP gap, over-compensation of SOE employees 
reduces profits relative to what SOEs could have achieved given their 
productive efficiency. If it is prevalent enough, over-compensation at the 
end of market transition could make the difference between the SOE sector 
making positive profits or negative profits. The relevant questions to ask 
are: 
( 1) Does over-compensation exist? 
(2) How significant is it? 
(3) Does it expand or contract over time, especially at the end of the 
transition to competitive markets? 
In the light of this discussion, it would be too simplistic to attempt to resolve 
the debate over SOE performance by asking: 'How much of the profit 
decline is attributable to increased competition, and how much is due to the 
other two factors'. The burden of proof is not evenly balanced. The 
pessimistic school's case could withstand convincing evidence that 
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competition eroded SOE profits, if it could prove that either a TFP gap or 
chronic over-compensation would continue to bleed SOE profitability even 
after the transition to fully competitive markets. 
The onus upon the optimistic school is to show not only that intensifying 
competition contributed to declining profitability, but that it accounts for 
virtually the entire decline, viewed over the long run. If TFP divergence or 
over-compensation or both are found to contribute to SOE profit decline, 
then the optimistic school must show that this effect is only temporary, and 
that after the full transition to competitive markets SOE profits would 
converge to rates similar to those of NSEs. 
The onus upon the pessimistic school is to show that either the TFP gap or 
over-compensation or both together are significantly large, and that they are 
not temporary phenomena, implying that after market transition SOE sector 
profitability is doomed to persist at unsustainably low levels. 
3.7 Conclusion: proposed analysis 
In the light of the above discussion, the remaining analysis of this thesis 
concentrates upon the question of over-compensation. Further evidence on 
the competition question, while interesting, would not necessarily resolve 
the SOE debate, since the pessimists' argument could happily co-exist with 
evidence that competition reduced profits. Further evidence on TFP is also 
unlikely to resolve ·the debate at this point. The TFP aspect has already been 
the subject of far more extensive research than either the competition 
question or the over-compensation question. Moreover, most studies have 
shown that, despite inferior TFP grow~h, the SOE sector enjoys a higher 
level of TFP than the NSE sector. What we need to know is whether the 
NSE sector is destined to catch up with the TFP levels of the SOE sector 
and then to keep on growing at a faster rate. We keenly await new TFP 
studies using good quality data from the late 1990s and the new century, to 
see whether such developments are revealed. However, this author has no 
such data to hand. 
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What this thesis can pursue is evidence of employee over-compensation by 
SOEs over the period from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. An extensive 
database collected by the Chinese Academy of Social Science covering the 
years 1980 to 1994 is suitable for this purpose. In Chapter 4, using the 
contribution of Sicular as a starting point, I develop a theoretical framework 
for addressing the over-compensation issue and the related behavioural 
issue. From this framework, I conclude that the most appropriate empirical 
test for the over-compensation question would be one along the lines of 
Minami and Hondai (1995) or Raiser (1997b). Such a test is carried out in 
Chapter 5. 
Endnotes 
1 The producer price index is not available for the pre-reform years. However, it is known 
that price levels varied little under the traditional centrally planned system. 
2 For completeness, the variable output elasticities are as follows: 
aQ K 
s K == - - == a K + a KK In K + a KL In L , and aK Q 
3 Official data for independent accounting units excludes industrial activity carried out by 
non-industrial organisations, such as university publishing and printing houses. 
4 After-tax profits for SOEs 'within the budget', a large subset of the SOE sector, actually 
turned negative a year earlier, in the first quarter of 1996. In the seasonal production pattern 
of the Chinese economy, the first quarter is typically the weakest, since it encompasses the 
Lunar New Year holiday period, when enterprises shut down for as long as a month. 
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4 
Explaining the puzzle of state-owned enterprise 
performance: the labour-managed firm 
Chapters 2 and 3 have highlighted two unresolved controversies in the 
literature on Chinese SOEs in the reform period, which I refer to as the 
'Behavioural Issue' and the 'Over-compensation Issue'. The Behavioural 
Issue relates to the hypothesis that Chinese SOEs have not been behaving as 
profit-maximising firms but rather sought to maximise the benefits accruing 
to their own employees. The Over-compensation Issue is closely related and 
refers to the assertion made by the Pessimistic School that poor SOE 
financial performance can be explained by increases to SOE wages and 
benefits beyond the extent that would be justified by productivity. This 
chapter develops a theoretical framework from which empirical tests can be 
designed to address both these issues. We begin from the contribution of 
Sicular ( 1995), who put forward a theoretical model to explain SOE loss-
making on the basis of a different objective function from that of the 
standard profit-maximising firm. The Sicular model is considered to be a 
variation of the Labour-Managed Firm (LMF) model. 
The profit-maximising firm (PMF), which forms the basis of standard 
Western microeconomic theory, seeks as its name suggests to maximise the 
return to capital owners, or after-tax profits. Profit is defined as total revenue 
minus total costs, the costs including the costs of capital, labour, 
intermediate materials and other inputs. Labour-managed firms on the other 
hand seek to maximise the return to the firm's workers, who share out the 
firm's profits as well as receiving wages. Therefore, whereas the firm's total 
wage bill is a negative component in the objective function of the PMF, it 
appears twice in the objective function of the LMF, as both a negative and a 
positive component. In effect, it cancels itself out, leaving the LMF to 
maximise total revenues minus total costs excluding labour costs. A more 
detailed mathematical examination of the objective functions of PMFs and 
LMFs is presented below. 
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The hypothesis here is that enterprise reforms in China, while ostensibly 
encouraging SOEs to maximise profits, have in fact created incentives for 
the firms to recycle potential profits into extra payments and non-cash 
benefits for employees. In other words, SOEs may have been acting 
clandestinely as labour-managed firms. Such a behavioural model, if 
verified by empirical analysis, would explain why gains in SOE productivity 
have not been matched by concomitant gains in profitability. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents a review of four 
theoretical models pertinent to the analysis. The first of these is the standard 
model of a profit-maximising firm, which serves as a reference point from 
which the other models are developed. Next, three distinct versions of the 
labour-managed firm model are reviewed. The first of these is the so-called 
'Illyrian' model developed by Ward (1958), Vanek (1970) and others to 
describe the behaviour of firms in socialist Yugoslavia. The second is a 
model developed by Sicular ( 1995) for specific application to the 
performance puzzle of Chinese SOEs, but which has not been empirically 
tested by Sicular herself. The third LMF model incorporates a labour force 
that is segmented into 'insiders' and 'outsiders' with only the 'insiders' 
being entitled to profit shares. In Section 4.2, we discuss a number of 
complicating factors that must be taken into account in applying LMF 
models to prevailing Chinese circumstances. This discussion includes 
explanations of the various measures that are proposed to deal with each of 
these complications. We then proceed in Section 4.3 to the development of 
an empirical test to identify from data whether SOEs in fact behave as PMFs 
or LMFs. This section commences with a review and critique of a paper by 
Meng and Perkins (1998), which was the first to attempt an empirical test of 
this sort. Having noted the strengths and weaknesses of the Meng-Perkins 
approach, an alternative test is proposed. This empirical test is carried out in 
Chapter 5. 
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4.1 Review of theoretical models 
This section reviews and compares four firm-behavioural models that are 
pertinent to the analysis of this chapter: the standard model of a profit-
maximising firm; the Ward-Vanek LMF model, the Sicular model for 
Chinese SOEs, and an Insider-Outsider version of the LMF model. The 
review of each model encompasses the model's background and context, its 
objective function and choice variables, first-order conditions for 
optimisation, consideration of the scale at which optimisation is achieved, 
capital-labour ratios under optimisation, factor income shares, and other 
notable features. To elucidate the models, both general and specific 
production functions are employed. Purely for conve~ience and ease of 
exposition, the specific production functions used here are of the Cobb-
Douglas form. However, in the actual empirical testing other functional . 
forms are tested for explanatory power against Cobb-Douglas. The four 
theoretical models are considered under two distinct sets of assumptions 
regarding economies of scale. These are, first, constant returns to scale 
(CRS), and second, a pattern in which returns to scale are first increasing 
(IRS) at low levels of scale, then constant at a certain point or through a 
range, and finally decreasing (DRS) at high levels of scale. 
Standard model of a profit-maximising firm 
The profit-maximising firm (PMF) is the standard model of a production 
unit in microeconomic theory. It is included here simply to provide a useful 
template upon which to consider the various LMF models and the ways in 
which they differ ( or do not differ) from the PMF. 
A conventional profit-maximising firm producing a single output good with 
two inputs, capital (K) and labour (L), possesses a technology defined by its 
production function. The firm is assumed to choose its inputs of K and L so 
as to maximise profits, defined as the difference between revenues and input 
costs. The objective function is as follows: 
Maxn = pV-rK-wL 
(K ,L) 
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(4.1.1) 
where ,r denotes profit, p denotes the price of value-added, V denotes value-
added, r denotes the cost of capital and w the cost of labour. This presents 
the simple case in which the firm is a price-taker in terms of output, and 
capital and labour; p, r and w are constants. 
We establish the convention here of using V rather than output Q as an 
argument in the profit function. This provides a neat way of incorporating 
information on various other types of inputs, such as materials, fuels and 
energy, for the empirical tests to be carried out in the. next chapter. Denoting 
all such miscellaneous inputs as M, we can define Vas (Q-M). The price of 
value-added p is a composite of output prices and materials prices. We 
implicitly assume here that the quantity of materials required is a fixed 
proportion of output and hence of value-added and that no substitution is 
possible between materials and the other two inputs. This is not an entirely 
realistic assumption. In the real world, some material inputs are certainly of 
this type. For example, a certain quantity of raw wool is required to produce 
a yard of pure worsted cloth. Other types of material, clothing dyes for 
example, do not possess this quality; a manufacturer may use more or less of 
the material per unit of output. Moreover, some material inputs such as 
agricultural fertilisers are substitutable for other inputs. Unfortunately, firm-
level data typically does not allow us to distinguish between expenditure on 
different types of input, hence the need for a simplifying assumption. 
Substituting the general production function V= V( K,L) into the objective 
function, differentiating the objective variable 1rwith respect to the input 
choice variables Kand L and setting the derivatives to zero gives the 
standard first-order profit-maximising conditions whereby the marginal 
costs of each input Kand L are: 
and pVL = w. (4.1.2) 
These conditions imply that for profit maximisation, the marginal cost of 
each input (on the right-hand side) must equate to the value of marginal 
product of the input. 
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By combining the two first-order conditions we can derive an expression for 
the capital-labour ratio under optimality (in re the maximisation of Equation 
4.1.1 ). For this purpose it is convenient to replace the general production 
function with a specific function. We will use the Cobb-Douglas form: 
with A > 0, 0 < /J 1 < 1, 0 < /32 < 1. (4.1.3) 
The two first-order conditions become: 
(4.1.4) 
Dividing the two first-order conditions one by the other, the optimal 
capital-labour ratio is derived: 
(4.1.5) 
· This shows that the optimal factor intensity is a function of the relative 
factor prices and of the technology expressed via the coefficients of the 
production function. 
Under conditions of constant returns to scale, a PMF that acts as a price 
taker in all inputs and outputs will earn either positive, negative or zero 
profits at any level of scale. If profits are negative, it will not produce at all. 
If zero profits are attainable, the firm will be indifferent to the scale of 
production. If positive profits are attainable, the firm will always seek to 
expand the scale of output, to an infinite extent, since it is always profitable 
to do so under these assumptions. This is of course impossible in reality. In 
practice it is not possible for a firm to face both constant returns to scale and 
constant input costs at all levels of scale. Once a firm grows large enough it 
will face a downward-sloping demand curve for its products, upward-
sloping supply curves for its inputs and in many if not most cases decreasing 
returns to scale. 
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In the more realistic case of increasing-constant-decreasing returns to scale, 
and assuming again that the firm is a price-taker in all markets, if positive 
profits are attainable then the firm will always optimise at a point in the 
range of decreasing returns to scale. This is self-evident since, while in 
either the increasing returns to scale or constant returns to scale range, the 
firm is always in a position where it can increase profits by increasing scale. 
Therefore it will always expand its scale of production into the decreasing 
returns to scale range. If the firm has market power in either input or output 
markets (is not a price-taker), then the optimal point also may occur in the 
increasing returns to scale or the constant returns to scale ranges, depending 
on the particular specifications of the supply, demand and production 
functions. 
Under the Cobb-Douglas functional form the factor income shares are easily 
shown. Having defined value-added Vas the value of output minus all input 
costs other than capital and labour, the question of allocating factor income 
becomes one of dividing Vamong the various providers of capital and 
labour services. Transforming equation ( 4.1.5) we have: 
If economic profits are zero, then rK + wL = V. In this case, rK represents 
aggregate payments to capital and wL the wage bill, and we can write the 
factor income shares as follows: 
and (4.1.7) 
/JK and /JL thus represent the fractions of V claimed by capital and by labour, 
respectively. If the entrepreneur or shareholders had raised the capital via 
indirect finance (bank finance), then the amount rK is paid to the bank; if the 
capital is from direct finance (the owners' equity) then rK is collected by the 
owner(s) themselves. If there are positive profits then we have rK + wL + ;r 
= V and the owners must receive ;rin addition to rK (if the -capital is 
financed from owners' equity), while labour still receives only wL. In this 
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case, the factor shares of capital and labour as represented in equation 
( 4.1. 7) are amended to: 
and (4.1.7a) 1 
The Ward-Vanek labour-managed firm 
Since the initial works of Ward (1958) and Vanek (1970), which introduced 
the 'Illyrian' model of a firm managed by its workers, a considerable 
literature has emerged around the labour-managed firm. Ward and Vanek 
originally wrote in the context of firms in socialist Yugoslavia (the region of 
modern Yugoslavia roughly corresponds to the ancient Roman province of 
Illyria, hence the name). However, the model has come to be applied to a 
broader variety of economic situations, including producer cooperatives in 
the major market economies. A sole owner-manager in a market economy 
could be thought of a special case of the labour-managed firm. Some of its 
advocates claim the LMF to present a more 'democratic' model of economic 
organisation than either its standard 'capitalist' counterpart or Stalinist 
socialism. 
Profits in an LMF are divided among the workers, who also control the firm 
by electing the management. Each worker seeks to maximise his or her own 
income, comprising a base wage plus a share of the firm's profits, and via 
his voting power compels the management to maximise income per worker, 
for which we use the notation y . The expression y denotes income per 
worker at its maximised level. Assuming a uniform base wage and uniform 
profit shares for all workers in the firm, we have the following objective 
function: 
M 1r (pV(K,L)-rK-wL) axY=-+w=--------+w 
{K,L) L L 
(4.1.8) 
It can be seen from this expression that the actual level of the base wage is 
irrelevant to the firm in terms of maximising the objective function, since 
wages w cancel out on the right hand side,2 reducing the expression to: 
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Max(pV-rK) 
{K,L} L 
(4.1.9) 
Substituting in the general production function, the following first-order 
conditions for optimisation can be derived: 
and pVL = (pV - rK) = y. 
L 
(4.1.10) 
The former condition, that the value -marginal product of capital equates to 
the rental cost of capital, is no different from the first first-order condition 
that we noted above for the PMF. The latter condition, however, differs 
from the PMF in that the marginal value product of labour is equated not to 
the wage but to the maximum attainable income per worker. Rather than the 
wage, it is income per worker- the amount that the firm must pay to any 
marginal additional worker- which constitutes the marginal cost of labour 
for the labour-managed firm. Indeed, for the present purposes, the wage in 
LMFs is irrelevant and may be set at zero with no inconvenience. 
A labour-managed firm that is a price-taker will always optimise by 
producing at constant returns to scale. Suppose it were operating at 
increasing returns to scale, then income per worker could always be 
increased by increasing the scale of output. On the other hand, at decreasing 
returns to scale, income per worker could always be increased by decreasing 
the scale of production. If constant returns to scale were to prevail over a 
range of output scales, then the firm would be indifferent between any of 
those points at which constant returns to scale prevailed. For example, under 
constant returns to scale an LMF with ·-10 workers could divide itself 
amoeba-like into two firms of five workers each, leaving all the workers no 
better or worse off; income per worker would be unchanged. This of course 
assumes the absence of any frictional costs in hiring, firing, or otherwise 
restructuring the firm. 
To examine the capital-labour ratio of the LMF under optimisation, we 
again employ the first-order conditions as derived from the specific Cobb-
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Douglas production function and divide them one by the other. This gives 
the following: 
Kl= /JK(pV - rK/L) 
7L f]Lr 
- f]Ky 
f]Lr 
. (4.1.11) 
We can see that in this expression compared with the equivalent expression 
in the case of the PMF, the only difference is that maximised income per 
worker y replaces the wage. Let us imagine a hypothetical economy 
populated by both PMFs and LMFs, all possessing the same technology. So 
long as the prevailing wage rate facing the (price-taking) PMFs happens to 
equate with the maximum income per worker attainable by LMFs, then both 
types of firm will behave identically as regards their factor intensity. 
Moreover, with free movement of labour, this equality in worker incomes 
can be viewed as an equilibrium condition since, if it did not hold, workers 
would be induced to migrate from one form to the other. Such an 
equilibrium would also entail zero profits for the PMFs, as per the standard 
result for price-taking PMFs under constant returns to scale. 
The system of factor income distribution in LMFs is clearly different from 
the PMF case since any profits are paid to workers rather than to providers 
of capital. To usefully compare the LMF case with the PMF case, let us 
assume that LMFs and PMFs coexist and set a 'wage' w* within the LMF 
sector that happens to be equal to that prevailing in the PMF sector. 
Payments to LMF employees in excess of (falling short of) w are defined as 
profits (losses), so that we have y = w·* +75{. If profits so defined are zero 
and constant returns to scale prevail such that /JK + /JL = 1, then the factor 
income distribution is identical to the PMF case with zero profits. This 
follows because (4.1.11) is the equivalent of (4.1.5), giving us rK = /JKVas 
the factor income share of capital, with w*L = /JL V following from the CRS 
condition. If profits, as defined here, are positive then we have: 
127 
and (4.1.12) 
With positive economic profits therefore, the factor income share of labour 
ought to be less than its output elasticity under profit maximisation, but 
would exceed its output elasticity under labour management. 
In the context of factor income distribution, we can consider the Chinese 
SOE under the Contract Management Responsibility System and the floating 
wage system as representing a kind of hybrid between the PMF and the 
Illyrian LMF. In many cases, both the state (as shareholder) and employees 
both typically had claims on profits as stipulated in the contracts. 
The Sicular model of Chinese SOEs 
A model constructed by Sicular ( 1995) to explain the loss-making behaviour 
of Chinese SOEs shares some characteristics with the Ward-Vanek 'Illyrian' 
model. Hence I use the term Sicular LMF to refer to its representative firm 
and to distinguish it from the Illyrian LMF. 
A Sicular LMF maximises 'internally retained funds', which include both 
profits and wages as in the Illyrian model, plus any subsidies that the firm 
might be able to obtain from government, minus taxes. This is quite 
analogous to worker income as it has been considered above, since taxes and 
subsidies could easily be incorporated into the Illyrian model. It should be 
noted that 'wages' in this context include not only monetary payments but 
also all types of non-cash benefits received by workers, such as housing, 
health and education services, the sum of which typically comprises a large 
portion of the real income of SOE employees. In Sicular' s approach, what 
the firm explicitly maximises is the totality of these funds rather than funds 
per worker. Since a fixed labour force is assumed, income per worker is also 
maximised, albeit in an implicit sense. The quantity of labour, being fixed, 
does not serve as a choice variable. The firm is free to set its own wage rate, 
and therefore the wage serves as a second choice variable along with the 
quantity of capital. Thus described, the objective function of the Sicular 
LMF would be expressible as follows: 
128 
MaxE =JZ'+ wL+ s == pV-rK -wL+ wL+ s 
{K,w) 
== pV-rK +S 
where E denotes internally retained funds and S denotes subsidies. 
(4.1.13) 
A feature of this model is that it can be specified to incorporate either a hard 
or a soft budget constraint. For example, we could set subsidies equal to 
zero and require that profits not fall below zero (a hard-budget assumption). 
Alternatively, we could assume that any negative profits would be fully 
compensated by subsidies, either up to a certain amount, or even infinitely 
(an extreme soft-budget assumption). As a starting point we will take the 
former assumption; that subsidies are unavailable and that profits may not 
fall below zero, that is: 
pV-rK-wL >O (4.1.14) 
The maximisation problem can now be written without subsidies and with 
the non-negative profit constraint as follows: 
Max Ens == pV(K, L) - rK + A[pV(K, L)- rK - wL] (4.1.15) 
{K,w) 
Differentiating with respect to K gives the familiar first order condition pVK 
= r, just as in the PMF and Illyrian LMF models. The choice of the wage 
rate w, despite playing a role in meeting the non-negative profits constraint, 
is irrelevant to the productive behaviour and efficiency of the firm. The first-
order condition generated via differentiation of w is w < (p V = rK) . That 
L 
is, w may take any value so long as it is.low enough to avoid negative 
profits. Under the objective function as expressed above, the firm (including 
its workers, assuming that profits are to be distributed equitably among all 
employees) would regard all levels of the wage with indifference. 
Nevertheless, the firm's choice of wage level has a critical effect on its 
financial performance, determining the decomposition of the firm's internal 
funds among wages and profits and hence whether the firn1 is profit- or loss-
making. We will examine this aspect in more detail below. 
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As labour is not a choice variable in this model, the firm can only optimise 
subject to the pseudo-constraint created by its initial endowment of L. 
Whether the attainable 'constrained optimum' is equal to or inferior to the 
unconstrained optimum that would obtain if the firm were free to set L, that 
is, whether a Sicular LMF is capable of achieving the same level of factor 
productivity as an Illyrian firm with an identical production function, 
depends on scale considerations. 
Under the case whereby constant returns to scale prevail everywhere, the 
efficient choice of K will imply constant returns to scale and hence an 
efficient 'choice' of L. This follows from the standard result wherein under 
constant returns to scale, a production function in two inputs can be 
transformed into a production function in the ratio of those inputs, with 
output expressed in per-worker terms. For example, the production function 
V = F(K,L) transforms to V = F(K ,1) or v = f (k). Choosing the optimal 
L L 
level of capital given the fixed labour force is therefore equivalent to 
choosing the optimal capital-labour ratio, and is sufficient for a global 
optimum. 
Under an assumption of increasing-constant-decreasing returns to scale, full 
efficiency is only attainable over the constant returns to scale range. It may 
be the case that the firm's endowment of labour is too small, so that even 
with the most efficient choice of capital the firm would be operating under 
increasing returns to scale, and cannot attain a global optimum. On the other 
hand, too high an initial endowment of labour may consign the firm to 
decreasing returns to scale. In either of.these cases, internal funds per worker 
could be increased if the firm were free to adjust capital and labour 
simultaneously so as to arrive in the constant returns to scale range of 
output. 
To derive an expression for the optimal KIL ratio in this model, we can use 
the first-order condition p VK = rand the fact that labour is fixed at L. Again 
specifying the production function as Cobb-Douglas, we have: 
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(4.1.16) 
It can be seen therefore that the capital-labour ratio is a function of the 
initial endowment of labour L as well as the parameters of the production 
function. Were these parameters such that constant returns to scale were to 
prevail, that is, should /JK and /JL sum to unity, then the expression would 
simplify to: 
(4.1.17) 
In other words, if constant returns were attainable, then the initial 
endowment of labour would be immaterial as far as the optimal KIL ratio is 
concerned. If, on the other hand, returns were increasing ( decreasing), that is 
if the sum of /JK and /JL were greater than (less than) unity, then production 
would be more (less) capital intensive than in the case of constant returns to 
scale. 
It was noted above that the choice of w had no effect on the firm's 
- . 
productive efficiency in this model, but that it did have a critical impact on 
financial performance. Clearly, any increases in the wage, while having no 
net effect on the firm's objective, decrease profits by transferring them to the 
wage bill. To see why the firm may wish to do this, we can add further 
f ea tu res to the model. 
One modification we can n1ake is to adopt a different set of assun1ptions 
regarding subsidies and budget constraints. Two possible approaches to this 
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are (1) to assume that infinite subsidies are available to make good any 
losses incurred by the firm, and (2) to assume that subsidies are available up 
to a certain finite amount. In the former case, the intuitive solution is very 
obvious; the firm would seek to employ an infinite quantity of inputs 
(confined to capital inputs due to the assumption of the fixed labour force), 
so long as the marginal product of such inputs were positive. Such a case is 
theoretically instructive but unrealistic; in the real world some constraint 
must operate. Let us therefore leave this case to one side and examine the 
second case more closely. 
If we set the ceiling on subsidies to So, and assume that the government will 
fully compensate losses up to this amount, then we can write: 
rK + wL - pV = S < S0 
Therefore the optimisation problem simplifies as follows: 
Max Es= pV(K,L)- rK -wL + wL + S0 
K ,w 
= pV(K,L)- rK -wL + wL + rK + wL - pV(K,L) 
=wL 
(4.1.18) 
(4.1.19) 
The firm is now no longer indifferent to a wide range of values for w and 
has a single optimal choice. Having chosen the optimal levels of Kand 
hence V, it then raises wage payments wL up to the limit represented by 
equation ( 4.1.18). 
Another motivation for increasing the wage bill at the expense of profits 
arises from the effects of taxes. For most of the reform period, the incomes 
of most industrial workers lay below the tax-free threshold for income tax. 
Therefore, while profits were typically taxable (see Chapter 2 for a review of 
tax regimes), wages were taxed lightly, if at all. This produced an incentive 
for the firm to conve1t its internal funds from profits to wages. To illustrate 
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this more formally, the objective function can be re-written to incorporate 
profit tax. At this point, we return to the assumption of no subsidies and 
non-negative profits. We also introduce capital depreciation; this allows us 
to write the function essentially as it appeared in Sicular' s paper: 
Max Ens= pV(K,L)-wL -(r+ o)K + wL -T-t[pV(K,L)-wL -(r+ d)K -T] 
{K,w} 
= (1- t)[pV(K, L)- wL - r + d)K -T] + wL + (d - o)K (4.1.20) 
where Ens denotes internally retained funds in the absence of subsidies, T 
denotes lump-sum taxes (such as the adjustment tax), t denotes the rate of 
profit tax, o denotes the actual rate of depreciation on physical capital, and d 
denotes the rate of depreciation that the Chinese authorities permit firms to 
employ in their accounts. 
Differentiating by K, we obtain the first-order conditions governing the 
allocation of capital: 
(4.1.21) 
Having maximised its productive efficiency via its choice of K, the firm is 
induced by the tax bias against profits and in favour of wages to choose w so 
as to convert all potential profits into wages. This would imply that the 
optimal level of retained income equates precisely with the wage bill, also 
expressible as value added less capital costs and lump-sum taxes. We can 
write: 
E: = pV* -(r+o)K* -T = _w*L (4.1.22) 
where asterisks denote optimal values. 
In both the above cases, a preference for wages over profits within the mix 
of internal funds induces the firm to 'aim' its profit outcome at the lowest 
possible level given the constraints it faces. But note again that the model 
characteristics that generate zero or negative profits in no way impair the 
firm in its pursuit of productive efficiency. 
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In considering the factor income distribution characteristics of the Sicular 
LMF, it is useful to again consider my above observation that the Chinese 
SOE under CMRS could be thought of as a kind of hybrid between the PMF 
and the Illyrian LMF. Formally, the CMRS contracts should stipulate the 
proportions of the operating surplus (profits) accruing to the state and to 
employees, respectively. In Sicular's world however, the true profit shares 
actually paid out are determined by the employees' capacity to transfer 
resources to themselves and to conceal this activity from the government 
agencies. The firm's actual profit share therefore is likely to be more 
generous than that written into the CMRS contract. We can consider true 
total profit .1ras being divided into the government's and the employees' 
shares, denoted .7rc; and Jrw respectively. The firm notionally pays the rK to 
the state via the state-owned bank and seeks to maximise the employees' 
share of value-added, which is MPL + Jrw. Since Jrw = Jr- Jrc;, it has two 
ways of maximising Jrw; it can maximise .1rby operating efficiently and it 
can also minimise Jrc; by surreptitiously transferring resources. The extent to 
which it can do the latter depends upon the weakness of state monitoring 
mechanisms. The weaker those mechanisms are, the greater will be the 
extent to which the employee share of value-added exceeds to output 
elasticity of labour. One can consider Jrc; to be to some extent institutionally 
determined by the monitoring regime, as has been suggested above. 
The Sicular LMF model would seem to hold some promise as a means of 
explaining SOE behaviour. Furthermore, the model has the attractive feature 
of allowing us to consider varying degrees of budget 'hardness' and their 
effects on firm behaviour. A possible weakness of this model, how-ever, is 
that the assumption of a fixed labour force weakens its realism and 
usefulness. 
It is debatable whether Sicular' s fixed labour force as-sumption presents an 
accurate depiction of the environment facing Chinese SOEs. It is certainly 
the case that through most of the reform period SOEs operated something 
akin to the Japanese system of lifetime employment. It was virtually unheard 
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of even for loss-making firms to dismiss significant numbers of employees 
(although this has changed under the most recent reforms). Nevertheless, as 
Meng and Perkins (1998) argue, SOEs have gradually acquired the right to 
hire and fire employees. They note from survey evidence that by the early 
1990s a majority of state firms claimed to have the right to dismiss workers, 
even though they may have been reluctant to exercise that right since they 
are politically accountable for the overall welfare of their employees. In 
modelling terms, we could propose that the firm is free to dismiss workers, 
but that there is a cost to be incurred for doing so, and that this cost 
increases sharply with the number of workers to be dismissed. This would 
allow the firm to remove the occasional recalcitrant, but would make large-
scale retrenchments unattractive, with the costs of severance and damage to 
workplace morale exceeding the labour cost savings. Even though it may be 
reasonably accurate to assume that SOEs never reduce their labour forces, it 
is another matter to assume that they never increase their labour forces 
either. Moreover, in practical terms it is very difficult to proceed with 
empirical testing of a model that assumes a fixed labour force when it will 
be found (as we do in Chapter 5) that the data inevitably reveal firms ' labour 
forces increasing over time. 
A potential solution to the problem of setting the most appropriate 
assumptions for the labour force lies in the fact that lifetime employment 
(the 'iron rice bowl') in SOEs only extends to those workers who are 
permanent employees of the firm. As noted in Chapter 2, such workers are 
not the only sources of SOE labour. SOEs also frequently hire temporary 
workers ( often migrants from rural areas) over whom they have more 
complete freedom to hire and fire. Firms are also free to contract out some 
of their work to other enterprises, including collective and privately-owned 
firms, as described for example in Chen (1995).3 Since these contracts need 
not be permanent arrangements, the effect is similar to having available a 
pool of discretionary labour. 
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The Insider-Outsider Labour-Managed Firm 
As a compromise between the Sicular model, with its fixed labour force, and 
the Illyrian model with its flexible force of profit-sharing employees, a third 
model can be constructed, which I refer to as the Insider-Outsider Labour-
Managed Firm (IOLMF). The IOLMF borrows from Lindbeck and Snower 
(1988) the concept of a firm in which some employees (insiders) are in an 
advantageous position relative to outsiders. 
Lindbeck and Snower' s paradigm sought to explain persistent involuntary 
unemployment in market economies. The differences between insiders and 
outsiders are described as follows: 
Insiders are experienced incumbent employees whose positions are protected by 
various job-preserving measures that make it costly for fums to fue them and hire 
someone in their place. The outsiders have no such protection; they are either 
unemployed or work at jobs in the "informal sector," which offer little, if any, job 
security. Insiders have more clout than outsiders.4 
In standard insider-outsider models, dismissal of insiders is costly for 
various reasons, and therefore insiders are able to demand and receive wages 
in excess of what outsiders would accept in order to work in the firm. This 
can result in a non-market-clearing equilibrium in the labour market and 
involuntary unemployment among the outsiders. 
Our model of the insider-outsider LMF is not motivated by any desire to 
explain unemployment but simply to model accurately the labour-hiring 
behavior of SOEs. We postulate the existence of two classes of employee, 
insider and outsider. Insiders (the permanent worker class employees of 
SOEs) cannot be dismissed (or at least not without incurring prohibitive 
costs) and their numbers are regarded as fixed. Outsiders, on the other hand, 
represent temporary workers and subcontractors, and may be employed and 
terminated freely. 
The firm maximises profits plus insider wages, after taxes and subsidies, 
divided by the number of insiders. The objective function is as follows: 
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(4.1.23) 
Here we implicitly assume that insiders and outsiders are equally productive. 
The wage paid to outsiders is market determined; the firm is a price-taker in 
w0 . It can be shown that the wage paid to insiders w1 is immaterial to the 
results, unless taxes and subsidies create a preference for wages over profit 
shares, as outlined in the Sicular model. We can abstract from taxes and 
subsidies for the moment by assuming that all taxes and subsidies are 
lump-sum and unaffected by firm behaviour. The level of w1 may be set 
equal to w0 , at a level higher than w0 or indeed at virtually any other level. 
The simplest assumption is in fact to set it at zero and assume that insiders 
take all their income in the form of profit shares. 
Differentiating with respect to Kand Lo, we derive the first-order 
conditions: 
and pVL = wo. (4.1.24) 
These are essentially the same as the first-order conditions for a profit-
maximising firm. This is not surprising if one looks back at the left hand 
side of the objective function. Setting w1 equal to zero eliminates it from the 
expression, and under the present assumptions T, S and L1 are all constants 
with respect to the choice variables. Therefore the objective function reduces 
simply to maximising profits by choosing capital and the flexible component 
of the labour force, outsider labour. 
In terms of both the optimum scale of production and the optimum 
capital-labour ratio, the IOLMF again shares the characteristics of the PMF 
as discussed above. The only proviso worth noting is that in the expression 
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for the optimal KIL ratio, /3K Wo the wage rate w0 is relevant only for the /3Lr 
outsider labourers. 
The factor income distribution for an IOLMF is analogous to that prevailing 
in other LMFs, excepting that the employees' share of profits is distributed 
only among insiders. Outsider employees receive only the equivalent of their 
output elasticities, or even less. Since outsiders are typically registered as 
rural residents, their reservation wages correspond to the wages in rural 
areas, rather than the higher wages prevailing in urban labour markets. 
Therefore urban SOEs may be able to pay rural outsiders even less than their 
value marginal products. Empirical results reported by Knight, Song and Jia 
( 1999) suggest that this has indeed been the case. This paper found evidence 
of over-compensation of SOE insiders and under-compensation of outsiders, 
and these findings were broadly supported by the evidence of Meng and 
Zhang (2001). Where an IOLMF also has some power to surreptitiously 
transfer profits from the state to its employees a la Sicular, its employees 
may receive the equivalent of their labour output elasticities plus a profit 
distribution, with the profit distribution coming from as many as three 
potential sources: (1) a legitimate profit share under CMRS contracts (2) 
illicit distributions from the State's share, and (3) proceeds from the 
exploitation of rural outsiders. The extent of insider over-compensation 
depends on the firm's power over state agencies and outsiders. As with the 
other models already discussed, rK is assumed to be paid to the providers of 
capital, such as state banks. However, the state as shareholder may also 
collect a negative profit share (incur a loss) if the employees' power to 
transfer and conceal funds is sufficiently great. 
The IOLMF therefore is a labour-managed firm model that shares some of 
· the key characteristics of profit-maximising firms. Theoretically, it may 
achieve similar productive efficiency to profit-maximising firms. However, 
given particular incentives, the IOLMF is likely to exhibit behaviour sinlilar 
to the other forms of LMF in terms of converting would-be profits into 
w&ges and benefits for insider labourers. 
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4.2 Realism of assumptions 
The foregoing discussion of the three LMF models employed a number of 
assumptions that, while quite standard in nature and convenient for 
exposition, do not accurately reflect the Chinese economic environment. 
This section takes note of six aspects of Chinese conditions where 
alternative sets of assumptions or refinements to the models may be 
appropriate. 
First, it should be noted that, although we have discussed the various models 
in this chapter in terms of decisions firms make to maximise their 
objectives, in practice SOEs have, of course, not been entirely free to make 
choices regarding capital and labour allocation and a plethora of other 
matters. Rather, firms can be viewed as engaging in a messy partnership 
with government authorities at various levels, who intervene in the 
management of firms in order to pursue a variety of economic, social and 
other objectives. Moreover, the nature of this intervention has tended to be 
arbitrary and inconsistent in nature, and therefore does not easily lend itself 
to formal modeling. My approach is to view the performance of firms as the 
result of the joint actions of management and their governmental 'partners', 
rather than of firm management alone. Performance outcomes therefore 
reflect not only on the firm in question but also on the policy authorities that 
interact with it. 
Another complication is the classification of profits to be remitted to the 
government as the owners of SOEs. While these non-retained earnings are 
generally labeled as profits in financial results and elsewhere, for our 
purposes they are in part analogous to taxes. If a firm seeks to maximise 
retained income, it will only regard its own share of profits as a part of 
retained income; where moneys are to be remitted to the government it 
makes little difference whether those funds are classified as profits or as 
taxes. Certainly, in terms of the import of state enterprise reform to the 
overall ref orn1 process and Chinese economic performance, government 
profits are crucial. As the 'pessimistic' camp has argued (see Chapter 3) the 
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spiraling loss-making of SOEs has been placing great strain on the Chinese 
fiscal position, imperiling macroeconomic control and creating the potential 
for a financial crisis. From this macro-economic perspective, the loss of 
profit revenue to the state would not be a problem if an equivalent stream of 
tax revenue were to replace it ( although issues of resource allocation may 
arise). Therefore, in this sense also, it is state profits plus taxes (and 
arguably even interest payments to state-owned banks) that are relevant. 
The presence of soft budget constraints and endogenous subsidies presents 
another complication to the analysis. In this chapter we have mostly 
considered subsidies in 'hard' form. That is, we have supposed that there is 
an absolute maximum amount of subsidy that the firm can obtain. In 
practice, the upper limit to subsidies is not pre-determined but is determined 
by authorities ex-post after observing firms' trading results, negotiations 
between firms and authorities and related factors. This is the nature of the 
soft-budget syndrome. 
An issue closely related to subsidies and soft budgets is the existence of 
distortions in the capital market that depress interest rates to artificially low 
levels. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, subsidisation of SOE losses has 
increasingly come to take the form of easy credit from state banks, often on 
an ex-post basis. This has the effect of depressing effective interest rates to 
artificially low lev_els and inducing SOEs to engage in excessive and value-
destroying capital investment (Lardy 1998). Such distortions may well be 
the primary source of productive inefficiency among SOEs. A way to model 
this process would be to designate the interest rate as an endogenous 
variable. The firm would seek to engage in excessive capital investment and 
to expend managerial effo11 in bargaining with the authorities to compensate 
losses via reductions in interest rates. 
The existence of highly segmented labour markets in China due to 
restrictions on internal ( especially rural-urban) migration and other factors 
has implications for the market-clearing wage. In the models presented in 
this chapter, we have generally assumed implicitly that all firms face a 
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single market-clearing wage. In fact, in China there are many differing 
wages at which markets clear. Urban wages are generally considerably 
higher than rural wages, and there are considerable differences across and 
even within provinces. There are also differences across ownership 
categories; foreign-funded enterprises tend to pay higher wages than SOEs 
and collective enterprises lower wages than SOEs. This partly reflects 
differences in non-cash benefits and the geographical distribution of firms. 
A final opservation in this section is that the assumption of price-taking 
behaviour (perfect competition) is far from appropriate for many SOEs. 
Many SOEs are large and exert market power, if not on a national scale, 
then at least in their local regions, due to local protectionism, institutional 
and policy barriers and deficiencies in infrastructure that hamper inter-
regional trade. In general, the extent of market power has lessened over the 
course of the reform period, due to improvements in infrastructure and the 
entry of new competition from non-state firms, foreign imports and from 
other SOEs breaking out of traditional markets. 
4.3 Review of Meng and Perkins 
The chapter up to this point has laid out the theoretical differences between 
the PMF and LMF models. Our objective is to derive from these a workable 
empirical test to resolve the over-compensation issue. First however, let us 
review the approach of Meng and Perkins ( 1998), who were the first to 
apply the Sicular theoretical model empirically to actual Chinese data and 
thus to test its assertions regarding SOE behaviour. 
Theoretical model 
In the theoretical model proposed by Meng and Perkins, the firm seeks to 
maximise retained funds per employee, and the short-run maximisation 
problem is expressed as follows: 5 
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M S (l-t)[pQ(L,K)-wL-(r+d)K-T]+(d-J)K ax = -------------------+ w 
L L 
(4.3.1) 
where S denotes income per workforce member, t denotes the profit tax 
rate, d denotes the government depreciation rate, J denotes the enterprise 
depreciation rate, T denotes lump-sum taxes or profits remitted to the 
government, Q denotes output, p denotes output prices and other variables 
are as defined previously in this chapter. 
Note how this model derives partly from Sicular and partly from the Ward-
Vanek LMF model. It differs from Sicular in three main respects. First, 
wage only comprises the basic wage here, whereas it encompasses all 
compensation to employees in Sicular' s model. Second, this firm maximises 
retained income per employee, reflecting the Illyrian LMF model rather than 
total retained income as per Sicular. Third and most importantly, labour is 
the only choice variable in this model ( capital is assumed to be fixed) 
whereas in Sicular' s model, wages are the endogenous variable. 
Empirical model 
The Meng-Perkins study utilised data for collective and privately-owned 
firms in China as well as SOEs, covering the years 1985 and 1990 to 1992. 
They based their empirical tests upon the following hypotheses relating to 
the respective ownership sectors. For the SOE and collective sectors, the 
determination of employee income levels were thought to be dominated by 
firms' retained profit per employee, with labour productivity playing a minor 
role. For private Chinese firms, on the other hand, labour productivity was 
expected to dominate earnings determination, with firm profitability 
contributing little. In other words, the following general model of employee 
earnings determination was proposed: 
rtJr 
W=W(L,LP) (4.3.2) 
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where W denotes average firm level income, rtnfL denotes retained profits 
per worker and LP denotes labour productivity measured as value added per 
worker. Here the authors make use of the result that under Cobb-Douglas 
production technology, the marginal return to labour is proportional to the 
average product of labour. The prior expectation was that for SOEs and 
collectives the coefficient on (rtnfL) would be significant and the coefficient 
on LP possibly insignificantly different from zero, while for private firms, 
the coefficient on LP would be more significant relative to that on rtnfL. 
Results and interpretation of the Meng-Perkins study 
The empirical results fulfilled these prior expectations. In the cases of all 
three ownership sectors, the coefficient on the explanatory variable that had 
been expected to dominate was both larger in magnitude and of a higher 
order of significance than the other coefficient. 
What the Meng-Perkins results show is that the remuneration of SOE 
employees is closely related to firm profitability. This result should be of no 
surprise when we recall from Chapter 2 that SOEs at the time operated 
under the Contract Management Responsibility and Floating Wage systems. 
Employees were entitled to a profit-determined bonus under most CMRS 
contracts, and under the Floating wage system the boundaries between 
wages and bonuses were blurred. The results are not inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that employees received a wage component that was determined 
by labour productivity plus a profit share that was determined by firm 
profitability. If, as is reasonable to suppose, labour productivity and 
profitability were multicollinear, and if profitability were to vary more from 
firm to firm than labour productivity, then it is quite likely that the direct 
relationship between wages and labour productivity could be submerged in 
Meng and Perkins' s nested test. 
The important question as far as this thesis is concerned is whether SOEs 
over-compensate their employees. Establishing that employees received 
some share of profits as indeed they ought under CMRS, does not directly 
address this question. What we need to investigate is whether profit-sharing 
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behaviour had degenerated to the point where employees received 
substantially more than their legitimate share as measured by the output 
elasticity of their labour. Therefore for the present purposes, a framework 
along the lines of Minami and Hondai ( 1995) or Raiser ( 1997b ), both of 
which are reviewed in Chapter 3, would be more appropriate than Meng and 
Perkins (1998). 
Meng and Perkins' s study may also be improved upon in one technical 
sense. Their models feature at least two variables, retained profits and 
income per worker, which ought to be difficult to observe under the 
assumptions of the Sicular model, the very model which was to be tested. 
Sicular had proposed, as an explanation for persistent SOE losses, that firms 
were effectively converting profits into wages and other benefits for 
distribution to employees. Therefore, one cannot credibly rely upon reported 
profit data at face value to test whether firms are engaging in 'Sicular 
behaviour'. Moreover, since the greater part of these diverted profits are 
likely to be converted into non-wage benefits such as housing, education, 
medical and welfare services, reported wage data are likely to be similarly 
unreliable. The choice and measurement of variables for the analysis need to 
be carefully considered in this light. 
4.4 Proposed empirical test 
What criteria can be used to empirically differentiate profit-maximising 
firms from labour-managed firms using commonly available data? What is it 
in the data that can reveal the true objective function actually being pursued 
by a group of firms? Three possibilities can be listed based on the discussion 
in Section 4.1. 
1. First-order conditions 
2. Capital/labour ratios 
3. Factor income shares 
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Let us first consider the feasibility of first-order conditions as a criterion. 
The first-order condition relating to capital is the same for the PMF and for 
all three forms of the LMF discussed above; pVK = r. This leaves the FOC 
relating to labour as the only possibility. For the Ward-Vanek LMF, we have 
V (pV - rK) ~ · h ~ . h . . d 1 1 f. p L = ----= y , wit y representing t e max1ill1se eve o income 
L 
per worker. But we have no workable procedure for determining what the 
maximised level of a variable would be. The Sicular model does not provide 
any FOC for labour allocation at all, since it treats the labour force as 
exogenous. For the IOLMF, the FOC relating to labour is the same as that 
for the PMF, except that the value marginal product of labour is set equal to 
the wage of outsiders rather than to a general wage covering all employees. 
In short, first-order conditions do not provide any workable avenue for 
empirically differentiating PMFs from LMFs. 
To conduct a test using capital/labour ratios, we would need to be able to 
test whether firms obey the PMF condition ¾ = PK w or the LMF 
. /3Lr 
condition ¾=PK Y . Again we have the difficulty of somehow calculating 
/3Lr 
y . We also have the difficulty of producing an accurate measure of the 
interest rate r. We can generally observe ex post the amounts of interest 
payments that firms may have paid, and to divide these by measures of 
capital to estimate actual interest rates. But in the light of the problem of soft 
finance (see Chapter 2) the actual payments may be considerably less than 
what firms were to have paid ex ante. It is highly dubious that the ex post · 
interest rates should be used to discern what behavioural rules firms are 
seeking to follow. 
Factor income shares offer the only feasible measures by which to 
distinguish PMFs from LMFs. Under the PMF model, the labour share of 
value added unambiguously equals the output elasticity of labour. Under 
LMF models on the other hand, there is scope for the labour -share of value 
added to exceed the output elasticity of labour, via as many as three channels 
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as detailed in the sub-section on IOLMFs. Moreover, measures of factor 
income share clearly illuminate the issue of labour over-compensation with 
which we are centrally concerned. Factor income share is also a workable 
aspect from the point of view of collecting appropriate data. 
It is apparent then that the most appropriate test of LMF behaviour, and of 
the over-compensation hypothesis, would essentially follow the lines of 
Minami and Hondai (1995) or Raiser (1997b), which are reviewed in 
Chapter 3. This would provide, for our purposes, a more appropriate test of 
Sicular' s hypothesis of labour-managed behaviour than the approach taken 
by Meng and Perkins (1998). It would also have the advanta,ge of not relying 
heavily on the accuracy of reported wage and profit data. Profit data is not 
required for the analysis at all, and as far as wages are concerned we can use 
broad measures of compensation including bonuses, welfare payments and 
welfare facilities, rather than the money wage alone. 
The first step in the empirical analysis is a production function estimation, 
from which we derive estimates of the output elasticity of labour. The labour 
share of value added is then calculated and the two measures compared. 
Within each of these sets of estimates we seek to ascertain trends over time, 
and also measures specific to a number of industrial sectors.6 If Minami and 
Hondai' s results are confirmed, we will observe under-compensation of 
SOE labour during the opening years of the reform process, followed by a 
pronounced trend toward over-compensation through the reform period. We 
are also able to observe which sectors over-compensated the most at various 
times. This analysis is carried out in Chapter 5. 
Endnotes 
1 Under perfect competition, it is a standard result that economic profits are zero in the long 
run, since any profits are competed down. Equation 4.1.6 can be thought of as representing 
this situation. It follows that equation 4. l.7a describes some sort of imperfect competition. 
For example, the firm may enjoy some sort of market power that generates rents, resulting 
in the profit 1r. Such market power would enhance the value marginal products of both 
capital and labour, since the firm would be able to extract higher output prices ceteris 
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paribus. If the owners of the firm were able to extract all of the value of the rent by paying 
employees only the competitive market wage as per equation 4.1.6, then employees would 
be under-compensated; their remuneration would fall short of their (higher) marginal value 
product. 
2 In socialist Yugoslavia, government agencies employed a schedule of notional accounting 
wages in order to split workers' incomes into wage and profit components for accounting 
and statistical purposes. These 'wage' levels had relatively little meaning from the point of 
view of the employees, and in many cases the workers may not have even been aware of 
what their 'wages' were (Sarkovic 1986). 
3 See, for example, discussion of the subcontracting activities of Beijing Dahua Shirt 
Company p. 119. 
4 Lindbeck and Snower (1988) p. 1. 
5 In Meng and Perkins's paper, the actual expression that appeared was: 
MaxS = (l-t)[pQ(L,K)-wL-(r+d)K -T]+(d-8)K 
L L 
However, such an expression omits wages, which must be counted as a part of retained 
mcome. 
6 An interesting variation on the analysis would be to separately examine the output 
elasticity and labour income share of permanent ('insider') and temporary ('outsider') 
employees, after the manner of Knight, Song and Jia (1999) and Meng and Zhang (2001), 
who find over-compensation for insiders and under-compensation for outsiders. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to replicate this analysis with the broad compensation 
measures and the data set being used for this thesis, since the data set lacks any breakdown 
between permanent and temporary employees for (1) non-production line labour, and (2) 
non-monetary benefits received by employees. 
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5 
The overcompensation question: empirical analysis 
As is argued in Chapter 4, the most appropriate empirical test for identifying 
and measuring over-compensation in a given set of firms is a comparison of 
the estimated labour elasticity of output with the estimated labour share of 
value added in those firms. This chapter carries out such a test using a multi-
sector panel data set of state-owned firms. 
The database used is the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 800 
Firm Database. It is in two parts, one survey covering the years 1980 to 1989 
and a second survey covering the years 1990 to 1994. In total, 840 firms 
appear in the database, but of these only 681 participated in both surveys. 
General descriptions of the data series used in this chapter are included in 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 as relevant, with more detailed descriptions on aspects 
such as deletions, depreciation and deflation processes being provided in 
Appendix 5.1. My data set covers nine specific industrial sectors plus the 
miscellaneous category of 'other manufacturing sectors', and the time span 
is both longer and more recent, covering the years 1980 to 1994. After 
deletions, 661 firms are included in the data set for the principal estimations. 
The data is drawn from 21 cities in four geographically diverse provinces: 
Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shanxi and Guilin. 
The analysis here follows the same concepts as Minami and Hondai ( 1995), 
but improves upon that contribution in data coverage and some 
methodological aspects. The Minami and Hondai study covered only the 
machinery industry and used national census data for 1980 and 1985 (389 
firms), plus survey data of firms taken only from the city of Tianjin during 
the years 1985 to 1990 (129 firms). The various methodological differences 
between the two studies are explained in the next section. 
Section 5.1 carries out a production function analysis to generate estimates 
of the output elasticity of labour. Section 5 .2 estimates the labour share of 
value added. The two sets of estimates are compared in Section 5 .3 and the 
implications discussed. Appendix 5 .1 describes the preparation of the data 
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for the analysis. Appendix 5 .2 holds many of the tables and figures that 
present the results of this chapter. 
5.1 Estimation of labour elasticity of output 
Model specification 
Recall from Equation 4.1.2 that under profit maximisation the value 
marginal product of labour is equated to the wage: 
pVL = w. (5.1.1) 
Normalising the price of value added to unity and multiplying each side by 
L/V we have: 
av L wL 
dL V V 
(5.1.2) 
The left-hand expression is the labour elasticity of value added1 while the 
right-hand expression is the labour share of value added (if wages as 
denoted by w represent all income accruing to labour). 
A production function estimation is necessary to generate estimates of 
labour elasticity. The estimation process can be carried out either on the 
basis of net output or value added, where intermediate inputs are subtracted 
from gross output, or on the basis of gross output with intermediate inputs 
serving as one of the explanatory variables in the estimation. Using the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form a basic econometric model for net output is: 
ln V = A + /3 L In L + /3 K ln K + u (5.1.3) 
An alternative model in gross output terms is: 
In Q = A + /3M In M + /3 L In L + /3 K In K + u (5.1.4) 
where u represents stochastic shocks to production and all other notation 
follows Chapter 4. 
Minami and Hondai ( 1995) employ a net output approach and a Cobb-
Douglas functional form, imposing constant returns to scale such that 
/3 L + /3 K = l . Using a as their notation for /J L and Y as their notation for net 
output, they are accordingly able to express their model as: 
Yp KP In-= A+ (1-a)ln-+ u 
LP LP 
(5.1.5) 
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Their use of the subscripts P denotes the fact that only productive inputs are 
used in their estimations. 
Minami and Hondai add further explanatory variables to their estimation by 
modeling the technology variable A as follows: 
3 5 9 
A== a0 + LaiI: + LaiSi_2 + a6 ln FAU + LaiSi_6 ln FAU + £ 
1 3 7 
(5 .1.6) 
where T denotes type of ownership (state, collective, or state-collective joint 
venture), S denotes sub-sector within the machine industry and FA U denotes 
the intensity of fixed asset utilisation as measured by the ratio of materials 
and fuels to net fixed assets. The latter variable is included to account for the 
effects of materials rationing and bottlenecks. My analysis does not employ 
the full set of these categorical dummy variables. In the first place, 
ownership dummies are not required since my data set solely includes SOEs. 
I do incorporate categorical information on sectors, although my method is 
different from Minami and Hondai's and is explained later in the chapter. I 
do not include Minami and Hondai' s FA U since for these purposes I regard 
productive inefficiency arising from supply shortages no differently to 
inefficiency arising from any other cause. Finally, whereas Minami and 
Hondai appear to have simply used ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, 
I also conduct fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimations and 
use Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests to determine the most appropriate 
model from among these three. FE and RE estimation effectively 
incorporate firm-specific dummy variables for each firm, thereby reducing 
the need for additional variables such as FA U. 
In the analysis of this chapter, rather than selecting one functional form at 
the outset, I conduct functional form tests to choose between the CES, 
translog and Cobb-Douglas specifications. Constant returns to scale is tested 
for rather than being automatically imposed on the model. Gross output 
functional forms as well as net output forms are tested. Whereas Minami 
and Hondai only use data for productive labour and productive capital in 
their estimation, I test various alternative specifications that also include 
'non-productive' labour and capital. 
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Data issues 
The data required for the analysis falls basically into four categories; output, 
intermediate inputs, capital and labour. Because of various features of the 
data set, we have alternative series to choose from in each of these 
categories. 
For output, we can use gross output (with intermediate inputs as an extra 
explanatory variable), or one of two different variables that I refer to as net 
output and value added. Net output is provided in the survey as a single 
series. Value added must be calculated as the difference between gross 
output and intermediate inputs. If the net output series has been compiled 
correctly, it should represent gross output minus all intermediate inputs and 
depreciation. Value added should therefore comprise net output plus 
depreciation. 
My measure of intermediate inputs sums the various database series for 
materials, ancillary materials ( a series provided in the 1980-1989 survey 
only), fuels and energy. Hereafter I also refer to this variable as materials, 
fuels and energy or MFE. Due to missing data etc., some discrepancies may 
arise between net output which is compiled by the responding firms and 
value added which is compiled by myself. 
In the 1980-1989 survey, the available data series for capital (commonly 
referred to as fixed assets in Chinese sources) include total capital, 
productive capital and non-productive capital. In this survey, non-productive 
capital mainly comprises non-manufacturing facilities such as employee 
housing and welfare facilities, but may also include idle manufacturing 
capital. In the 1990-1994 survey we have an explicit series for housing and 
welfare capital. In this latter survey, productive capital is calculated as the 
sum of separate series for plant-and-equipment and for buildings. The 
procedures used for depreciating and deflating the capital data are detailed in 
Appendix 5.1. 
In preparation for the production function estimations, I convert both the 
capital and labour input data from year-end form to year-average form. This 
is a standard technique that is carried out so that the input data reflects the 
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productive activity throughout a calendar year and thus n1atches the output 
data. I generate year-average capital data for year t by taking the simple 
mean of year-end observations for the years t and (t-1). 
Available data series for labour include total labour and its constituent 
categories; line workers, managers, engineers/technicians and non-line 
workers (or 'other employees'). Non-line workers would predominantly 
comprise those workers employed to provide social services to employees. 2 
Productive labour is considered as the sum of line workers, managers and 
engineers/technicians. Both year-end and year-average data is available for 
total labour. The database only provides year-end data for the categories but 
year-average data for these series is estimated by multiplying each year-end 
category series by the ratio of year-average total labour to year-end total 
labour. 
Summary statistics for the main data series employed in the various 
estimated specifications are listed in Tables A5.2.1 and A5.2.2 in Appendix 
5.2. For reasons explained in Appendix 5.1 (page 186), I believe that the 
reliability of the data is better towards the end of the survey period than at 
the beginning. Therefore, results derived for the early part of the survey 
period should be interpreted with greater caution. 
Specification tests - panel data estimation 
To determine the appropriate panel data model for the data, Breusch-Pagan 
( 1980) Lagrange Multiplier tests and Hausman ( 1978) tests were carried out 
on a number of alternative specifications. The random effects or random 
components model is expressed as follows: 
Y. = a+x. /J+v . +£. tf ti l ti (5.1.7) 
where y is the dependent variable, xis the vector of explanatory variables, 
the subscripts i denote individuals (firms in our case) and subscripts t denote 
years. The error term is in two parts; vi is a firm-specific random error whose 
value is constant for a given firm, and cir is a conventional error term of the 
type assumed in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. Under fixed 
effects assumptions the vi are constants; under random effects assumptions 
they are random drawings. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier reports a 
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test of the hypothesis that Vi =0, which if true would imply that the model 
reverts to the standard panel data model, which can be estimated using the 
OLS method. The Hausman test can be used to aid the choice between the 
fixed effects and random effects estimators. Under RE, vi is uncorrelated 
with cft· 
As has been noted, data used in this analysis was collected in two separate 
surveys covering 1980-1989 and 1990-1994 respectively. The data-
collecting questions asked of the two surveys were quite different in a 
number of respects, the most notable being that which is called Non-
Productive Capital in the 1980-89 survey and Housing and Welfare Capital 
in the 1990-94 survey (see Appendix 5.1 for more details on data series). 
For this reason, we first proceed separately to conduct functional form tests 
on the 1980-89 and 1990-94 period data, before assessing whether it is 
feasible to pool the two halves of the data set. A decision to pool the data 
would require tests to show a similar preferred model for each of the two 
periods, using data series that are common to both surveys. 
In tests on the 1980-1989 data, regardless of the specifications used, all of 
the Breusch-Pagan tests indicate the rejection of the OLS model versus the 
random-effects model, and all of the Hausman tests indicate the rejection of 
the random-effects model versus the fixed-effects model. Results are 
presented in Table A5.2.3a. 
For tests on the 1990-1994 data, the results are slightly mixed. For the eight 
different specifications listed in Table A5.2.3b, the Breusch-Pagan tests 
consistently indicate rejection of the OLS model versus the random-effects 
model. However, the Hausman test does not indicate rejection of the 
random-effects model versus the fixed-effects model at the 95 per cent 
significance level in one specification, and random effects is not rejected at 
99 per cent in a further three specifications. The remaining four 
specifications, in which the random effects model is rejected, all employ my 
own calculated value added series rather than the survey-supplied net output 
series. On the basis of these results we proceed with fixed-effects estimation 
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to carry out the various specification testing, and repeat the Breusch-Pagan 
and Hausman tests when the preferred specification has been determined. 
Functional form tests - 1980-1989 survey data 
Tests for functional form between the translog, CES and Cobb-Douglas 
forms were carried out for both total-input and productive-input data from 
the 1980-1989 survey. The format of the translog specification is as follows: 
ln 2 L ln 2 K 
lnV = /31 + /32 lnL+ /33 lnK + /34 --+ /35 --+ /36 lnLlnK +£ 2 2 
(5.1.8) 
We test the Cobb-Douglas model via the joint restriction /34 = /35 = /36 = 0. 
The format of the Taylor series approximation to the CES (Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution) specification is as follows: 
In V = /31 + /32 In L + /33 In K + /34 In 2 ( 1) + e (5.1.9) 
In this case we test Cobb-Douglas via the restriction /34 = 0. 
The results of a series of specification tests are summarised in Table 
A5.2.4.3 The Cobb-Douglas specification is not rejected at 95 per cent 
significance in tests versus both translog and CES regardless of whether 
total input data or productive input data is used. 
We find however that the goodness-of-fit measures of all three of these 
specifications are very sensitive to the years of data that are employed. 
Adjusted R2 improves if we exclude certain years, notably 1981, 1982, 1988 
and 1989. (1980 data is already lost due to the averaging of year-end data to 
generate year-average series for capital.) Conducting separate regressions on 
the pooled 1981-1982 and 1988-1989 period data, we find results that are 
very different to the 1983-1987 period. Results using productive inputs for 
the period 1981-1982 yield an insignificant coefficient on productive capital 
and a coefficient on productive labour of 1.05, which is not only very 
different from 1983-1987 but a strange result from a theoretical perspective. 
Results for 1988-1989 yield a negative and insignificant coefficient on 
productive capital as well as an insignificant coefficient on productive 
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labour. This divergence between the 1981-1982, 1983-1987 and 1988-1989 
period results makes some intuitive sense. Two factors could explain the 
apparent structural divergence of the earliest part of the period. First, it 
could reflect the 'the truth' with regard to the Chinese economy in the early 
reform years when it was just starting to emerge from central planning. 
Second, it could reflect inaccuracies in the data. The quality of data in the 
early years of the survey appears to be quite poor compared to later years, as 
evidenced by the number of missing values and the number of obvious 
clerical errors found (see Appendix 5.1). A possibility is that, since the 
survey was actually carried out after 1989, some firms may no longer have 
had accurate information about their operations in e~rlier years.4 The results 
for 1988 and 1989 are likely to have been impacted by the severe recession 
that occurred in those years, which would have delivered a major demand 
shock, left capital and labour underutilized and impacted upon production 
function results. Note that the model we have been testing here holds the 
coefficients constant over time. Later in the analysis we will test models 
with year-variant coefficients. 
To cover the possibility that the best specification may turn out to be one 
confined to the years 1983 to 1987, we conduct the functional form tests 
again to cover only those years. These results are also reported in Table 
A5.2.4. We find that the Cobb-Douglas specification is preferred over 
translog and CES regardless of whether total inputs or productive inputs are 
used. For each of the three specifications, a better fit is obtained by using 
productive input data as opposed to total input data, as measured by adjusted 
R2. The best specification therefore appears at this point to be Cobb-Douglas 
using productive inputs, possibly confined to the years 1983 to 1987. 
Specification tests incorporating non-productive inputs - 1980-1989 
survey data 
A number of further econometric specification tests incorporating non-
productive labour and non-productive capital were carried out against the 
productive-input Cobb-Douglas specification. The test results are 
summarised in Tables A5.2.5a and A5.2.5b in Appendix 5.2. Table A5.2.5a 
presents tests on the full period of the 1980s, and in these tests Cobb-
Douglas is consistently rejected, although the specification featuring only 
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non-productive labour shows a substantially lower test statistic than those 
specifications that feature non-productive capital in some form. Table 
A5.2.5b presents tests on the 1983 to 1987 period only. In this group of 
tests, Cobb-Douglas is not rejected for the specification featuring only non-
productive labour, while Cobb-Douglas is rejected for all five specifications 
in which non-productive capital appears. 
Why does non-productive capital hold possible explanatory power in a 
production function? It is possible that in fact this is a case of reverse 
causality; that firms enjoying high productivity have more access to funds 
that can be invested in non-productive welfare capital. We investigate this 
hypothesis via a Granger ( 1969) Causality Test carried out between TFP 
(calculated as value added minus productive capital and productive labour 
each multiplied by their respective coefficients from the Cobb-Douglas 
estimation) and non-productive capital. For the explanatory variables we use 
just a single lag. The test is carried out on the full period using full-period 
estimated coefficients and on the 1983-1987 period using estimated 
coefficients for that period. Tables 5.2.6a, and 5.2.6b summarise the results. 
In each case, lagged TFP is a significant explanator of lagged non-
productive capital, but the reverse is not the case (in two cases the 
coefficients on lagged non-productive capital are significant but of negative 
sign). The results therefore indicate that there is only unidirectional causality 
running from value-added to non-productive capital. It seems that non-
productive capital does not contribute to value-added production, but rather 
productivity is associated with higher profits that in turn are partly invested 
in non-productive welfare capital. These results hold regardless of whether 
the full data set is used or only the years 1983 to 1987. Therefore we discard 
non-productive capital as an explanatory variable and our preferred 
specification at this point remains Cobb-Douglas using productive labour 
and capital inputs, possibly covering only the years 1983 to 1987. 
Functional form tests - 1990s survey data 
The results of various specification tests for the 1990-1994 survey data are 
presented in Table A5.2.7. First, the translog and CES specifications are 
tested against the Cobb-Douglas model. At this stage we use year average 
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data for the input variables and our own calculated series for value added 
rather than the net output series supplied by the firms. The F test for the 
translog model leads us to reject Cobb-Douglas when total capital and total 
labour are used as regressors, but leads us to not reject Cobb-Douglas when 
productive inputs are used. Tests on the CES form lead us to not reject 
Cobb-Douglas regardless of whether total or productive inputs are used. 
Tests on specifications featuring non-productive input variables are 
presented in Table A5.2.8. As was found with respect to the 1980-1989 data 
results, a number of specifications featuring non-productive inputs 
outperform the Cobb-Douglas specification on the basis of F tests. The best 
fitting of these are those that include housing and welfare capital; non-line 
labour does not have strong explanatory power. The best performing 
specification is Zn V = j31lnLp + /32lnKp + /33(/nKp *lnKh) + £, although other 
models with Kh such as Zn V = /31lnLp + /32lnKp + /33/nKh + £, also perform 
very well.5 
As with the 1980-1989 data, we test via a Granger Causality Test the 
hypothesis that under the Chinese system productivity leads to profitability 
and thence to higher investment in housing and welfare facilities. The results 
are reported in Table A5.2.9. We find that lagged housing and welfare 
capital is not significant as an explanator of TFP ( calculated as value added 
minus [0.602*Kp] minus [0.476*Lp ]), but lagged TFP is a significant 
explanator of housing and welfare capital at the 99 per cent significance 
level. Therefore we conclude that productivity drives housing and welfare 
capital rather than vice versa, and set aside all of the specifications that 
include non-productive inputs. As is the case with regard to the 1980-1989 
data, our preferred model remains Cobb-Douglas with productive inputs. 
Tests for constant returns to scale 
Having established Cobb-Douglas as the appropriate functional form, we 
can test for constant returns to scale via hypothesis tests on the restriction /JK 
+ /JL = l. The format of the F tests is: 
,,,.... ,,,.... 2 
F[l, N - 3] = ,,,.... ,,,.... (/3 L + ! K =- l) ,,,.... ,,,.... 
Cov[/3 L, /3 L] + Cov[/3 K, /3 K] + 2Cov[/3 L, /3 K] 
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(5.1.10) 
Table 5.1 summarises the results of separate hypothesis tests on the 1980-
1989 and 1990-1994 data. We see that the assumption of CRS is valid for 
the 1991-1994 period and for 1983-1987. However, the strength of the 
finding for CRS in the 1980s is somewhat diluted when we add the years 
1988 and 1989 (the F statistic rises substantially, while remaining below the 
critical value), and the results indicc:1te rejection of CRS when we add 1981 
and 1982 to the estimation period. 
To resolve the ambiguity in these results, we conduct a new hypothesis test 
using all of the data from 1981 to 1994, with multiplicative dummy 
variables for each year. Since the specification tests carried out above have 
indicated similar preferred functional forms for both the 1980-89 and 1990-
94 periods (Cobb-Douglas with productive inputs), it is now appropriate to 
pool the data from the two surveys. Estimations were initially conducted on 
the two surveys separately because of differences in the compilation of 
certain data series, notably for non-productive capital. However, we have by 
now excluded non-productive capital from the specification and are only 
using productive capital and productive labour as explanatory variables. 
Based on the definitions listed in the database there would not seem to be 
any problem of discontinuity with these two variables. 
Using multiplicative dummy variables for each year, we can express the 
econometric model as follows: 
(5.1.11) 
where Dr is a vector of dummy variables denoting the year.6 This 
specification allows us to test the hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
separately for each individual year, as follows: 
(5.1.12) 
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Table 5.1 
Years covered 
(a) 1983-1987 
(b) 1983-1989 
(c) 1981-1989 
(d) 1991-1994 
Tests for constant returns to scale: FE estimation 
A A F Statistic D.F. (j,N-k) Result /JK /JL 
0.382 0.592 0.078 1,2229 Not reject CRS 
0.316 0.793 2.446 1,3163 Not reject CRS 
0.407 0.899 21.130 1,3968 Reject CRS 
0.476 0.602 0.647 1,2320 Not reject CRS 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out in the Cobb-Douglas form with productive inputs, in year-
average terms. 
(2) F test critical values for 1= 1 and N-k> 100 are [at 95%] 3.84; [at 99%] 6.63. 
(3) The denominators of the respective F tests are: (a) 0.01268+0.00231 - 2 (0.003324); 
(b) 0.007792 + 0.001839- 2 (0.002388); (c) 0.007213 + 0.001395 - 2 (0.002089); and 
(d) 0.01305 + 0.003766 - 2 (0.00359). 
For the base year 1994, both year dummy coefficients are automatically zero 
so the test simplifies to a test of /3 K + /3 L = l. Tables A5 .2.1 0a and A5 .2.1 Ob 
summarise the results using fixed effects and random effects estimation 
respectively. Each row presents results for a specific year; coefficients and t 
statistics for the two year-dummy products and an F test statistic for the 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale in that year. Using fixed effects 
estimation, the results lead us to reject the null hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale at 95 per cent significance for all years except 1988 and 
1990. Using random effects estimation on the other hand, the constant 
returns to scale hypothesis is not rejected for all years except for 1981 and 
1982. This latter result is consistent with the inclusion of 1981 and 1982 
data upsetting the finding of CRS in the estimations reported in Table 5.1. 
We also find that t_he year-variant coefficients are relatively stable through 
the years 1983 to 1987. This is consistent with our previous finding under 
year-constant coefficients that the 1983-1987 period has a better 
econometric fit than the full period of the 1980s (see Figure 5.1). 
To further pursue the most appropriate econometric specification, we shall 
now examine regression results using an alternative measure of Value 
Added. The data series that I have called Value Added and used in the 
various regressions to this point is calculated as Gross Output minus Real 
Materials, Fuels and Energy. An alternative series provided in the CASS 
database is a standard Chinese accounting term known as Net Output 
(gongye jingchanzhi). It is equal to Gross Output minus a wider range of 
intermediate inputs, including Materials, Fuel and Energy but also other 
inputs such as advertising costs, and also capital depreciation. The broader 
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coverage of intermediate inputs that this series provides is desirable but not 
the subtraction of capital depreciation. Capital depreciation already enters 
the model via the explanatory variable Productive Capital, and it has no 
place in the calculation of the dependent variable Therefore my preferred 
measure of income is the one that I label Adjusted Net Output, whereby I 
add capital depreciation back into Net Output. This series comes closest to a 
standard theoretical concept of value added. 
A test for CRS using Adjusted Net Output and RE estimation is reported in 
Table 5.3, and a similar test using FE estimation is reported in Table 
A5.2.10c. Under fixed effects, the previous results are echoed as the 
hypothesis of constant returns is rejected at 95 or at 99 per cent significance 
for every year except 1988. Under random effects on the other hand, the 
hypothesis of constant returns is rejected for every year except 1981, where 
it is rejected at 95 per cent but not at 99 per cent significance. 
The results of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier tests for RE 
models incorporating multiplicative year dummy variables (Tables 5.4 and 
AS .2.11 b) are summarised in Table 5 .2. The tests indicate that the RE model 
is appropriate if using Value Added, while with Adjusted Net Output the FE 
model is preferred at the 95 per cent significance level but not at 99 per cent. 
Table 5.2 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier and Hausman tests: 
1980-94 
Cobb-Douglas in CRS terms, value-added, 
productive inputs, multiplicative year dummies, 
1981 to 1994 
Breusch-Pagan LM Hausman 
Chi2 Prob>Ch Chi2 Prob>Ch 
·2 ·2 l l 
9512.87 0.0000 13.21 0.5097 
Cobb-Douglas in CRS terms, adjusted net output, 11928.76 0.0000 45.01 0.0220 
productive inputs, multiplicative year dummies, 
1981 to 1994 
Note: All input and output variables used in the above regressions are in year-average terms. 
On balance, on the basis of the CRS tests and the Hausman and Breusch-
Pagan tests I prefer to rely primarily on the random effects model using 
Adjusted Net Output for the analysis. The reasons are: 
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1. Adjusted Net Output appears to be closer to the proper definition of 
value added than my own calculated Value Added series. It also 
results in a better 'fit' as measured by Adjusted R2 than does Value 
Added; 0.6560 as opposed to 0.5753 when using RE estimation. 
2. On the basis of the tests for CRS, the use of random effects rather 
than fixed effects permits us to impose constant returns to scale upon 
the model, which is very convenient for the comparison with labour 
income share. 
3. Using Adjusted Net Output under RE estimation, we can be fairly 
confident in using data for the full period, rather than dropping any 
years. The only year for which CRS was rejected is 1981, but it is 
rejected somewhat marginally. At any rate, the early years of the 
period are of the least interest for the purposes of the question that 
we are investigating. We are chiefly interested in whether SOEs were 
overcompensating by the end of the period. 
The principal argument that can be raised against our choice of model is that 
the Hausman test found in favour of FE over RE estimation when using 
Adjusted Net Output. While this makes the decision over models somewhat 
difficult, it is not an overwhelming argument. The theoretical literature of 
econometrics recognizes that the choice between RE and FE models is often 
contentious and does not reduce to a single straightforward test (Greene 
1993: Chapter 16, Hsiao 1986: Chapter 2, Mundlak 1978). There is scope 
for judgment based on the nature of the problem at hand. For example, RE 
models may be preferred to FE models where we wish to make inferences 
from a random sample regarding a larger population, which is the case here, 
whereas FE is more appropriate where we are intrinsically interested in the 
particular firms or individuals in the sample.7 
Assuming CRS then, the year-dummy model can be expressed in the 
following terms: 
ln(V) = a+ /3K ln(KP J+ L /JrDr ln(KP J+E L L Y~I L p p (5.1.13) 
Estimation results for this model in its preferred form, using RE estimation, 
Adjusted Net Output as the dependent variable and the whole survey period, 
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are presented in Table 5 .4. Results from a number of variations to this model 
are presented in Tables AS .2.11 a to AS .2.11 e. Year-specific estimates of the 
labor elasticity of output are generated from these results as follows: 
7lr = l-/JK -/Jr (5.1.14) 
These are plotted in Figure 5.1 alongside five alternative sets of labour 
elasticity results including those from the corresponding FE estimation, 
results over the period 1983-1994, and results from the regressions without 
CRS imposed as presented in Tables 5.3 and A5.2.10c, calculated as /JL + 
/JLY· A clear inverted U-shaped trend is visible; labour elasticity rises from 
1981 to 1985, roughly maintains its peak until 1990 and then declines. There 
is a sharp spike in 1990, which might be attributed to some firms altering 
their data reporting procedures somewhat between the two survey periods. 
Comparing the results with CRS imposed with those where CRS is not 
imposed, we see that both sets of results show remarkably similar estimates, 
except that the results without CRS imposed indicate higher labour elasticity 
estimates for 1981 and 1982. This gives us confidence in using the model 
with CRS imposed as represented in equation 5.1.13, which is convenient 
for the analysis since under CRS, (1- /3 K - /Jr) can be compared directly 
with the labour income share to ascertain the extent of over-compensation. 
Note also that FE and RE estimation provide very similar estimates of 
output elasticity, thus minimizing any concern as to our choice of RE over 
FE estimation in the face of the adverse Hausman test result. 
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Table 5.3 Test for constant returns to scale with year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Random effects estimation, dependent variable adjd. 
net output 
Year DrKP DyLp Sum of 
f3's 
Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic 
1981 -0.255 ·-6.29*** 0.222 5.82*** 0.956 
1982 -0.161 -4.10*** 0.143 3.85*** 0.970 
1983 -0.142 -3.58*** 0.144 3.81 *** 0.990 
1984 -0.198 -5.10*** 0.215 5.79*** 1.005 
1985 -0.144 -3.59*** 0.173 4.50*** 1.017 
1986 -0.150 -3.82*** 0.178 4.70*** 1.016 
1987 -0.148 -3.74*** 0.182 4.75*** 1.022 
1988 -0.107 -2.69*** 0.156 4.02*** 1.037 
1989 -0.143 -3.64*** 0.174 4.55*** 1.020 
1990 -0.043 -1.04 0.059 1.44 1.004 
1991 -0.045 -1.19 0.051 1.36 0.994 
1992 -0.045 -1.21 0.062 1.68* 1.005 
1993 0.007 0.20 0.001 0.04 0.996 
1994 (base year) 0.988 
Coefficient T Statistic 
lnKp 0.439 15.42*** 
lnLp 0.549 15.88*** 
Con-stant -0.624 -4.64*** 
Adj. R2 
-within 0.3524 
-between 0.7451 
-overall 0.6560 
No. of 6549 
obsns 
No. of 661 
firms 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out with productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 
observations are lost through the averaging process. 
(2) F test critical values are [at 95 %] 3.84; [at 99%] 6.63 . 
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F test 
Statistic 
4.41 ** 
2.03 
0.23 
0.07 
0.71 
0.63 
1.20 
3.30 
0.97 
0.04 
0.09 
0.06 
0.03 
0.094 
Table 5.4 Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 1981-
1994 
Random effects estimation: dependent variable adjd. net 
output 
Variable 
ln(Kp/Lp) 
D19s1-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s2-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s3.(Kp/Lp) 
D19s4.(Kp/Lp) 
D19ss-(Kp/Lp) 
D1986·(Kp/Lp) 
D19s7.(Kp/Lp) 
D19ss-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s9.(Kp/Lp) 
D1990.(Kp/Lp) 
D 1991. ( Kp/Lp) 
D1992.(Kp/Lp) 
D1993.(Kp/Lp) 
D1994.(Kp/Lp) 
Constant 
Adj. R2 - within 
- between 
- overall 
No. of obsns 
No. of firms 
Coefficient 
0.467 
-0.046 
-0.033 
-0.091 
-0.222 
-0.221 
-0.222 
-0.233 
-0.228 
-0.212 
-0.077 
-0.046 
-0.079 
-0.011 
(base year) 
-0.605 
0.1097 
0.2564 
0.1993 
6527 
661 
T Statistic 
16.48*** 
-1.30 
-0.94 
-2.58*** 
-6.30*** 
-6.02*** 
-6.03*** 
-6.24*** 
-5.97*** 
-5.58*** 
-1.86* 
-1.23** 
-2.13 
-0.30 
-27.49*** 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee 
terms with productive inputs , in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging 
process. 
164 
Figure 5.1 Meta-function estimates of labour elasticity of output 
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Note: These elasticity estimates all use Adjusted Net Output as dependent variable. Estimates are performed 
on the same basis as comparative results in Section 5.3; observations are deleted as required by labour 
income share data. 'RE from 1981' represents the main set of estimates used in Section 5.3. 
The results presented to this point are all based on a meta-production 
function, imposing the same production function on every sector. Tables 5.5 
and A5.2.12 present results for estimations in which each sector has its own 
multiplicative dummy. This permits the various sectors to display variations 
in factor intensity while maintaining constant returns to scale for every year 
and sector. Such a model would be represented as follows: 
( V J ( K J 94 ( K J Io ( K J In~ =a+/JKln _P + I: /JrDyln _P +I:j35 D5 ln _P +£ L L y =8 I L S=l L p p p p 
(5.1.15) 
where the subscripts S denote sectors, of which there are five with adequate 
sample sizes. (In the above expression, Y and S subscripts have been omitted 
from the Kand L variables for simplicity.) Figure A5.2.1 in Appendix 5.2 
presents in chart form the elasticity estimates for each of the five sectors that 
have fairly large sample sizes. The results are generally in line with what 
would be expected, with sectors such as textiles and food processing 
exhibiting labour intensive technology and others such as iron and steel 
exhibiting capital-intensive technology. An exception is machinery; this 
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might be attributable to the distorting effects of the recession of the late 
1980s, the temporary re-imposition of central controls at that time, and 
import competition, which together would have resulted in substantial 
domestic overproduction of capital machinery (see Chapter 2). 
Table 5.5 Estimation results with CRS imposed and year and sector 
dummies: 1981-1994 (random effects estimation) 
Variable Coefficient T Statistic Prob>ltl 
ln(K~Lp) 0.508 8.00*** 0.000 
D19s1-(K~Lp) -0.049 -1.40 0.161 
D19s2-(K~Lp) -0.034 -0.97 0.330 
D19s1- (K~Lp) -0.096 -2.73*** 0.006 
D19s4.(K~Lp) -0.232 -6.58*** 0.000 
D19ss,(K~Lp) -0.227 -6.19*** 0.000 
D1986·(K~Lp) -0.225 -6.13*** 0.000 
D19s7.(K~Lp) -0.237 -6.35*** 0.000 
D19ss-(K~Lp) -0.232 -6.07*** 0.000 
D19s9.(K~Lp) -0.207 -5.46*** 0.000 
D1990.(K~Lp) -0.083 -1.99** 0.046 
D1 991.(K~Lp) -0.049 -1.30 0.195 
D1992.(K~Lp) -0.081 -2.18** 0.029 
D1993.(K~Lp) -0.013 -0.36 0.719 
D1994.(K~Lp) (Base year) 
Food Processing (Base sector) 
Textiles 
-0.109 -1.69* 0.092 
Chemicals 0.028 0.38 0.703 
Pharmaceuticals 
-0.170 -2.15** 0.032 
Bldg Materials 
-0.027 -0.35 0.724 
Iron & Steel 0.213 2.26** 0.024 
Machinery 
-0.128 -1.96** 0.050 
Transport Eqpt. 0.184 2.01 ** 0.044 
Electronics 0.200 2.76*** 0.006 
Other Mfg. 
-0.058 -0.90 0.368 
Constant 
-0.609 -28.24*** 0.000 
Adj. R2 - within 0.1228 
- between 0.2398 
- overall 0.1906 
No. of obsns 6527 
No. of firms 661 
Note: (1) Adjusted Net Output used as dependent variable. Estimates are performed on the same basis as 
comparative results in Section 5.3 ; observations are deleted as required by labour income share data. 
Figure A5.2.1 is based on these estimates. 
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The estimation summarised in Table 5 .5 and Figure AS .2.1 has a limitation 
in that it imposes a uniform 'shape' on the elasticity estimates for each 
sector. Estimations are also carried out that allow each sector to trend 
independently over time. There are at least two possible approaches that can 
achieve this. First, the estimation can be carried out on each sector's data 
one at a time in separate regressions. Second, dummies can be created to 
account for both years and sectors. With fourteen time periods and ten 
sectors to be covered, 140 dummy variables would be required. Estimations 
were attempted under this method for the 1980-1989 and 1990-1994 
periods separately only (requiring 100 dummy variables). The estimation 
results were not useful however, as ( 1) not a single dummy variable was 
found to be statistically significant even at 90 per cent, and (2) the overall 
adjusted R2 measure in each case was lower than for the corresponding year-
and-sector-dummy specification (such as the one reported in Table 5.5). We 
therefore regard the results in Table 5 .5 as the best available estimates of the 
labour elasticity of output. 
5.2 Estimation of the labour share of income 
This section seeks to generate the most realistic possible estimates of the 
costs associated with labour as a proportion of value added, within the 
constraints of the available data. Minami and Hondai ( 1995) identified three 
main components of employee compensation; (1) cash wages including 
bonuses (2) welfare payments in cash such as accident insurance, medical 
care payments and pensions, and (3) benefits from various types of welfare 
capital facilities such as housing, clinics and schools. They also presented 
three alternative measures of labour share as follows: 
Estimation A: 
Estimation B: 
Estimation C: w w1 w2 W3 -=-+-+-
Yp YP Yp Yp 
(5.2.1) 
(5.2.2) 
(5.2.3) 
where the subscript P denotes productive manufacturing activity and the 
numerical subscripts denote the three components of remuneration listed 
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above. Yp refers to the production of manufactured goods for external sale, 
such as a textile firm's production of cotton cloth, as opposed to the 
production of housing and other services for the internal use by employees. 
As the production data supplied by the CASS data set only covers goods 
produced for external sale, then as far as the denominator is concerned I can 
only calculate Yp. As for the numerator, the CASS data on the various 
components of compensation does not feature breakdowns between benefits 
received by 'productive' and 'non-productive' employees. Therefore, my 
compensation data corresponds to Wand the calculated ratio corresponds to 
Estimation C. Conceptually however, one can think of the wages of 'non-
productive' employees as reflecting the value of services whose ultimate 
purpose is to compensate 'productive' employees. In this sense we can 
regard the estimates generated here as corresponding to Estimate A in a 
broad sense. 
Cash wages 
Data for this component is supplied in the CASS database. It is broken down 
into various sub-components including basic wages, bonuses and overtime 
payments, the sum of all these sub-components being the variable of interest 
for this exercise. For the 1980-1989 data survey, a breakdown is also 
provided by types of employee (managers, line workers, engineers etc.). The 
data that is provided on the sub-components and employee types is useful in 
checking against the totals to expose clerical errors. A series for the wages 
of casual workers is provided, and it is apparent that some firms included 
this amount in their figures for total cash wages while others did not. The 
Data Appendix details how this anomaly is dealt with. 
Cash welfare payments 
There are two available approaches to calculating cash welfare components. 
The first is to sum various entries in the CASS database. The second is to 
follow Minami and Hondai and use certain aggregated annual data published 
in the Statistical Yearbook of China (page 685 in the 1995 edition). This 
table enables us to calculate the ratio of welfare cash payments to total cash 
wages for the combined SOE, civil administration and urban collective 
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sectors. Since SOEs comprise over 80 per cent of total welfare cash 
payments of this group of organisations, the data is reasonably 
representative of the SOE sector. This ratio is then multiplied by the 
measure of total cash wages in our own sample to obtain the relevant 
estimate of cash welfare payments. 
In the CASS database, cash welfare payments are compiled quite differently 
in the two survey periods. For the 1980-1989 period they comprise 
payments into the employee collective welfare fund plus total payments to 
retirees. For the 1990-1994 period they comprise medical expenditures, 
upward payments to state authorities or funds for medical purposes, 
collective welfare expenditure, firm payments to retirees, plus firm 
payments into consolidated retirement funds . Examining the data on a year-
to-year basis as presented in Table AS.2.13 and Figure A5.2.2, we see that 
the use of the CASS data seems to introduce a sizeable structural change 
between 1989 and 1990, in that the 1980-89 data produces much lower 
ratios to value added than the 1990-94 data. The Statistical Yearbook of 
China data on the other hand tracks the 1990-94 data quite closely. 
Therefore I surmise that the 1990-94 data is probably more complete than 
the 1989-94 data, and is quite well represented by the Statistical Yearbook 
of China series. Therefore for the purposes of this analysis I rely on the 
Statistical Yearbook of China ratios to generate the labour income share 
estimates. 
Benefits from welfare capital facilities 
The annual value of the flows of services from welfare capital facilities is 
equal to their annual depreciation plus their opportunity cost. We use the 
firms' own recorded data on depreciation. To estimate opportunity cost, we 
must multiply the value of the welfare capital stock in each year by an 
appropriate rate of return. Minami and Hondai used the actual ratio of 
profits to fixed capital achieved annually by the SOE sector. However, this 
generates a very skewed estimate, since this ratio declined from 23.2 per 
cent in 1980 to 4.8 per cent in 1990. This sharp decline dominates Minami 
and Hondai's estimate and masks the influence of the considerable growth 
in welfare capital over the reform period. I prefer to use state bank lending 
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interest rates collected from the China Finance Almanac 1995. Two 
alternative calculations are examined: (1) using the actual interest rates for 
each year, and (2) using the geometric mean of interest rates over the whole 
1980-1994 period. This second approach produces a constant rate so as to 
remove any effect from fluctuations in interest rates. Further details 
regarding the interest rates are provided in Appendix 5 .1. 
Alternative measures of income 
The above three components of total compensation are · summed· and then 
divided by firm income to produce the labour share of income. As discussed 
above (page 158), three alternative measures are available to represent 
income: Value Added, Net Output and Adjusted Net Output. For reasons 
explained above I regard Adjusted Net Output as the most appropriate 
measure of income, but for completeness also present below some results 
using Value Added and Net Output. In all of the comparative results · 
presented here, the same measure of income is used to calculate both output 
elasticity and labour income share. However, for the labour share estimates, 
since we are calculating a ratio, we use nominal values for the denominator 
income measure as well as nominal values for the wage variables in the 
numerator. Real variables are required for the production function 
estimations. 
Alternative calculations of labour share 
Three alternative methods are used to calculate the all-SOE and sector-
specific annual estimates of the labour share of income. The first measure, 
designated Mean, is the mean of all firm-level ratios. Raiser (1997b) used 
this measure in his analysis. 
Mean == - 1 -------, where N is the number of firms. 
N 
(5 .2.4) 
This measure must be processed for outliers since some firms have very 
small or even negative Adjusted Net Output, leading to some 
disproportionately large (positive and negative) ratios. Negative value added 
observations have already been deleted priorto the production function 
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estimations since one cannot take logarithms from a negative. To deal with 
the positive-signed outliers, we delete all firm-level ratios (calculated under 
Welfare Facilities measure B) exceeding a value of 5.0. The twenty-two 
resultant deletions are detailed in Table A5.2.14. In the comparative 
estimates that are presented below, all observations that are deleted in 
generating production function estimates are also deleted in calculating the 
corresponding labour income share estimates, and vice versa. 
The second measure used is the median of firm-level ratios, after the 
deletions mentioned above. Because Mean is skewed towards high values, 
the Median measure is consistently lower than Mean. Mean is preferred to 
Median as it better reflects the full characteristics of the data. 
The third measure, which I designate simply Share, is the measure used by 
Minami and Hondai ( 1995). It comprises the aggregate of all three wage 
components across all firms, divided by the aggregate value added of all 
firms. 
Share = - 1-· ------ , where i represents firms. 
LCY) (5 .2.5) 
I 
5.3 Output elasticity and labour income share estimates 
compared 
In this section we compare the estimates of the output elasticity of labour as 
generated from regression results, with estimates of the labour share of 
income. Observations that are deleted for the elasticity estimations are also 
deleted for the labour income share estimations, and vice versa, so that the 
comparisons are carried out on a consistent basis. This results in very slight 
changes to the regression results as reported above as the data set changes to 
report different measures. 
Figure 5.2 charts the results of the comparison at the meta production 
function level (all manufacturing SOEs), using Adjusted Net Output. 
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Corresponding charts for the results using Value Added and Net Output are 
presented in Figures A5.2.3a and A5.2.3b in Appendix 5.2. 
Regardless of the measure of income employed, both Mean and Median 
show a clear upward tend in the labour income share from the mid-1980s to 
the mid-1990s. The reported results from the first two years of the period 
should be interpreted with caution, as the data may be relatively unreliable. 
Using Adjusted Net Output as the income measure (Figure 5.2), we observe 
substantial overcompensation of over 20 per cent of income by the end of 
the period. 'Crossover', the point at which labour share starts to exceed 
output elasticity, is seen to have occurred in 1991. The use of Value Added 
suggests a smaller degree of overcompensation while Net Output suggests a 
larger degree of overcompensation. These results probably reflect the 
inherent biases in each these two measures of income; Value Added 
overstates income since not all intermediate costs are deducted, and Net 
Output understates income since it deducts depreciation. 
The charts show that it makes little difference which of the two methods is 
used for estimating the value of services from welfare facilities. In the lower 
charts I choose to use the flow of services as calculated with a constant 
interest rate. 
Sectoral results 
Sectoral results for five manufacturing sectors are presented in graphic form 
in Figures 5.3a to 5.3e. On the basis of Mean, each of the five sectors shows 
substantial overcompensation by the end of the period of analysis, with 
crossover occurring in the early 1990s. The use of Median suggests roughly 
'appropriate' compensation for each sector except Electronics, which shows 
overcompensation even under this nieasure. 
Let us directly compare these results with the sector-specific results obtained 
by Raiser (1997b) and Minami and Hondai (1995). Raiser analysed four 
sectors - garments, textiles, electrical appliances and iron and steel -
finding overcompensation in the former two sectors and undercompensation 
in the latter two. My results for the textile sector agree unambiguously with 
Raiser's. I do not report results for the garments sector or the iron and steel 
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sector as the sample size is too small after deletions. The electrical 
appliances sector is a sub-sector of the electronics sector under standard 
Chinese classifications. My finding of overcompensation here contradicts 
Raiser, although the sector definitions are only a partial match. 
Minami and Hondai studied only the machinery sector, and found evidence 
of overcompensation, with crossover occurring in 1988. Using Mean as the 
income measure, we find overcompensation, although crossover does not 
decisively occur until 1993. If we employ the Share measure (see Figure 
A5 .2.4e) the finding is similar to Minami and Hondai' s with crossover 
occurring in 1990, but only if we also use pooled OLS estimation to 
generate the elasticity estimates, as Minami and Hondai did. If we use 
Random Effects, which our specification tests reveal to be the correct 
model, the Machinery sector only barely achieves crossover in 1994. 
Figures A5.2.4a to A5.2.4f present results using Minami and Hondai's Share 
measure for all manufacturing sectors, and for the textile, chemical, building 
materials, machinery and electronics sectors. The calculated Share measures 
are to be consistently lower than Mean measures, with the result that results 
based on this measure do not in general support a conclusion of 
overcompensation. On an all-sector basis, the results indicate under-
compensation through the whole period relative to elasticity as measured 
with RE estimation. Using pooled OLS estimation, the results show roughly 
appropriate compensation. None of the sectors show decisive 
overcompensation relative to elasticity as measured by RE estimation. 
Table 5.7 Summary of results by other authors: Minami and 
Hondai (1995) (machinery sector) 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Labour share - China 
Output elasticity - China 
Labour share - Tianjin 
Output elasticity - Tianjin 
.477 
.536 
.386 
.487 
.367 
.550 
.432 
.479 
.514 
.576 
.550 
.498 
.564 
.488 
.690 
.430 
Notes: This table presents that set of labour share results that correspond with the approach taken in this 
chapter - all remuneration divided by all income (not restricted to 'productive' employees). 
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Table 5.8 Summary of results by other authors: Raiser (1997b) 
Labour Share of Income (SOEs only Output 
Elasticity 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 
Textiles .298 .355 .615 .682 .811 0.57 
Garments .284 .349 .622 .909 .753 0.68 
Electrical Appliances .418 .316 .427 .293 .254 0.91 
Iron & steel .379 .528 .409 .422 .400 0.60 
Notes: The labour share figures presented here are calculated similarly to 'Adjusted Mean'. 
Raiser's elasticity estimates are constant for all years. 
Comparative results by size of firm 
To gain further insights, we can separate out the data by firm size so as to 
investigate whether large, medium or small firms were most prone to engage 
in overcompensation. Chinese industrial statistics categorise all firms as 
large, medium or small, although the official criteria by which they are 
categorized differ from sector to sector. A data series is available in the 
CASS database that identifies firms by these three classes. Of the 769 firms 
in the total pooled (1980-1994) database, 176 are categorized large, 374 
medium and 219 small. After deletions, 661 firms are used in the Adjusted 
Net Output calculations. Of these, 154 are categorized as large, 326 medium 
and 181 small. Table AS .2.16 shows the results of a regression which is 
identical to the model we have used for our main results, except that it 
features two dummy variables for large and for medium-sized firms (leaving 
small firms as the baseline group). The firm size dummies are both found to 
be clearly insignificant. Therefore we may use the same set of elasticity 
coefficients for all three size categories to examine the extent of 
overcompensation by firm size. 
Figures 5.4a, 5.4b and 5.4c present the results. Based upon the Mean 
measure, it is very clear that medium-sized firms overcompensated more 
than large firms, while small firms overcompensated most of all. The 
Median measure, which is consistently lower than the Mean measure, shows 
undercompensation by 1994 for large firms, 'appropriate' compensation for 
medium-sized firms, and overcompensation for small firms. Figure A5.2.5 
presents the estimates of Minami and Hondai' s Share measure for the three 
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size categories and also for all manufacturing firms. This chart confirms the 
finding that small and medium-sized firms paid their employees a higher 
proportion of Adjusted Net Output than did large firms. 
Summary 
The results presented in this chapter show strong evidence of 
. overcompensation for the manufacturing sector as a whole, based upon 
those measures that are seen as the most technically sound. 
Overcompensating behaviour is found consistently across a range of 
industrial sectors. Finally, small and medium-sized firms show a markedly 
stronger tendency towards overcompensation than do large firms. 
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Figure 5.3a Elasticity and labour share: textile sector 
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Figure 5.3b Elasticity and labour share: chemical sector 
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Figure 5.3c Elasticity and labour share: building materials sector 
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Figure 5 .3d Elasticity and labour share: machinery sector 
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Figure 5.3e Elasticity and labour share: electronics sector 
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Figure 5.4a Elasticity and labour share: large firms 
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Figure 5.4b Elasticity and labour share: medium firms 
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Figure 5 .4c Elasticity and labour share: small firms 
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1 Minami and Hondai refer to this entity as 'output elasticity of labour'. Labour elasticity 
of output is the more orthodox expression, corresponding as it does to the very familiar 
'price elasticity of demand', expressed algebraically as dq .E_ 
dp q 
2 Non-line workers also include some miscellaneous types of employees such as political 
cadres, but these are few in number. 
3 The F statistic for the hypothesis test is 
(URSS - RRSS) I k 
F[k,N-k]=-----
RRSS l(N -k) 
As an example, the test of translog versus Cobb-Douglas for the total-inputs 
specification this gives: 
(1668.86 -1667.39) / 3 
F[3,5037] = ------- = 1.48 
1667 .39 / 5039 
The critical value at 95% is 2.60, so we do not reject the hypothesis that Cobb-Douglas 
is appropriate. 
4 Anecdotal evidence suggests that accounting standards were generally deficient in the 
pre-reform and early reform periods, due to inadequate education and training and the 
peculiarities of accounting in planned economies. This issue of accounting standards 
was briefly noted in various parts of Chapter 2, such as Section 2.8 and the anecdote 
from Purves (1991) mentioned in the Chapter 2 endnotes. Accounting standards no 
doubt improved over time due to such factors as better training, an aspect that Purves 
also discusses. 
5 Here, the subscript P denotes productive input variables (capital or labour), while 
subscript H denotes housing and welfare capital. 
6 We continue to use the fixed-effects estimator, therefore the error term £ in this model 
incorporates both a firm-specific constant and a purely stochastic error variable with 
zero mean. 
7 As argued in econometric course notes by Colin Cameron of ANU, 1995. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Description of data and data preparation 
The database used for the analysis of Chapters 5 was collected by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It covers 840 state-owned 
firms in total and is in two parts, one survey having been carried out to 
cover the years 1980 to 1989 and a later survey covering the years 1990 to 
1994. The sets of firms covered in the two survey datasets are not identical 
due to some of the firms in the 1980-1989 survey merging, converting to 
joint venture form and so forth. To replace some of the losses, CASS 
included some new firms for the second survey. 769 firms participated in 
the first survey (some of which commenced operations after 1980 and 
therefore did not have data to report for the whole period) and 752 
participated in the second. Of these, 681 firms participated in both surveys. 
Each of the two surveys includes one set of questions addressed to the 
senior accountant of the firm and another set of questions addressed to the 
manager. The information supplied by the accountant consists of 
quantitative variables such as output, expenditure on inputs, earnings, and 
balance sheet data, whereas the information supplied by the manager covers 
such aspects as the management system, objectives of the firm, relationships 
with supervisory agencies and the treatment of employees. The 1980-1989 
survey features 321 accounting variables and 70 questions addressed to the 
managing director. The 1990-1994 survey features 153 accounting variables 
and 85 questions addressed to the managing director. 
A number of variables are reported somewhat differently in the first and 
second surveys, and the quality and reliability of the data appears to be 
higher for the second survey than for the first. The ref ore the data is collated 
in such a way as to enable analysis to be carried out either on the entire 
database or on each of the two survey sets separately. 
The survey firms come from 35 different industrial sectors. However, only 
nine specific sectors contributed 20 or more firms to each of the two survey 
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periods. The firms are therefore classified into these nine sectors, plus a 
group labeled 'other manufacturing sectors', and a non-manufacturing group 
that includes mining, forestry and public utilities firms. Tables AS. la and 
AS .1 b list the numbers of firms in each sector before and after deletions 
(explained below). After deletions, only five sectors have adequate sample 
sizes for the empirical analysis: Textiles, Chemicals, Building Materials, 
Machinery and Electronics. We do not include the non-manufacturing group 
in estimations since we expect their performance to be influenced by such 
factors as natural resource endowments in the case of mining and fores try 
firms and economies of scale in the case of utilities. 16 firms that are 
reported as being in two different sectors in the two surveys are relegated to 
the 'other manufacturing' group. 
Table AS. I. la Number of firms in database by sector 
Code no. Sector F" . 1st S irms 10 urvey Firms in 2"0 Survey 
10 Food processing 34 33 
14 Textiles 99 102 
26 Chemicals 76 71 
27 Pharmaceuticals 27 28 
31 Building materials 51 52 
32 Iron and steel 26 22 
35 Machinery 156 148 
36 Transport equipment 27 27 
38 Electronics 44 45 
Other Manufacturing 177 173 
Non-Manufacturing 52 51 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the total number of firms in the original database, not subtracting 
deletions. 
'Other Manufacturing' here includes 16 firms originally categorised in two different sectors in the two 
periods. 
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Table A5.1.lb Number of firms by year and sector after deletions 
Sector 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Food processing 11 13 13 14 14 12 15 16 17 17 25 24 23 23 
Textiles 54 62 68 73 73 75 74 71 68 70 86 86 84 85 
Chemicals 43 45 47 48 44 45 44 46 45 44 64 64 60 60 
Pharmaceuticals 16 17 16 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 26 26 25 25 
Bldg. materials 25 29 30 32 30 31 30 30 31 32 46 45 45 43 
Iron and steel 14 13 14 14 15 15 14 16 16 10 17 17 17 16 
Machinery 93 94 95 99 99 96 92 92 93 93 122 120 118 116 
Transport Eqpt. 14 14 15 15 15 15 14 13 13 15 22 22 22 22 
· Electronics 24 24 25 26 28 28 28 27 29 29 38 37 35 35 
Other Mfg. 91 95 100 103 104 105 108 101 102 95 140 139 135 132 
Notes: The above indicate the total number of firms after deletions, as used for the estimations reported in 
Figure 5.2c. 
AS.l Data for production function estimations 
For the production function estimation we require data variables on output, 
intermediate inputs, capital and labour. This section describes the 
preparation processes undertaken for this data. 
Close examination of the database reveals numerous instances of missing 
observations and also some obvious clerical errors in the recording of the 
data. For example, sometimes an observation would suddenly diverge by a 
decimal place from the observations immediately preceding and following 
it, or the sub-categories of a series may not sum correctly to the aggregate 
series. (For example, 'managers', 'engineers/technicians', 'workers' and 
'other employees' may not sum correctly to the recorded figure for total 
'employees', suggesting an error either in the total or in one of the 
categories.) Therefore, all of the data series used in the analysis are carefully 
screened to identify such errors, and either correct them or delete the 
offending observations. Zero and negative observations are also deleted 
where necessary so that the input and output variables could be transformed 
into logarithmic form for the production function estimation. Unbalanced 
panel data techniques are used in the analysis, so that firms need not be 
deleted entirely when observations for one or more years are deleted. 
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Microsoft Excel was used for the data cleaning and Tables A5.2 and A5.3 
provide information on the methods used to check each of the variables. 
'Flag columns' were created in Excel to highlight various characteristics of 
the data that might call for scrutiny. For example, to check for errors in the 
nominal output series, a column was created to show the year-on-year 
growth rate of output, but only if the recorded output more than doubled or 
fell by more than half. The observation would then be cross-referenced 
against other variables such as real output and raw material usage to 
ascertain whether the apparent large fluctuation is likely to have actually 
occurred or whether there may have been an error in the recording of the 
data. Where the origin of an error can be confidently identified the data is 
modified back to the correct value, and where this is not possible the 
observation is marked for deletion. In the cases of capital and labour 
variables where categories ought to sum to the value of the aggregate 
variable, the quality of the data is checked by comparing the aggregate 
variable with the sum of the categories. Such observations are not 
automatically deleted however, as this would lead to an excessive number of 
deletions from the database. 
For each variable a deletion column vector is created, consisting of zeros 
(indicating that the data is to be deleted), ones (indicating that it is to be 
retained) and Ms (indicating that the data has been modified from the raw 
data and is to be retained). In this way, full records are kept of all deletions 
and modifications so that the cleaned data series can be compared with the 
raw data series. Also, different groups of data series can be used for 
different econometric specifications while discarding only the minimum 
necessary number of observations. . 
Tables A5.2 (for 1980-89 data) and A5.3 (for 1990-1994 data) detail the 
flag columns, summation relationships and cross-references that are used to 
check each variable in the cleaning process, as well as the number of 
modifications and deletions. These two tables are laid out such that each 
variable or group of variables (separated by horizontal lines) corresponds to 
a single deletion vector. For example, the deletions and modifications for 
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both B025 Fuels and B028 Energy in the 1980-1989 survey are all recorded 
in the deletion vector DEL_FE. The deletion counts cited in Tables A5 .2 
and A5 .3 are overlapping in the sense that, for example, Firm #22 in 1986 
has zeroes recorded in the deletion columns for Output, Materials and also 
for Depreciation on B 133 and B 134. The number of observations actually 
deleted from the combination of variables used in a particular econometric 
specification and corresponding labour income share calculation is reported 
in Table AS.lb for each year and sector. 
The data of the 1980-1989 survey is less complete and seems to contain 
more clerical errors than that of the 1990-1994 survey. Note in particular 
the high deletion ratios for the sub-categories of Fixed Assets, Depreciation 
and Labour in the 1980-1989 survey. Almost 25% of firms do not return 
any data for B70 Line Workers, and in fewer than half of all observations do 
the data for the labour sub-categories sum exactly to the figure for B65 
Total Labour. The data for the 1990-1994 survey is much more complete 
fewer deletions were required from this data. In addition, the data of the 
1980-1989 survey appears to be less reliable in the earlier years than in the 
later years; there are more missing entries and relatively more deletions are 
required. Three reasons can be suggested for this. First, accounting and 
record-keeping standards are likely to have been lower at the start of the 
reform period, improving thereafter. Second, as the first survey was taken 
after 1989, by that time some firms may not have retained good records for 
the early years of the 1980s. Third, for the earlier years any data recorded in 
nominal money amounts would be more heavily influenced by the prices set 
under the state plan at that time. Although in theory the data deflation 
process (described below) adjusts the_ resulting price distortions, the fact that 
in the earlier years this deflation process needs to account for both general 
deflation and price distortions is likely to mean that the resultant deflated 
data is somewhat less accurate. Because of the lower reliability, empirical 
results obtained for the earlier part of the survey period should be 
interpreted with greater caution. 
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Table A5.1.2 Data cleaning details for 1st survey nominal data 
Codes Variable 
Names 
Flags and Cross-References Modified Deleted 
B004 
B0ll 
(B019+ 
B022) 
B025, 
B028 
B129, 
B132 
B138 
B133, 
B134 
B139, 
B140 
Gross Output 
Net Output 
Materials (plus 
Ancillary 
Materials) 
Fuels, 
Energy 
Total Fixed 
Assets 
(Capital): year 
beginning and 
year end 
Accumulated 
Depreciation 
on B132 
Productive and 
Non-
Productive 
Fixed Assets 
Accumulated 
Depreciation 
on B133 and 
B134 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); B00l Output 
Prices, B002 planned Output, B003 Real 
Output, B019 Materials. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); B004 Output 
and its growth rate; All negative or zero 
observations deleted. 
B004 Output, BOOS Materials; Growth rate 
(>100% or <-50%); Sum of B020 Materials 
at plan prices, B021 Materials at market 
nces. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); Sum of 
B026 and B027 Fuels at plan and market 
prices, Sum of B029 and B030 Energy at plan 
and market prices; B006 Fuel & Energy; 
(B019+B022) Materials. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); Check B129 
+ B 130 Yearly Increase - B 131 Yearly 
Decrease= B132; B129 equal to B132 of 
previous year; Sum of categories B133 to 
B137 (productive, non-productive etc.); Sum 
of B 138 Accumulated Depreciation and B 143 
Net Fixed Assets. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); B138 = 
B132- B143 [Net Fixed Assets]; Ratio 
B138/Bl32. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%) in B133; 
Large changes ( over 10%) in ratio 
B133/B132; Check sum B132 = 
B133+B134+B135 [yet unused]+ B136 [not 
required]+ B137 [land], and delete if sum 
differs from B132 by more than 1 %. 
Check sum B138 = B139+B140+B141 [yet 
unused], do not use if sum differs from B 138 
· by over 1 %. If raw data missing etc., replace 
with B139 = B138*B133/(Bl33+B134), 
B140 = B138*B134/(B133+B134). 
58 
(0.8%) 
22 
(0.3%) 
244 
(3.2%) 
227 
(3.0%) 
460 
(6.0%) (b) 
381 
(5.0%) 
211 
(2.7%) 
B139: 
3722 
(48.4%) 
B140: 
3734 
(48.6%) 
(a) 
182 
(2.4%) 
313 
(4.1 %) 
312 
(4.1 %) 
338 
(4.4%) 
206 
(2.7%) 
309 
(4.0%) 
274 
(3.6%) 
348 
(4.5%) 
B64, B65 Total Labour 
Force (year 
ave. and year 
end) 
Growth rate (>100% or<-50%); Flag ifB64 
deviates from B65 by over 20%, unless B64 
lies between the B65 values of the same and 
the previous year. 
B64: 
75 (1.0%) 
B65: 
73 (0.9%) 
276 
(3.6%) 
B69 
B70 
B73 
B76 
B79 
Notes: 
Total Workers Growth rate (>100% or <-50%) for B69, B70, B69: 
Line Workers B73, B76; B70 not to exceed B69; Check the 75 (1.0%) 
Engineers/Tee sum B65 = B69+B73+B76+B79, and delete if B70: 
h sum differs from B65 by more than 1 %. 43 (0.6%) 
Managers B73: 2 
Other B76: 7 
Employees B79: 31 
2536 
(33.0%) 
(d) 
(a) Some deletion vectors relate to more than one variable. The groupings of variables and the 
numbers cited for modifications and deletions here each relate to a single deletion vector. 
(b) The majority of these modifications are trivial, arising from a decimal rounding issue. 
(c) The majority of these modifications arising from the need to replace missing original data; 
42.5% of observations in the case of B 139 and 43.5% for B 140. 
(ct) The main reason for the high deletion rate here is missing original data - 23.8% in the 
case of B70. 
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Table A5.1.3 Data cleaning details for 2nd survey nominal data 
Codes 
N2 
N4 
Nl4 
N25, 
N29, 
N33 
N102 
N104, 
N105, 
N106, 
N107 
N108, 
N109, 
Nll0, 
Nlll 
N37 
N38, 
N39, 
N41, 
(N42~4 
4) 
Notes: 
Variable Names Flags and Cross-References 
Gross Output 
Net Output 
Materials 
Electricity, 
Coal, 
Petroleum Fuels 
Total Fixed 
Assets (Capital) 
Plant & 
Equipment, 
Buildings, 
Housing & 
Welfare, 
Other Fixed 
Assets. 
Total 
Depreciation, 
N104 
Depreciation, 
N105 
Depreciation, 
N106 
Depreciation. 
Total Labour 
Managers, 
Engineers/Tech, 
Line Workers, 
Non-Line 
Workers. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); 
N4 Net Output, N8 Sales Revenue, 
N14 Materials. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); 
N2 Output, Value Added calculated 
as N2-(N14+N25+N29+N33). 
Delete negatives. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); 
Sum (N18 + N20) Materials Items 
1 & 2. 
Check sum N23 [Fuel & Energy] = 
N25+N29+N33; 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%) of 
N23. 
Growth rate (>100% or <-50%); 
Check sum N102 = N103 
[Productive Fixed Assets] 
+N106+N107, and delete if sum 
differs from N 102 by more than 
1%. 
Check sum N102 = 
N104+N105+N106+N107, delete if 
sum differs from N 102 by more 
than 10%. 
Check sum N108 = 
N109+Nl 10+Nl 1 l. Delete if sum 
differs from N108 by more than 
10%. 
Check sum N37 = 
N38+N39+N41 +N42+N43+N44, 
delete if sum differs from N37 by 
more than 1 % . 
Check sum N37 = 
N38+N39+N41 +N42+N43+N44, 
delete if sum differs from N37 by 
more than 1 % . (a) 
Modifie Deleted 
d 
2 
36 
(1.0%) 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
(a) 
0 
85 
(2.3%) 
5 
(0.1 %) 
36 
(1.0%) 
40 
(1.1%) 
59(b) 
(1.6%) 
11 
(0.3%) 
44 
(1.2%) 
69 
(1.8%) 
Ca) Despite the checking process being the same as for N37 , these variables have a different 
deletion vector from N37. This is because observations with zero values in any of the 
categories cannot be used in log-form regressions featuring the sub-category data, whereas 
such observations can be used in regressions featuring only Total Labour. 
(b) Also, five zero observations for Nl05 are deleted for Nl05 but retained for 
(Nl04+Nl05). 
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Deflation and depreciation of nominal data 
As standard production theory considers inputs and outputs strictly in real 
terms, all monetary variables in the data set must be deflated by an 
appropriate price index. It is not necessary to deflate the various labour 
variables. The variables for Output, Net Output and Materials were all 
deflated using the producer price indices for industrial products as reported 
on page 249 of the China Statistical Yearbook ( 1995). This source provides 
specific indices for the following sectors; Textiles, Food Manufacturing, 
Chemicals, Building Materials and Machinery. The Machinery index was 
also used to deflate the Electronics and Transport Equipment sector data. 
The Metallurgy index was used to deflate Iron and Steel sector data. The 
overall producer price index was used to deflate the data for the 
Pharmaceuticals and 'Other Manufacturing' sectors. The debate over the 
possible hazards of using the same price indices to deflate both output and 
material inputs is discussed in the review of total factor productivity studies 
in Chapter 3. The procedure is accepted here for two reasons. First, here we 
are seeking to measure not TFP but the output elasticity of labour, which is 
less sensitive to the procedure. Second, no better information on material 
inputs is available in this data set. 
These producer price indices are also used to deflate the various series for 
fuel and energy. The Power industry index is used for B028 Energy and N25 
Electricity. The Coal and Petroleum industry indices are used for N29 Coal 
and N33 Petroleum Fuels in the second survey data. Since the first survey 
reports B025 Fuels as a single variable for first survey firms the deflator for 
this variable is calculated as a weighted average of the Coal and Petroleum 
indices. For firms appearing in both surveys, the weights were calculated 
from the average ratio of coal and petroleum costs for the particular firm in 
the five years of the second survey. For firms appearing in the first survey 
only, the weights are calculated from the average ratio of all firms in the 
second survey (0.770 *Coal+ 0.230 * Petroleum). 
The deflation and depreciation of the capital variables is a complex 
integrated procedure. For all first survey capital and depreciation variables 
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and for N102 Total Fixed Assets and N108 Total Depreciation in the second 
survey, the following weighted average of the Machinery and Building 
Materials producer price indices is used to deflate the original data: 
PK = (0.75 * PMACH) + (0.25 * PBMAT) (AS. 1. 1) 
The Machinery index is used to deflate N 104 Plant and Equipment and the 
Building Materials index is used to deflate N105 Buildings. 
To deflate the original data, the capital series must first be broken down into 
vintages by taking annual differences. Each vintage, that is the quantity of 
new capital added in each year, is then deflated by the price index 
correspondin_g to that year. This approach is taken even when the data shows 
that the annual increment to the gross capital stock is negative. The vintages 
up to and including each respective year are then summed to calculate real 
gross capital for that year. All of the capital stock in 1980 is treated as 1980 
vintage capital. Since essentially fixed prices prevailed in China prior to this 
time, it is not necessary to break the 1980 data down into vintages. 
Accumulated depreciation is broken down into vintages by a different 
method. It is assumed that depreciation represents the wearing-out of capital 
and that the oldest capital wears out first. Therefore, all recorded 
depreciation is assumed to represent the wearing-out of 1980 capital up until 
the point where the figure for 1980 vintage depreciation equals 1980 vintage 
capital. Subsequent depreciation is then taken to represent 1981 capital until 
the accumulated depreciation equals 1980 vintage plus 1981 vintage capital, 
and so on. Each yearly vintage figure is then deflated by the same index as 
for capital, and the vintages are summed to calculate real accumulated 
depreciation for each year. Real accumulated depreciation is then subtracted 
from real gross capital to derive real net capital. This final variable is the 
one used in econometric estimation. 
For second-survey firms, 1989 real and nominal capital data is compiled 
from the first survey data to aid in calculating vintages. For N102 Total 
Fixed Assets this is relatively straightforward. For N104 Plant and 
Equipment and N105 Buildings, the 1989 value of B 133 Productive Fixed 
Assets is imported and multiplied by the average ratios of N 104 and N 105 
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in 1990 to 1994 to estimate the 1989 values of the respective series. This 
procedure cannot be used for_ firms that appear only in the first survey. For 
such firms I employ qualitative survey information on the vintage 
breakdown of total capital in 1994 and the starting year of the firm. 
However, this data is very incomplete. Of the 71 firms concerned, 40 are 
deleted due to missing or inconsistent data. Also, this data only indicates the 
proportion of capital acquired during each decade, so the vintages 1980 to 
1989 must be allocated uniformly as a best estimate. In consideration of 
these limitations, this procedure is only used for N102 Total Fixed Assets; 
for N104 and N105 all firms appearing only in the second survey are 
deleted. 
For the capital variables, the process of deflating and depreciating the 
nominal data yields some negative values for the real net data, which also 
need to be deleted. The numbers of observations thus deleted are detailed in 
Table A5.4. 
Table AS .1.4 Deletions arising from deflation and depreciation 
Codes Variable Names Modified (a) Deleted (b) 
B132 
B133 
B134 
N102 
N104 
N105 
N106 
Notes: 
Total Fixed Assets (year end) 
Productive Fixed Assets 
Non-Productive Fixed Assets 
Total Fixed Assets (year end) 
Productive Fixed Assets - Plant & 
Equipment . 
Productive Fixed Assets - Buildings 
Housing & Welfare Fixed Assets 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
323 
(4.2%) 
432 
(5.6%) 
585 
(7.6%) 
342 (c) 
(9.1 %) 
508 
(13.5%) 
492 
(13.1 %) 
556 
(14.8%) 
<al Refers only to modifications made in the deflation and depreciation processes, i.e. not including 
those carried out on nominal variables (capital and depreciation) as listed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
(bl Refers to all deletions , including those carried out on nominal variables as listed in Tables 5.2 and 
5.3. 
<cl Deletion rates for the real net capital variables in the second survey are higher than the deletion rates 
for the nominal variables because (1) 1989 capital and depreciation data is required as an input to the 
calculations, (2) some observations tum negative once depreciation is subtracted, and (3) firms that 
appear only in the 1990-94 survey cannot be depreciated. 
Second-stage examination of data for outliers 
After the creation of clean deflated data series in Excel, the data files were 
transferred to Stata 7 .0 for further processing and econometric estimation. In 
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the first stage of this process, the data was examined for outliers and any 
remaining errors. Four previously overlooked zero observations were found 
during this process (in the 1980s data) and the deletion vectors adjusted 
accordingly. A typographical error was found in one observation of the 
1980s data and corrected. The details in Tables A5.2 and A5.3 include these 
deletions. Histograms of all variables, both in absolute terms and normalised 
by total labour, were examined to detect outliers. It was found that the 
utilities and forestry sectors tended to exhibit large outliers for output and 
capital variables when normalised by labour. Consequently we exclude 
these sectors from the 'other manufacturing sectors' grouping and from the 
analysis altogether. Utilities are typified by substantial economies of scale 
and enduring market power. The productivity of forestry enterprises, as with 
the mining sector, depends on the quality of the natural resources to which 
they have access. For such reasons none of these sectors are appropriate to 
the analysis here. All other large observations were judged to be valid based 
upon comparison with associated data. 
In the 1990s data, one observation was corrected for typographical errors in 
total labour and line workers. A small number of zero values were found 
and deleted; six for total fuel and energy, one for total capital and five for 
buildings (these latter five were deleted for the buildings variable itself but 
retained as zero for productive capital, being the sum of plant and 
equipment and buildings). All large outliers were examined and found to be 
valid, except that we will again exclude the mining and utilities sectors 
where numerous outliers are observed. 
AS.2 Data for labour share of income calculations 
Cleaning details for the various data series used to calculate the labour share 
of income are provided in Tables A5.5a and A5.5b. 
Cash wages 
In the 1980~ 1989 data survey, the series B062 represents the wages of 
casual employees. It is readily apparent that some firms included this 
amount in their compilation of total cash wages (B045) while other firms 
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did not. It would appear that the survey designers intended for casual wages 
to be included, however since it is quite common practice (for example, in 
the Statistical Yearbook of China) to include only 'regular' employees' 
wages in measures of the total wage bill, some respondents omitted casual 
wages from the total. This is clear upon carrying out two summation checks, 
one for the sum BO4S =BOSS+ BOS8 + BO61 + BO62, and the other for the 
sum BO4S = BOSS + BOS8 + BO61. In 7 .8 per cent of cases the first 
summation was correct while the second was not correct (to within a 1 per 
cent tolerance, the same criterion being used for all summation checks 
discussed here). In 2.2 per cent of cases the second summation was correct 
but not the first, in 31.1 per cent of cases both summations were correct 
(because casual wages were either zero (25.6 per cent of cases) or very 
small), and in 58.9 per cent of cases neither summation was correct. For 
those 2.2 per cent entries where only the second summation was correct, the 
data is modified by adding B062 Casual Employee Wages to B045 Total 
Cash Wages. For all other entries the Total Cash Wages data is left intact. 
Since more respondents unambiguously included Casual Wages than 
unambiguously omitted them, I assume that this is the more common 
practice for those entries where either neither or both test summations were 
found to be correct. 
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Table A5. l.5a Data for labour share of income calculations - 1st 
survey 
Codes Variable Names Flags and Cross-References Modified Deleted 
B045 Total (Cash) Wages Check sum of payment types 64 165 
(+B062) (plus Casual Employee (B46,B47,B50~B54) (0.8%) (2.1 %) 
Wages if required) Check sum .of employee 
types 
(B55, B58, B61, B62) 
Accept if either sum is 
correct to within 1 % 
tolerance. 
Also check sum (B55, B58, 
B61), add B062 if required 
(see text). 
B261 + Payments to Employee Check sum retained profits 62 1394 
B063 Welfare Fund plus B259 = (B260~B264) (0.8%) (18.1 %) 
Payments to Retirees Large changes (+500% or-
70%) [1 lxB261; 
Blank entries 51xB063] 
Modify some B063 to correct 
unit-of-measure errors 
B134 Nonproductive capital Calculate flow of services as As per 1190 (b) 
B140 Nonproductive (interest rate*B 134 + Table 5.2 (15.5%) 
depreciation (increase in B 140 from 
previous year)) Ca) 
All 1980 observations are · 
lost. 
Series are not deflated. Use 
deletion vectors from Table 
5.2. 
B04 Gross output Calculate Value Added as As per 471 
B019 Materials B04- Table 5.2 (6.1 %) 
B022 Ancillary materials (B019+B022+B025+B028) 
B025 Fuels Series are not deflated. 
B028 Energy Use Table 5.2 deletion 
vectors. 
Notes: <al Interest rates are detailed in Table AS .6. 
(bl Sum of all deletions due to series B 134, B 140, and lagged B 140. 
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Table A5.1.5b Data for labour share of income calculations - 2nd 
survey 
Codes Variable Names Flags and Cross-References Modified Deleted 
N060 Total (Cash) Wages Check sum of payment types 7 0 
(N061, N062, N063), delete if (0.2%) (0.0%) 
sum differs b~ more than 1 %. 
Welfare Payments: Sum Large fluctuations in Welfare 12 5 
N64 of Payments/Total Cash Wages (0.3%) (0.1%) 
N65 -Medical Expenditure Check sum N72 + N73 Fund 
N66 -Upward Medical Payments = N71 Total 
N72 Payments Payments to Retirees 
N74 -Collective Welfare 
Expend. 
-Firm Payments to 
Retirees 
-Payments to Retiree 
Funds 
N106 Housing & welfare Calculate flow of services as As per 70 
Nlll capital ((interest rate*N106) + Nl 11) Table 5.3 (1.9%) 
Housing & welfare (a) 
depreciation Series are not deflated. Use 
deletion vectors from Table 
5.3. 
N2 Gross output Calculate Value Added as As per 49 
N14 Materials (N2 -(N14+N25+N29+N33)) Table 5.3 (1.3%) 
N25 Electricity Series are not deflated. 
N29 Coal Use Table 5.3 deletion 
N33 Petrol vectors. 
Welfare payments 
The two components of Cash Welfare Payments for the 1980~ 1989 survey 
are B261 Payments into Employee Welfare Fund and B063 Payments to 
Retirees. B261 is one of four accounting items that, in principle, should sum 
to B259 Retained Profits, the other items being Payments into Investment 
Fund, Bonus Payments and Emergency Reserves. It appears that this 
financial rule is not very strictly adhered to; it is satisfied by only 60.0 per 
cent of observations. Therefore I do not automatically delete those 
observations that violate the summation. The summation test is nonetheless 
useful for identifying a number of apparent clerical errors, and for 
determining whether blank entries for B261 could be accepted with zero 
value. 
Some firms included retiree payments in series B063, while others included 
them in series B261, leaving B063 blank. A check revealed that the mean 
ratio of (B261 + B063) to total cash wages is around 11 per cent regardless 
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of which approach is used to account for retiree payments. As some 
responding firms used yuan as the unit of measure for question B063 while 
others used 10,000 yuan, the data was checked and modified accordingly. 
Welfare facilities 
The value of the flow of services from welfare facilities ('non-productive 
capital' or 'housing and welfare capital') is calculated as follows: 
WKn =(Kn* i) + d (A5.2.l) 
where Kn denotes nominal gross non-productive (or housing and welfare) 
capital, d denotes nominal yearly depreciation, and i is an interest rate. The 
capital and depreciation values are as supplied by the firms in the original 
database, except that for the 1980~89 data survey yearly depreciation must 
be calculated by differencing the accumulated depreciation. 
Two alternative approaches are taken with respect to the interest rate. The 
first approach is to use an average of state bank loan rates actually 
prevailing on a year-to-year basis. Table A5.6 shows the basis of the 
calculation. Published data on state loan rates comprise an upper and lower 
bound. I calculate the product mean as follows: 
PM= ,JUpper* Lower (A5.2.2) 
I use the fixed capital loan rates for each year with the exception of 1990, 
when due to the unusually low lower bound, the working capital loan rate 
bounds are used instead. 
The second approach is to use a constant interest rate for the whole period. 
For this rate we use the product mean of all the yearly rates, which is 7. 71 
per cent. 
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Table A5.1.6 Interest rates for calculation of flow of services from 
welfare facilities 
Ind. Working Capital Loan Fixed Capital Loan Rate Product 
Rate Mean 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
1980 5.04 5.04 2.16 4.32 3.05 
1981 5.04 5.52 2.16 4.32 3.05 
1982 3.60 7.20 4.32 5.76 4.99 
1983 3.60 7.20 7.20 7.92 7.55 
1984 3.60 7.20 7.20 7.92 7.55 
1985 3.60 7.92 7.92 10.80 9.25 
1986 7.92 7.92 7.92 10.80 9.25 
1987 7.92 7.92 7.92 10.80 9.25 
1988 9.00 9.00 7.92 10.80 9.25 
1989 9.00 9.00 7.92 10.80 9.25 
1990 7.92 11.34 3.60 12.00 9.48 * 
1991 . 8.64 9.36 8.46 11.16 9.72 
1992 8.10 8.64 8.46 9.72 9.07 
1993 8.10 10.98 8.46 14.04 10.90 
1994 9.00 10.98 10.98 14.04 12.42 
Notes: * The rate used in this analysis is the product mean of the upper and lower Fixed Capital Loan Rates, 
except for the year 1990 where the product mean is calculated from the Industrial Working Capital 
Loan Rates, due to the unusually low lower bound for the Fixed Capital Rate in that year. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1995) Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, p. 509. 
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Appendix 5.2 
Miscellaneous results tables and charts 
This appendix presents various tables and charts that are referred to in the 
main text of Chapter 5. The contents are as follows: 
Table A5.2.1 
Table AS .2.2 
Table AS .2.3a 
Table A5.2.3b 
Table A5.2.4 
Table A5.2.5a 
Table AS .2.5b 
Table A5.2.6a 
Table A5.2.6b 
Table A5.2.7 
Table A5.2.8 
Table A5.2.9 
Table A5.2.10a 
Table A5.2.10b 
Table A5.2.10c 
Table A5.2.1 la 
Table AS .2.11 b 
Summary statistics: 1980-1989 survey data 
Summary statistics: 1990-1994 survey data 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier and Hausman tests: 
1980-89 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier and Hausman tests: 
1990-94 
Specification test results: 1980-1989 survey 
Specification tests with non-productive input data: 
1981-1989 
Specification tests with non-productive input data: 
1983-1987 
Granger causality tests with non-productive capital: 
1981-1989 
Granger causality tests with non-productive capital: 
1983-1987 
Specification test results: 1990-1994 survey 
Specification tests with non-productive input data: 
1990-1994 
Granger causality tests with non-productive capital: 
1990-1994 
Test for constant returns to scale with year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation, dependent variable value 
added 
Test for constant returns to scale with year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Random effects estimation, dependent variable value 
added 
Test for constant returns to scale with year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation, dependent variable adjusted 
net output 
Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation: dependent variable value 
added 
Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Random effects estimation: dependent variable value 
added 
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Table A5.2.1 lc 
Table A5.2. l ld 
Table A5.2.1 le 
Table A5.2.1 lf 
Figure A5.2.1 
Table A5.2.12 
Table A5.2.13 
Figure A5 .2.2 
Table A5.2.14 
Table A5.2.15 
Figure A5.2.3a 
Figure A5 .2.3b 
Figure A5.2.4a . 
Figure A5 .2.4b 
Figure A5.2.4c 
Figure A5 .2.4d 
Figure A5 .2.4e 
Figure A5.2.4f 
Table A5 .2.16 
Figure A5 .2.5 
Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1983-1994 
Fixed effects estimation: dependent variable value 
added 
\ 
Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1983-1994 
Random effects estimation: dependent variable value 
added 
Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation: dependent variable adjusted 
net output 
Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Pooled OLS estimation: dependent variable adjd. net 
output 
Sectoral elasticity estimates 
Estimation results with crs imposed and year and sector 
dummies: 1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation 
Cash welfare payments using alternative measure 
Welfare payments / income under alternative measures 
Deletion of outliers for mean labour share 
Cumulative deletion count for main results 
Elasticity and labour share estimates using value added 
Elasticity and labour share estimates using net output 
Elasticity and labour share: all manufacturing 
Minami and Hondai ( 1995) share measures using 
adjusted net output 
Elasticity and labour share: textiles 
Minami and Hondai ( 1995) share measures using 
adjusted net output 
Elasticity and labour share: chemicals 
Minami and Hondai ( 1995) share measures using 
adjusted net output 
Elasticity and labour share: building materials 
Minami and Hondai ( 1995) share measures using 
adjusted net output 
Elasticity and labour share: machinery sector 
Minami and Hondai ( 1995) share measures using 
adjusted net outpµt 
Elasticity and labour share: electronics sector 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures using 
adjusted net output 
Estimation to test firm size dummy variables 
RE estimation: dependent variable adjd. net output 
Elasticity and labour share: all manufacturing 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures by firm size 
200 
Table A5.2.1 Summary statistics: 1980-1989 survey data 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Real Variables: 
Gross output 1793.28 5024.14 1807.84 5025.32 1961.95 5570.35 2260.03 7480.04 2510.43 7684.81 
Net output 536.85 1639.55 618.83 2545.50 652.48 2742.58 730.85 3143.92 825.76 3224.99 
Adjusted net output -- -- 708.14 3041.74 740.70 3180.09 821.57 3604.84 900.94 3533.62 
Value added 617.11 1601.56 683.74 2406.49 756.88 2791.11 818.25 2642.81 909.43 2585.69 
Materials, fuel & energy 1109.46 2782.15 1152.43 2943.48 1256.93 3162.61 1475.45 5614.04 1632.83 6174.04 
Total capital -- -- 1369.91 5919.56 1459.30 6302.35 1591.91 7464.89 1750.37 8903.37 
Productive capital -- -- 1099.58 4806.20 1012.16 3374.62 1258.67 6020.63 1391.33 7339.17 
Non-productive capital -- -- 183.30 918.17 174.52 550.20 234.06 1158.23 262.53 1313.91 
Labour Variables: 
Total labour 1587.64 4532.70 1682.83 4891.65 1737 .16 4984.74 1758.32 5055.29 1779.39 5121.86 
Productive labour 1119.38 2479.86 1164.53 2571.25 1211.08 2663.60 1212.12 2611.05 1207.21 2527.17 
Non-productive labour 669.23 . 3085.37 696.18 3383.92 715.40 3376.89 724.77 3484.62 743.83 3654.10 
Nominal Variables: 
Cash wages 100.10 131.47 104.08 130.26 110.36 135.99 113.46 137.63 113.46 137.63 
Welfare payments 23.30 85.04 26.59 96.88 31.38 115.14 36.63 134.83 36.63 134.83 
Welfare facilities A -- -- 21.71 78.08 27.35 78.88 35.83 124.91 35.83 124.91 
Welfare facilities B -- -- 33.51 111.51 35.17 101.41 36.36 126.77 36.36 126.77 
Net output 536.85 1639.55 615.33 2529.49 644.71 2716.75 718.58 3112.41 718.58 3112.41 
Adjusted net output -- -- 704.41 3026.11 732.58 3154.96 808.79 3574.78 808.79 3574.78 
Value added 667.76 1747.06 753.86 2952.91 819.83 3291.05 883.70 3235.55 883.70 3235.55 
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation. 
All variables listed here are in year average terms. 1980 capital observations are lost in the averaging process. Benefits from welfare facilities and adjusted net output cannot be generated for 1980 
since these would require 1979 accumulated depreciation data. 
Units of measure are RMB 10,000 for monetary variables, persons for labour variables. 
Real variables are deflated to 1980 values. 
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Table A5.2.1 continued Summary statistics: 1980-1989 survey data 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Real Variables: 
Gross output 2713.07 7829.11 2880.79 8440.90 3202.02 9420.60 3478.90 9305.04 3402.93 9056.92 
Net output 835.89 2735.84 886.42 3046.26 993.17 3400.50 1034.74 3330.74 955.43 3281.98 
Adjusted net output 943.21 3154.00 1014.59 3646.04 1152.37 4229.68 1206.13 3983.25 1145.47 4056.35 
Value added 1015.14 2912.29 1094.99 3781.24 1183.61 4026.74 1262.01 3893.12 1165.63 3621.48 
Materials, fuel & energy 1718.06 5435.57 1787.46 5000.15 2037.20 5842.99 2251.54 5860.97 2293.15 5845.12 
Total capital 1973.44 9791.77 2109.39 10179.3 2286.41 10544.9 2471.21 11101.1 2611.39 11662.0 
Productive capital 1586.47 8177.09 1676.34 8307.21 1801.45 8418.83 1931.32 8632.87 2012.18 8890.60 
Non-productive capital 291.22 1422.45 327.34 1584.52 358.76 1677.32 404.92 1993.79 442.00 2376.42 
Labour Variables: 
Total labour 1818.71 5235.05 1861.18 5057.25 1912.15 4978.11 1947.27 5057.78 2012.82 5383.62 
Productive labour 1224.89 2635.19 1248.70 2570.42 1289.65 2487.72 1313.45 2493.49 1356.45 2660.28 
Non-productive labour 755.17 3631.98 754.80 3399.43 769.02 3411.58 782.33 3491.24 793.21 3670.28 
Nominal Variables: 
Cash wages 148.52 155.36 169.13 163.38 186.93 168.43 224.55 180.55 249.14 192.94 
Welfare payments 55.64 194.35 70.78 251.02 85.71 272.66 114.27 346.16 142.68 492.59 
Welfare facilities A 60.09 227.77 73.98 304.76 95.88 684.73 84.63 371.53 103.44 458.15 
Welfare facilities B 52.92 198.03 65.76 270.68 86.32 645.95 73.31 357.04 91.03 400.92 
Net output 900.74 2938.29 990.18 3368.93 1198.06 4127.14 1445.48 4758.56 1601.47 5592.92 
Adjusted net output 1009.07 3362.94 1119.72 3966.72 1359.74 4962.78 1623.68 5429.82 1803.24 6391.80 
Value added 1181.49 3890.96 1323.50 4904.40 1561.34 5710.26 1957.83 6586.81 2228.14 7665.82 
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation. 
All variables listed here are in year average terms. 1980 capital observations are lost in the averaging process. 
Units of measure are RMB 10,000 for monetary variables, persons for labour variables. 
Real variables are deflated to 1980 values. 
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Table A5.2.2 Summary statistics: 1990-1994 survey data 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Real Variables: 
Gross output 3277.72 8710.31 3381.91 9084.52 3760.63 10279.3 3836.58 12000.0 3941.14 17284.5 
Net output 891.50 2964.14 875.10 2856.13 978.11 3212.44 967.03 3550.15 904.31 4244.23 
Adjusted net output 1128.93 3751.58 1150.23 3920.58 1285.88 4257.16 1461.35 6869.85 1399.20 7019.44 
Value added 1480.88 3937.69 1343.12 4104.89 1472.39 4662.l l 1551.00 5672.09 1618.60 8361.71 
Materials, fuel & energy 1789.71 5025.63 2022.61 5271.24 2278.55 5915.92 2270.98 6630.20 2313.74 9188.09 
Total capital -- -- 2467.17 10255.2 2519.48 10382.2 2632.67 10739.5 2685.48 11171.2 
Productive capital 2181.27 8336.85 2382.85 8575.66 2423.14 8663.59 2499.18 9038.80 2580.48 9479.51 
Housing & welfare -- -- 278.89 1766.44 289.07 1858.44 304.17 2041.19 331.09 2323.49 
Labour Variables: 
Total labour -- -- 1830.84 3286.50 1848.05 3310.08 1856.30 3321.69 1877.41 3359.10 
Productive labour 1482.49 2476.78 1488.74 2603.83 1500.31 2613.38 1501.20 2607.76 1512.07 2622.09 
Non-productive labour -- -- 350.61 859.84 356.41 858.68 363.75 890.68 374.18 967.49 
Nontinal Variables: 
Cash wages 443.48 869.41 487.04 952.27 560.95 1083.85 661.51 1253.89 807.47 1742.32 
Welfare payments 141.03 276.47 160.24 313.30 186.23 359.84 224.91 426.32 237.39 512.24 
Welfare facilities A 60.40 350.30 67.45 396.73 70.87 410.10 97.17 621.19 124.89 817.37 
Welfare facilities B 52.07 300.02 56.92 332.07 63.13 363.37 75.23 475.06 87.04 558.25 
Net output 1636.85 5439.52 1674.46 5436.48 1970.19 6359.87 2322.53 8182.27 2508.20 10716.6 
Adjusted net output 1805.40 5973.28 1913.29 6353.66 2250.59 7249.66 2845.79 11356.7 3122.39 14390.3 
Value added 2751.35 7402.65 2570.86 7802.93 2919.63 9063.47 3562.36 12088.4 4196.62 19319.0 
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation. 
All variables listed here are in year average terms. Some 1990 observations are lost in the averaging process. Productive capital and productive labou·r figures for 1990 are as generated for the pooled period 
(1980- 94) regression analysis. 
Units of measure are RMB 10,000 for monetary vaiiables, persons for labour variables. 
Real variables are deflated to 1980 values. 
203 
Table A5.2.3a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier and Hausman Tests: 
1980-89 
Breusch-Pagan LM Hausman 
Chi2 Prob >Chi2 Chi2 Prob >Chi2 
Cobb-Douglas, value-added, total inputs 6429.63 0.0000 78.94 0.0000 
Cobb-Douglas, value-added, productive inputs 4709.52 0.0000 24.27 0.0000 
Cobb-Douglas, net output, total inputs 7865.03 0.0000 158.13 0.0000 
Cobb-Douglas, net output productive inputs 5555.47 0.0000 34.36 0.0000 
Translog, value-added, total inputs 6422.11 0.0000 78.04 0.0000 
Translog, value-added, productive inputs 4583.35 0.0000 27.07 0.0001 
Translog, net output, total inputs 7871.48 0.0000 137.20 0.0000 
Translog, net output, productive inputs 5519.17 0.0000 34.90 0.0000 
Note: All input and output variables used in the above regressions are in year-average terms. 
Table A5.2.3b Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman tests: 
1990-94 
Breusch-Pagan LM Hausman 
Chi2 Prob >Chi2 Chi2 Prob >Chi2 
Cobb-Douglas, value-added, total inputs 2241.87 0.0000 6.73 0.0346 
Cobb-Douglas, value-added, productive inputs 2088.80 0.0000 5.49 0.0642 
Cobb-Douglas, net output, total inputs 2096.03 0.0000 16.01 0.0003 
Cobb-Douglas, net output, productive inputs 2018.48 0.0000 22.11 0.0000 
Translog, value-added, total inputs 2242.89 0.0000 13.37 0.0201 
Translog, value-added, productive inputs 2073.94 0.0000 13.18 0.0218 
Translog, net output, total inputs 2085.48 0.0000 24.48 0.0002 
Translog, net output, productive inputs 1998.44 0.0000 33.21 0.0000 
Note: All input and output variables used in the above regressions are in year-average terms. 
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Table AS .2.4 Specification test results: 1980-1989 survey 
Specification Adj R2 RSS F Statistic D.F. F test result 
(Crit. value) 
Translog: total data 0.8023 1664.123 1.533 3,5047 Not reject C-D 
(2.60) 
Translog: prod. data 0.8088 1051.52 0.312 3,3467 Not reject C-D 
(2.60) 
CES: total data 0.8022 1665.631 0.023 1,5049 Not reject C-D 
(3.84) 
CES: prod. data 0.8089 1051.665 0.459 1,3469 Not reject C-D 
(3.84) 
Cobb-Douglas: total 0.8022 1665.639 (baseline) 
data 
Cobb-Douglas: prod. 0.8089 1051.804 (baseline) 
data 
Translog: total data, 0.8592 546.892 0.496 3,2553 Not reject C-D 
1983-87 (2.60) 
Translog: prod. data, 0.8611 354.078 0.082 3, 1747 Not reject C-D 
1983-87 (3.84) 
CES: total data, 1983- 0.8593 546.864 1.625 1,2555 Not reject C-D 
87 (2.60) 
CES: prod. data, 1983- 0.8612 354.093 0.171 1, 1749 Not reject C-D 
87 (3.84) 
Cobb-Douglas: total 0.8593 547.211 (baseline) 
data, 1983-87 
Cobb-Douglas: prod. 0.8613 354.128 (baseline) 
data, 1983-87 
Notes: 1 All the above results are derived using year-average data. 
2 For an explanation of the format of the F tests, see page 153 and the endnote thereto. 
Table AS .2.Sa Specification tests with non-productive input data: 
1981-1989 
Variables in 
Specification 
Lp,Ln,Kp,Kn 
Lp,Kp,Kn 
LP, Ln, K p 
LP,KP,(KP * Kn) 
LP,KP,(LP *Ln), 
(KP*Kn) 
Adj R2 
0.8100 
0.8093 
0.8083 
0.8094 
0.8093 
0.8100 
RSS 
991.142 
994.939 
999.867 
994.494 
994.713 
990.751 
F Statistic 
(95 % Crit. Val.) · 
21.794 
(3.00) 
30.764 
(3.84) 
14.248 
(3.84) 
32.260 
(3.84) 
31.526 
(3.84) 
22.457 
(3.00) 
D.F. F test result 
2,3319 Reject C-D 
1,3320 Reject C-D 
1,3320 Reject C-D 
1,3320 Reject C-D 
1,3320 Reject C-D 
2,3319 Reject C-D 
Notes: (1) The above specifications are tested against the Cobb-Douglas form with productive inputs . 
(2) All regressions here employ data for the full period 1981 to 1989, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost 
due to the averaging process for capital. 
(3) All six regressions and the Cobb-Douglas baseline were run on the same sample; observations requiring deletions 
for non-productive capital or labour were also deleted in those specifications that do not include these variables. 
(4) Subscriptp denotes the productive form of the input, n the non-productive form and* the multiplicative function . 
(5) F test critical values for N -k > 100 are [at 95%] J=l : 3.84, J=2: 3.00; [at 99 %] J=l: 6.63 , J=2: 4.61. 
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Table AS .2.5b 
Variables in 
Specification 
L p ' Ln ' K p ' Kn 
Lp,Kp,Kn 
LP, Ln, K p 
LP,KP,(Kp * Kn) 
LP,KP,(LP *Ln), 
(KP*Kn) 
Specification Tests with non-productive input data: 
1983-1987 
Adj R2 RSS F Statistic D.F. F test result 
(95 % Crit. Val.) 
0.8622 330.479 5.969 2, 1670 Reject C-D 
(3.00) 
0.8621 330.858 10.017 1, 1671 Reject C-D 
(3.84) 
0.8615 332.451 1.963 1, 1671 Not reject C-D 
(3.84) 
0.8621 330.828 10.168 1, 1671 Reject C-D 
(3.84) 
0.8927 330.825 10.181 1, 1671 Reject C-D 
(3.84) 
0.8622 330.496 5.924 2, 1670 Reject C-D 
(3.00) 
Notes: (1) The above specifications are tested against the Cobb-Douglas form with productive inputs. 
(2) All regressions summarised in this table employ data for the years 1983 to 1987 only, in year-average terms. 
(3) All six regressions and the Cobb-Douglas baseline were run on the same sample; observations requiring deletions 
for non-productive capital or labour were also deleted in those specifications that do not include these variables. 
( 4) Subscript p denotes the productive form of the input, n the non-productive form and * the multiplicative function. 
(5) F test critical values for N-k > 100 are [at 95 %] 1=1: 3.84, 1=2: 3.00; [at 99%] 1=1: 6.63, 1=2: 4.61. 
Table A5.2.6a Granger causality tests with non-productive capital: 
1981-1989 
Log Non-Productive Capital 
(lagged 1 year) 
Log TFP (lagged 1 year) 
Constant 
Adjusted R2 
Number of Observations 
Log TFP as Dependent Log Non-Productive 
Variable Capital 
Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic 
---------------0.003 ❖ S 0,720 28,09*** 
0.304 10.67*** 
-1.696 
0.7309 
3264 
-17.55*** 
0.024 
1.422 
0.9496 
3334 
11.75*** 
Note: (1) T-statistics are marked with * if significant at 90% level ; with ** at 95 % level; and with *** at 99% level. 
(2) Estimations summarised in this table employ data for years 1981 to 1989, in year-average terms. 
(3) TFP calculated using coefficients from full-period regression; ln(V) - 0.89913 *ln(~) - 0.40682*ln(Kp), 
(4) Equivalent fixed-effects estimation technique employed (OLS with firm dummies). 
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Table A5.2.6b Granger causality tests with non-productive capital: 1983-
1987 
Log Non-Productive Capital 
(lagged 1 year) 
Log TFP (lagged 1 year) 
Constant 
Adjusted R2 
Number of Observations 
Log TFP as Dependent Log Non-Productive 
0.175 
0.677 
Variable Capital 
0.7526 
2034 
3.90*** 
5.84*** 
0.0616 
1.857 
0.9461 
2083 
9.33*** 
Note: (1) T-statistics are marked with* if significant at 90% level ; with** at 95% level; and with*** at 99% level. 
Non-productive capital in the TFP regression is significant at 99% but with negative sign and is marked with!!!. 
(2) Estimations summarised in this table employ data only for years 1983 to 1987, in year-average terms. 
(3) TFP calculated using coefficients from 1983-1987 regression; ln (V) - 0.59224 * ln (Lp) - 0.38223 * ln (Kp). 
(4) Equivalent fixed-effects estimation technique employed (OLS with firm dummies). 
Table AS .2. 7 Specification test results: 1990-1994 survey 
Specification Adj R2 RSS F Statistic D;F. F test result 
(Crit. Value) 
Translog: total input data 0.9238 233.168 6.407 3, 1848 Reject C-D 
(2.60) 
Translog: productive inputs 0.9185 224.712 1.998 3, 1725 Not reject C-D 
(2.60) 
CES: total inputs 0.9232 235.297 2.324 1, 1850 Not reject C-D 
(3.84) 
CES: productive inputs 0.9183 225.489 0.027 1, 1727 Not reject C-D 
(3.84) 
Cobb-Douglas: total inputs 0.9232 235.593 (baseline) 
Cobb-Douglas: prod've inputs 0.9184 225.492 (baseline) 
Note: (1) All estimations summarised here are conducted in year-average terms. Accordingly, 1990 observations are lost. 
(2) Equivalent fixed-effects estimation technique employed (OLS with firm dummies). 
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Table AS .2.8 Specification tests with non-productive input data: 1990-1994 
Specification Adj R2 RSS F Statistic D.F. F test result 
( Crit. Value) (j,N-k) 
Kp, Lp, Kh, Ln 0.9161 223.661 2.703 2, 1694 Not reject C-D 
(3.0) 
Kp, Lp, Kh 0.9161 223.699 5.121 1, 1695 Reject C-D at 95% 
(3.84) 
Kp, Lp, Ln 0.9159 224.334 0.306 1, 1695 Not reject C-D 
(3.84) 
Kp, Lp, (KP* Kh) 0.9163 223.248 8.556 1, 1695 Reject C-D 
(3.84) 
Kp, Lp, (LP* Kh) 0.9162 223.400 7.397 1, 1695 Reject C-D 
(3.84) 
Kp, Lp, (LP *Ln), (KP *Kh) 0.9162 223.233 4.332 2, 1694 Reject C-D at 95% 
(3.0) 
Kp, Lp, (L*Ln), (L*Kh) 0.9162 223.378 3.780 2, 1694 Reject C-D at 95% 
(3.0) 
Cobb-Douglas: 0.9159 224.375 NIA. (baseline) 
Productive data 
Note: (1) The above specifications are tested against the Cobb-Douglas form with productive inputs. 
(2) All estimations are conducted in year-average terms. 
(3) The subscript h denotes housing and welfare capital, n denotes non-line labour, p denotes a productive input, and* 
represents the multiplicative function. 
(3) F test critical values for N-k > 100 are [at 95 %] J=l: 3.84, J=2: 3.00; [at 99%] J=l: 6.63, J=2: 4.61. 
Table AS.2.9 Granger causality tests with non-productive capital: 1990-1994 
Log TFP as Dependent Log Non-Productive 
Variable Capital 
Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic 
---------------Log Non-Productive Capital 
(lagged 1 year) 
-0.0043 0.697 12.74*** 
Log TFP (lagged 1 year) 0.285 5.12*** 0.058 
1.254 Constant -0.696 -2.87*** 5.82*** 
Adjusted R2 0.8346 
1697 
0.9864 
1716 Number of Observations 
Note: (1) T-statistics are marked with* if significant at 90% level ; with** at 95% level ; and with*** at 99% level. 
(2) TFP calculated using coefficients from the 1990-1994 regression; ln (V) - 0.602 * ln (Lp) - 0.476 * ln (Kp), 
For robustness, TFP was also calculated with alternative coefficients and the test repeated, with similar results (not 
reported). Data is in year-average terms. 
(3) Equivalent fixed-effects estimation technique employed (OLS with firm dummies), with robust standard errors . 
Breusch-Pagan LM and Hausman tests actually indicate the OLS model for the TFP regression and FE for the non-
productive capital regression. For robustness, the test was also carried out using OLS, with similar results (not 
reported). 
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Table AS .2.1 Oa Test for constant returns to scale with year dummies: 1981-
1994 
Fixed effects estimation, dependent variable value added 
Year DyKp DyLp Sum of P's F test 
Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic statistic 
1981 
-0.363 -6.98*** 0.294 6.01 *** 0.828 16.9*** 
1982 
-0.213 -4.23*** 0.178 3.72*** 0.862 11.2*** 
1983 
-0.172 -3.40*** 0.165 3.43*** 0.890 7.2*** 
1984 
-0.134 -2.68*** 0.144 3.02*** 0.907 5.1 ** 
1985 -0.178 -3.57*** 0.196 4.06*** 0.914 4.4** 
1986 
-0.165 -3.31 *** 0.181 3.76*** 0.913 4.6** 
1987 
-0.155 -3.12*** 0.176 3.64*** 0.918 4.2** 
1988 
-0.140 -2.79*** 0.169 3.44*** 0.926 3.5 
1989 
-0.171 -3.50*** 0.176 3.67*** 0.902 6.1 ** 
1990 
-0.173 -3.19*** 0.221 4.14*** 0.945 1.9 
1991 
-0.125 -2.60*** 0.139 2.93*** 0.911 5.2** 
1992 
-0.087 -1.83* 0.108 2.29** 0.918 4.5** 
1993 
-0.051 -1.09 0.062 1.36 0.909 5.6** 
1994 (base year) 0.897 7.0*** 
Coefficient T Statistic 
lnKp 0.446 11.98*** 
lnLp 0.451 8.56*** 
Constant 0.176 0.66 
Adj. R2 0.2855 
- within 
- between 0.6424 
- overall 0.5732 
No. of obsns 6725 
No. of firms 658 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out with productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost 
through the averaging process. · 
(2) F test critical values are [at 95%] 3.84; [at 99%] 6.63. 
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Table AS .2.1 Ob Test for constant returns to scale with year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
lnKp 
lnLp 
Constant 
Adj. R2 
- within 
- between 
- overall 
No. of obsns 
No. of firms 
Random effects estimation, dependent variable value added 
DrKP DyLp Sum of P's F test 
Coefficient 
-0.375 
-0.231 
-0.187 
-0.147 
-0.189 
-0.173 
-0.161 
-0.143 
-0.178 
-0.169 
-0.115 
-0.080 
-0.048 
(base year) 
Coefficient 
0.492 
0.465 
-0.248 
0.2850 
0.6441 
0.5753 
6725 
658 
T Statistic 
-7.26*** 
-4.61 *** 
-3.71*** 
-2.96*** 
-3.79*** 
-3.49*** 
-3.25*** 
-2.86*** 
-3.66*** 
-3.13*** 
-2.4** 
-1.67* 
-1.03 
T Statistic 
13.63*** 
10.77*** 
-1.50 
Coefficient T Statistic statistic 
0.312 6.41 *** 0.893 16.71*** 
0.200 4.22*** 0.926 8.26*** 
0.184 3.83*** 0.954 3.25 
0.161 3.39*** 0.970 1.33 
0.210 4.37*** 0;978 0.78 
0.192 4.01 *** 0.975 0.94 
0.184 3.82*** 0.979 0.68 
0.173 3.54*** 0.987 0.28 
0.185 3.87*** 0.963 2.24 
0.218 4.10*** 1.005 0.05 
0.130 2.74*** 0.971 1.43 
0.101 2.14** 0.977 0.88 
0.059 1.30 0.968 1.76 
0.956 1.26 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out with productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost 
through the averaging process. 
(2) F test critical values are [at 95%] 3.84; [at 99%] 6.63 . 
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Table AS .2.1 Oc Test for constant returns to scale with year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation, dependent variable adjusted net 
output 
Year DrKP DrLp Sum of P's F test 
Coefficient T Statistic Coefficient T Statistic Statistic 
1981 
-0.248 -6.11*** 0.209 5.45*** 0.865 17 .2*** 
1982 
-0.152 -3.85*** 0.128 3.43*** 0.880 13.6*** 
1983 
-0.135 -3.39*** 0.131 3.47*** 0.901 9.5*** 
1984 
-0.194 -4.98*** 0.206 5.53*** 0.916 6.8*** 
1985 
-0.143 -3.55*** 0.167 4.33*** 0.929 5.0** 
1986 
-0.151 -3.83*** 0.175 4.60*** 0.929 5.1 ** 
1987 
-0.148 -3.73*** 0.179 4.66** 0.936 4.2** 
1988 
-0.109 -2.72*** 0.155 3.99*** 0.951 2.5 
1989 
-0.141 -3.60*** 0.171 4.46*** 0.934 4.4** 
1990 
-0.053 -1.26 0.067 1.63 0.919 6.9*** 
1991 
-0.058 -1.55 0.064 1.72* 0.910 8.7*** 
1992 
-0.056 -1.50 0.072 1.97** 0.921 6.7*** 
1993 0.001 0.03 0.007 0.20 0.913 8.2*** 
1994 (base year) 0.897 7.0*** 
Coefficient T Statistic 
lnKp 0.399 13.61 *** 
lnLp 0.506 12.12*** 
Constant -0.044 -0.21 
Adj. R2 
- within 0.3532 
- between 0.7442 
- overall 0.6541 
No. of obsns 6549 
No. of firms 661 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out with productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost 
through the averaging process. 
(2) F test critical values are [at 95%] 3.84; [at 99%] 6.63. 
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Table A5.2.1 la Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1981-1994 
fixed effects estimation: deEendent variable value added 
Variable Coefficient T Statistic 
ln(K✓Lp) 0.5084 13.44*** 
D19s1-(K✓Lp) -0.032 -0.70 
D19s2-(K✓Lp) -0.039 -0.84 
D19s1-(K✓Lp) -0.113 -2.44** 
D19s4.(K✓Lp) -0.147 -3.16*** 
D19ss-(K✓Lp) -0.216 -4.52*** 
D1986-(K✓Lp) -0.191 -3.98*** 
D19s7.(K✓Lp) -0.193 -3.97*** 
D19ss-(K✓Lp) -0.193 -3.88*** 
D19s9.(K✓Lp) -0.161 -3.30*** 
D1990.(K✓Lp) -0.248 -4.54*** 
D1991.(K✓Lp) -0.137 -2.81 *** 
D1992.(K✓Lp) -0.113 -2.33** 
D1993.(K✓Lp) -0.065 -1.39 
D1994.(K✓Lp) (base year) 
Constant 
-0.430 -48.92*** 
Adj. R2 - within 0.0834 
- between 0.1786 
- overall 0.1507 
No. of obsns 6725 
No. of firms 658 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process. 
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Table AS .2.11 b Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 1981-1994 
Random effects estimation: deEendent variable value added 
Variable Coefficient T Statistic 
ln(Kp/Lp) 0.5423 14.80*** 
D1981-(Kf¥'Lp) -0.053 -1.17 
D1982-(Kp/Lp) -0.063 -1.38 
D198J· (Kp/Lp) -0.135 -2.94*** 
D1984.(Kp/Lp) -0.167 -3.62*** 
D198s-(Kf¥'Lp) -0.234 -4.94*** 
D 1986· ( K f¥'Lp) -0.207 -4.33*** 
D 1987· ( K p/Lp) -0.205 -4.23*** 
D1988·(Kp/Lp) -0.202 -4.07*** 
D1989. ( Kp/Lp) -0.174 -3.57*** 
D 1990.( Kp/Lp) -0.250 -4.58*** 
D 1991.( Kp/Lp) -0.132 -2.7*** 
D1992.( Kp/Lp) -0.108 -2.23** 
D1993.(Kp/Lp) -0.064 -1.36 
D1994.(Kp/Lp) (base year) 
Constant -0.446 -16.49*** 
Adj. R2 - within 0.0833 
- between 0.1800 
- overall 0.1521 
No. of obsns 6725 
No. of firms 658 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process. 
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Table AS .2.11 c Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1983-1994 
Fixed effects estimation: de_eendent variable value added 
Variable Coefficient T Statistic 
ln(Kp'Lp) 0.478 13.44*** 
D 1981· ( Kp'Lp) (dropped) 
D1982-(Kp'Lp) (dropped) 
D1983.(Kp'Lp) -0.111 -2.62*** 
D1984.(Kp'Lp) -0.145 -3.39*** 
D198s-(Kp'Lp) -0.221 -5.04*** 
D1986·(Kp'Lp) -0.195 -4.41 *** 
D 1987· ( Kp'Lp) -0.199 -4.46*** 
D 1988· ( Kp'Lp) -0.207 -4.53*** 
D1989.(K~p) . -0.169 -3.77*** 
D 1990-( Kp'Lp) -0.271 -5.40*** 
D1991.(Kp'Lp) -0.151 -3.37*** 
D1992.(Kp'Lp) -0.126 -2.83*** 
D1993.(Kp'Lp) -0.073 -1.70* 
D1994.(Kp'Lp) (base year) 
Constant -0.410 -49.30*** 
Adj. R2 - within 0.0627 
- between 0.2014 
- overall 0.1666 
No. of obsns 5920 
No. of firms 658 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process. 
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Table A5 .2.11 d Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1983-1994 
Random effects estimation: d~pendent variable value added 
Variable Coefficient T Statistic 
ln(Kp1Lp) 0.525 15.32*** 
D19s1-(Kp1Lp) (dropped) 
D19s2-(Kp1Lp) (dropped) 
D1933.(Kp1Lp) -0.135 -3.19*** 
D1934.(Kp1Lp) -0.165 -3.90*** 
D19ss-(Kp1Lp) -0.239 -5.47*** 
D1986·(Kp1Lp) -0.209 -4.76*** 
D19s7.(Kp1Lp) -0.209 -4.69*** 
D19ss-(Kp1Lp) -0.213 -4.66*** 
D 1939. ( Kp1Lp) -0.180 -4.02*** 
D1990-(Kp1Lp) -0.267 -5 .33*** 
D1991.(Kp1Lp) -0.142 -3.17*** 
D1992.(Kp1Lp) -0.118 -2.65*** 
D1993.(Kp1Lp) -0.070 -1.62 
D1994.(Kp1Lp) (base year) 
Constant -0.426 -16.05*** 
Adj. R2 - within 0.0625 
- between 0.2024 
- overall 0.1681 
No. of obsns 5920 
No. of firms 658 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process. 
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Table A5 .2.11 e Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 
1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation: dependent variable adjusted net 
output 
Variable Coefficient 
ln(Kp'Lp) 0.428 
D1931.(Kp'Lp) -0.025 
D1932.(Kp'Lp) -0.011 
D1933.(Kp'Lp) -0.071 
D1934.(Kp'Lp) -0.206 
D1935.(Kp'Lp) -0.208 
D1986·(Kp'Lp) -0.212 
D1937-(Kp'Lp) -0.226 
D1933.(Kp'Lp) -0.223 
D1939.(Kp'Lp) -0.205 
D1990.(Kp'Lp) -0.084 
D1991.(Kp'Lp) -0.056 
D1992.(Kp'Lp) -0.092 
D1993.(Kp'Lp) -0.014 
D1994.(Kp'Lp) (base year) 
Constant -0.590 
Adj. R2 - within 0.1101 
- between 0.2545 
- overall 0.1967 
No. of obsns 6527 
No. of firms 661 
T Statistic 
14.68*** 
-0.70 
-0.31 
-2.02** 
-5.82*** 
-5.65*** 
-5.73*** 
-6.02*** 
-5.82*** 
-5.38*** 
-2.01 ** 
-1.50 
-2.46** 
-0.38 
-87.45*** 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process. 
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Table AS .2.11 f Estimation with CRS imposed and year dummies: 1981-1994 
Pooled OLS estimation: dependent variable adjd. net output 
Variable Coefficient T Statistic 
ln(Kp/Lp) 
D19s1-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s2-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s1-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s4.(Kp/Lp) 
D19s5.(Kp/Lp) 
D1986·(Kp/Lp) 
D 19s7. ( K p/L P) 
D19ss-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s9.(Kp/Lp) 
D1990-(Kp/Lp) 
D1991.(Kp/Lp) 
D1992.(Kp/Lp) 
D1993.(Kp/Lp) 
D1994.(Kp/Lp) 
Constant 
Adj. R2 
No. of obsns 
No. of firms 
0.610 
-0.148 
-0.139 
-0.181 
-0.293 
-0.263 
-0.243 
-0.235 
-0.212 
-0.206 
-0.043 
0.000 
-0.042 
-0.014 
(base year) 
-0.552 
0.2017 
6527 
661 
15.22*** 
-2.77*** 
-2.63*** 
-3.37*** 
-5.42*** 
-4.66*** 
-4.31 *** 
-4.09*** 
-3.60*** 
-3.52*** 
-0.66 
0.00 
-0.71 
-0.25 
-60.46*** 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs, in year-average terms. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process. 
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Figure A5.2.1 Sectoral elasticity estimates 
1.0 -----------------------------------~-------~ 
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Note: These elasticity estimates use Adjusted Net Output as dependent variable. Estimates are performed on the same basis as 
comparative results in Section 5.3; observations are deleted as required by labour income share data. Only sectors with 
adequate sample sizes after deletions are presented. 
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Table AS .2.12 Estimation results with CRS imposed and year and sector 
dummies: 1981-1994 
Fixed effects estimation 
Variable Coefficient T Statistic Prob>ltl 
ln(Kp"Lp) 0.469 6.97*** 0.000 
D19s1-(Kp"Lp) 
-0.025 -0.70 0.482 
D19s2-(Kp"Lp) 
-0.009 -0.24 0.807 
D19s1-(Kp"Lp) 
-0.074 -2.12** 0.034 
D19s4.(Kp"Lp) 
-0.215 -6.10*** 0.000 
D19ss-(Kp"Lp) -0.212 -5.76*** 0.000 
D1986·(Kp"Lp) -0.212 -5.75*** 0.000 
D 19s7.( Kp"Lp) 
-0.227 -6.08*** 0.000 
D19ss-(Kp"Lp) -0.225 -5.89*** 0.000 
D19s9.(Kp"Lp) -0.200 -5.27*** 0.000 
D 1990-( Kp"Lp) 
-0.090 -2.17** 0.030 
D1991.(Kp"Lp) 
-0.062 -1.66* 0.097 
D1992.(Kp"Lp) 
-0.097 -2.62*** 0.009 
D1993.(Kp"Lp) -0.017 -0.48 0.628 
D1994.(Kp"Lp) (base year) 
Food Processing (base sector) 
Textiles 
-0.134 -1.92* 0.054 
Chemicals 0.050 0.64 0.522 
Pharmaceuticals 
-0.082 -0.98 0.325 
Bldg Materials 
-0.153 -1.84* 0.066 
Iron & Steel 0.239 2.38** 0.018 
Machinery 
-0.123 -1.77* 0.078 
Transport Eqpt. 0.236 2.44* 0.015 
Electronics 0.274 3.58*** 0.000 
Other Mfg. 
-0.103 -1.49 0.137 
Constant 
-0.598 -86.68*** 0.000 
Adj. R2 - within 0.1255 
- between 0.1871 
- overall 0.1557 
No. of obsns 6527 
No. of firms 661 
Note: The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs. 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process . Dependent variable is Adjusted Net 
output. 
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Table AS .2.13 Cash welfare payments using alternative measures 
SSB Ratios Welfare Payments / Value Added 
Using SSB Using CASS Using CASS 
Ratios 1980~89 1990~94 
1981 18.9 3.99 2.08 
1982 20.5 4.34 2.27 
1983 22.7 4.66 2.24 
1984 22.7 5.17 2.64 
1985 24.0 5.29 2.71 
1986 25.3 6.16 2.48 
1987 27.0 6.54 2.61 
1988 28.2 6.78 2.99 
1989 29.3 6.90 2.80 
1990 31.8 7.22 7.18 
1991 32.9 8.22 7.84 
1992 33.2 8.26 7.85 
1993 34.0 8.49 7.66 
1994 29.4 7.87 8.03 
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Figure A5 .2.2 Welfare payments/ income under alternative measures 
10 ----,----------------------------------, 
--SSB ratios 
8 
~CASS 1980-89 
~ 2-t---L..F'----------------------------------------1 
0 -t-----r---,,----,,---,------,~-...,....--r----,---,-----,---.,..----,---.,......---. 
1981 1986 1991 
Notes: The ratios here are aggregated cash welfare payments across all finns, divided by aggregate Adjusted Net Output. 
Adjusted Net Output, an alternative measure of value added, is explained below in the sub-section Alternative 
Measures of Income. 
Table A5 .2.14 
Observations already deleted 
Observations between O and 1 
Observations > 1 
Observations > 2 
Observations > 3 
Observations > 5 
Observations > 10 
Deletions by Sector: 
Food Processing 
Textiles 
Chemicals 
Bldg. Materials 
Iron & Steel 
Machinery 
Other Mfg. 
Deletion of outliers for mean labour share 
No of Observations 
3806 
5863 
686 
173 
76 
22 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
9 
Details 
5.25 (1992), 7.98 (1983), 17.05 (1985) 
5.12 (1993), 7.03 (1992) 
5.60 (1994), 40.85 (1982) 
5.24 (1990), 5.72 (1993) 
5.50 (1981), 14.96 (1985) 
5.3 1 (1981), 5.86 (1981) 
5.02 (1989), 5.24 (1991), 5.33 (1992), 5.40 
(1993), 5.45 (1993), 6.19 (1984), 6.16 
(1993), 7.88 (1993), 11.33 (1994), 
Notes : Ratios used here calculated using Welfare Payments incorporating a constant interest rate. Denominator is Adjusted Net 
Output. 
221 
Table AS .2.15 Cumulative deletion count for main results 
Reason for deletions Number deleted Cumulative Deletions Obsns Remaining 
(Full data set) 11535 
Non-manufacturing 
740 (6.4%) 740 (6.4%) 10795 
firms 
Loss of 1980 obsns due 
717 (6.2%) 1457 (12.6%) 10078 
to averaging 
1990s obsns of firms 
appearing in 1980s 440 (3.8%) 1897 (16.4%) 9638 
survey only 
Adjusted Net Output 525 (4.6%) 2422 (21.0%) 9113 
Productive capital 266 (2.3%) 2688 (23.3%) 8847 
Productive labour 2130 (18.5%) 4818 (41.8%) 6717 
Cash wages 155 (1.3%) 4973 (43.1 %) 6562 
Welfare payments 0 (0.0%) 4973 (43.1 %) 6562 
Welfare facilities B 13 (0.1 %) 4986 (43.2%) 6549 
Firm labour share > 5 22 (0.2%) 5008 (43.4%) 6527 
Figure A5.2.3a Elasticity and labour share estimates using value added 
1.0 ----------------.....------------, ~------~ 
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Figure A5.2.3b Elasticity and labour share estimates using net output 
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Figure AS .2.4a Elasticity and labour share: all manufacturing 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures using adjusted 
net output 
A Share A 
0.4 +---------------------"'"""~------"""...-..~-; ~Elasticity 
1981 
Figure AS .2.4b 
1981 
(OLS) 
• Elasticity (RE) 
1986 1991 
Elasticity and Labour Share: Textile Sector 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures using adjusted 
net output 
• Share A 
--1:r- Share B 
-0-Elasticity (OLS) 
• Elasticity (RE) 
1986 1991 
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Figure AS .2.4c 
1981 
Figure AS .2.4d 
Elasticity and labour share: chemical sector 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures using adjusted 
net output 
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Elasticity and Labour Share: Building Materials Sector 
Minami and Hondai (1995) Share Measures using Adjusted 
Net Output 
A Share A 
-Ir Share B 
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Figure AS .2.4e Elasticity and labour share: machinery sector 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures using adjusted 
net output 
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Figure A5.2.4fElasticity and labour share: electronics sector 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures using adjusted net 
output 
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Table AS .2.16 
Variable 
ln(Kp/Lp) 
D19s1-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s2-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s1-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s4.(Kp/Lp) 
D19ss-(Kp/Lp) 
D1986·(Kp/"Lp) 
D 19s7. ( Kp/Lp) 
D19ss-(Kp/Lp) 
D19s9.(Kp/Lp) 
D 1990-( Kp/Lp) 
D1991.(Kp/Lp) 
D1992.(Kp/Lp) 
D1993.(Kp/Lp) 
D1994.(Kp/Lp) 
D_large 
D_medium 
Constant 
R2 - within 
- between 
- overall 
No. of obsns 
No. of firms 
Estimation to test firm size dummy variables 
RE estimation: dependent variable adjd. net output 
Coefficient T Statistic Prob >ltl 
0.459 12.60*** 0.000 
-0.047 
-0.034 
-0.092 
-0.223 
-0.222 
-0.222 
-0.234 
-0.229 
-0.214 
-0.078 
-0.046 
-0.079 
-0.011 
(base year) 
0.002 
0.017 
-0.606 
0.1099 
0.2557 
0.1988 
6527 
661 
-1.33 
-0.97 
-2.59*** 
-6.30*** 
-6.03*** 
-6.02*** 
-6.23*** 
-5.97*** 
-5.60*** 
-1.87* 
-1.23 
-2.13** 
-0.30 
0.05 
0.55 
-27.28*** 
0.184 
0.332 
0.009 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.062 
0.220 
0.033 
0.761 
0.964 
0.581 
0.000 
Note: (1) The above estimations are carried out as a Cobb-Douglas specification in per-productive-employee terms with 
productive inputs, in year-average terms . 1980 observations are lost through the averaging process. 
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Figure A5.2.5 Elasticity and labour share: all manufacturing 
Minami and Hondai (1995) share measures by firm size 
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6 
Conclusions and policy implications 
This thesis has sought to contribute to the debate over the direction of state-
owned enterprise reform in China by providing further evidence on the 
question of employee overcompensation. To this point our focus has mostly 
been confined to the period of Chinese economic reform up to the mid-
1990s, with the data set that is used in Chapter 5 finishing in 1994. 
Therefore, before discussing the policy implications of the thesis' findings 
we will briefly review developments in SOE reform since the mid-1990s, a 
period in which the urgency and scope of SOE reform increased 
dramatically. 
Developments in SOE reform since the mid-1990s. 
Recent years have seen a change in the objective of corporate governance 
from the Contract Management Responsibility System towards the 'Modern 
Enterprise System', the substantial withdrawal of the state from ownership 
of small and medium-sized SOEs, and the blurring of the conceptual 
boundaries between the state and non-state sectors. The shedding of surplus 
SOE labour has been pursued with determination, even in the face of 
substantial worker discontent. Capital market reform has proceeded with the 
separation of policy lending from commercial lending in the state bank 
sector and the further development of banks outside the Big Four state-
owned commercial banks. These recent reforms, while leading to further 
shrinkage of the state sector's share of output, have nonetheless been 
rewarded with much improved financial results. 
In Chapter 2 it was noted that the Contract Management Responsibility 
System, introduced around 1986, started to break down amid the recession 
and the conservative policy regime that temporarily prevailed in the wake of 
Tiananmen. While the CMRS had been quite effective when firms were 
profitable, it proved to be no solution when firms ran into financial 
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difficulty. The return to more intrusive state involvement in enterprise 
management around 1990 was often met by more creative tactics by SOEs 
to frustrate the state monitors. A new model of enterprise organisation was 
needed that could satisfy the often contradictory requirements of 
establishing genuine enterprise autonomy whilst improving the effectiveness 
of monitoring. The only viable discernable alternative was the 'modem 
enterprise system' drawing upon the principles of the limited liability 
corporation and the shareholding system (Huang 2001). The official 
definition of the system features the following four principles; (1) clearly 
defined property rights, (2) clear definition of autonomy and responsibility, 
(3) separation of state administration from enterprise management, and ( 4) 
scientific management. A more cynical definition might refer to wholesale 
importation of Western corporate governance structures, specifically the 
limited liability corporation and shareholding, whilst avoiding 'capitalist' 
language and image wherever possible. Enterprise autonomy was to be 
finally entrenched, after more than a decade of unfulfilled commitment, 
through the complete separation of the ownership rights from management 
rights and the withdrawal of the state administrative structure from the 
enterprise level. Enterprise monitoring was to be strengthened through the 
diversification of enterprise ownership through the shareholder system, 
allowing non-state actors to play a role in the monitoring of management 
alongside the representatives of the state. 
The SOE sector was not only to be internally transformed; it was to be cut 
back dramatically via the withdrawal of state ownership almost entirely 
from the small and medium-sized enterprise sector. The slogan of Zhuada 
Fangxiao ('hold the big and release the small ' ) was announced in 1994. It 
signaled an intention to consolidate the state's position in industry by 
focusing on a smaller number of large firms, thereby facilitating a more 
efficient state monitoring effort. The state would seek to concentrate its 
remaining ownership stake upon strategic and defence-related industries, 
natural monopolies, 'pillar' industries and high-technology fields. The firms 
remaining in state ownership are being consolidated into large 
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conglomerates numbering about 160. Meanwhile, the divestiture of the 
state's holdings in small and medium-sized firms has proceeded through 
five main mechanisms: leasing, joint ventures, mergers, bankruptcy and 
outright sale (privatisation, although for reasons of ideological appearance 
the term continues to be avoided). 
It was not a straightforward matter to find suitable non-state shareholders to 
buy into SOEs given the size of the SOE sector and China's stage of 
development; a sufficiently large number of wealthy individuals was simply 
not available. Instead, a variety of institutional investor types was suggested, 
including non-bank financial institutions (pension and mutual funds), other 
enterprises, and state holding companies (Wu 1993, Zhou 1994). Also, the 
establishment of a modern equity market is a complex piece of institution-
building, and the Chinese sharemarkets as of the mid-1990s were still 
rudimentary. Therefore, the conversion of SOEs into shareholding 
institutions and the proper functioning of modern corporate governance 
structures was to take time as institutional capacity was built up over a 
number of years. Sharemarket listing began with the best-performing 
enterprises. 
The formal adoption of the Zhuada F angxiao policy was preceded by its 
experimental implementation in the cities of Zhucheng in Shandong, 
Zhengding in Hebei and Shunde in Guangdong. Zhucheng divested all of its 
SOEs in 1993, mostly via the sale of shares to employees. Within a year, 
profits had risen by 159 per cent, tax revenue by 50 per cent and employee 
incomes increased substantially, largely through the distribution of 
dividends (World Bank 1996b ). Shunde started with 884 SOEs and TVEs in 
late 1993. By 1995 it had divested 834 of them, retaining in public 
ownership only firms in such sectors as public transport, utilities and real 
estate. Of the remainder, 730 were sold or leased to employees, 7 large firms 
became joint stock corporations, 20 formed joint ventures with foreign 
partners and 30 were sold to private investors. By 1995 most of the former 
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SOEs were profitable, and the transition was achieved without social 
disruption (EAAU 1997). 
The new initiatives in SOE reform were pushed from the very top. At the 
15th National Congress of the Communist Party in September 1997, 
President Jiang Zemin signaled the Chinese government's determination to 
accelerate enterprise reform despite the political difficulties that it would 
entail, declaring 'We should encourage mergers, standardise bankruptcy 
procedures, divert laid-off workers, increase efficiency by downsizing staff, 
and encourage re-employment prospects'. 1 In the same speech, Jiang also 
pushed back the ideological barriers to ownership reform via a definitional 
fudge, asserting that 'We cannot say in general terms that the joint-stock 
system is public or private. The key lies in who holds the controlling share'. 
The pared-down core of commitment to public ownership was still 
maintained however, as he stressed that China would 'keep public 
ownership as the foundation of its economic system'. 
Another element of the accelerated reforms that was ref erred to in the first 
of the above quotes from Jiang was a genuine drive to achieve flexibility in 
the input markets, especially the labour market. The 'iron rice bowl' was to 
be discarded forever as SOEs were permitted to shed their surplus labour, 
often on a large scale. Appleton et al. (2002) estimate that 11 per cent of all 
urban workers were retrenched between 1992 and 2000, and that 53 per cent 
of these remained unemployed as of 2000. The political determination that 
this policy required was considerable; the resultant hardships faced by laid-
off workers sometimes provoked resistance campaigns, which boiled over 
from time to time into violent protest requiring police and military 
intervention (Cai 2002). The judgment had clearly been made that such 
reforms were indispensable to China's continued growth. It was recognized 
that labour-shedding could not proceed without parallel reforms to establish 
a national social safety net. However, the effort to build pension, 
unemployment and retraining systems independent of the old SOE linkages 
is an ongoing project. 
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In the area of capital and banking, the direction of policy has been to 
strengthen the commercial orientation of the banks so as to harden budget 
constraints. To this end, policy lending has been split from commercial 
lending via the creation of asset management corporations (AMCs). The 
immediate burden of interest payments on enterprises has been relieved in 
some cases via debt-equity swaps with the banks. However, given the size 
of the accumulated liabilities that large SOEs still carry, the full 
commercialization and financial solidification of the banking sector will 
take some years to implement (Lardy 1998, Huang 2001). 
Table 6.1 State-Owned Enterprises: Various Indicators 1990-2000 
Total Invt in 
Employed Income Tax of Average wage, 
Persons mil (a) 
Fixed Assets, 
SOEs, RMB bil RMB 
' RMB bil 
1990 33.95 298.6 60.4 2289 
1991 34.82 371.4 62.8 2505 
1992 35.26 549.9 62.4 2889 
1993 34.44 792.6 58.3 3562 
1994 33.21 961.5 61.0 4508 
1995 33.26 1089.8 75.9 5352 
1996 32.18 1200.6 82.2 5798 
1997 30.11 1309.2 79.4 6008 
1998 18.83 1536.9 74.4 6981 
1999 16.48 1594.8 63.9 7611 
2000 14.15 1650.4 82.7 8554 
Notes: Ca) In state-owned manufacturing units. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, 2001. 
The impact of the reforms from the late 1990s on SOE performance appears 
to have been very positive. Table 6.1 shows that the SOE manufacturing 
work force has been cut (through redundancies and through the conversion 
of SOEs into other ownership forms) by more than half from 1995 to 2000. 
However, the total investment in fixed assets has continued to grow year by 
year, implying a considerable rise in the capital/labour ratio, which should 
lead to enhanced labour productivity. SOE financial performance has 
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recovered quite strongly from the downtrends of the early 1990s, with 
after-tax profit rising from RMB 42.3 billion in 1996 to RMB 238.9 billion 
in 2001 (for further data on past years see Table 3.6 in Chapter 3). 2 
Despite this improvement in profitability, the accumulated debts of the SOE 
sector and the non-performing loan (NPL) ratios of the state banks that 
service it remain at high levels, and this is complicating reform in other 
areas such as finance. While there is controversy over the accuracy of 
official statistics in this area, the overall NPL ratio of the state bank sector 
was reported as being around 24 per cent as of the end of 2002. The bank 
sector will be greatly challenged to meet the government's target of reducing 
this figure to 15 per cent by 2007, the year from which foreign-owned banks 
will be permitted to compete for RMB retail business under the terms of 
China's WTO accession. Continued divestment of some SO Es, especially 
the under-performers, would contribute to the repair of SOCB balance 
sheets both through stemming the flow of bad loans and through the 
proceeds from sales of SOE equity. 
Summary of Empirical Findings and their Policy Implications 
This thesis has reviewed the various policy developments that impacted 
upon China's SO Es during the reform period, especially up to the mid-
1990s. It has considered the performance of the sector as regards output 
growth, productivity and profitability, and the interpretations that have been 
placed upon that performance by various scholars. In particular, it has 
identified the rival assertions of the 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic ' schools 
with regard to Total Factor Productivity, profitability, employee 
compensation and the overall viability of the sector. The thesis has sought to 
advance this debate by empirically testing the hypothesis that the 
overcompensation of employees contributed to the poor financial 
performance of the sector, as argued by the 'pessimistic' school. 
At the level of the Chinese SOE sector as a whole, the empirical analysis of 
Chapter 5 lends weight to the arguments of the 'pessimistic' school. 
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Figure 5 .2, reproduced here as Figure 6.1, indicates that in the early 1980s, 
undercompensating behaviour was still being exhibited. This is not 
surprising, since it would represent a hangover from the centrally planned 
era when the role of the state sector was to extract large surpluses for re-
investment, as related in Chapter 2. However, over the course of the period 
covered by the data, a substantial increase in labour share and a substantial 
decline in output elasticity of labour are both clearly visible, with neither 
effect dominating the other. Both trends are especially pronounced from 
1989-1990 onwards. By 1994, substantial overcompensation is evident. 
Figure 6.1 
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At face value, Figure 5 .2 might suggest a strong movement towards 
undercompensation from 1981 to around 1984. However I believe that this 
impression is misleading. Most of this apparent movement occurs on the 
output elasticity side of the comparison. Recall Figure 5 .1, which charts 
elasticity estimates generated from several different estimation techniques. 
The trends in elasticity over time are virtually identical for all six techniques 
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from 1984 onwards. However, prior to 1984 those estimates where Constant 
Returns to Scale is imposed differ markedly from those without the 
imposition of CRS. Essentially, without the imposition of CRS, there is no 
net change in the elasticity estimate from 1981 to 1984. Furthermore, our 
various hypothesis tests of the CRS assumption (Tables 5.3 and 
5.2.l0a to 5.2.l0c) indicate that CRS either does not hold or does not hold 
as strongly for these earlier years as it does in the later years. 3 Also, ·for 
reasons explained in Appendix 5.1, the data for the earliest years of the 
database's coverage appear to be generally less reliable. 4 Therefore I 
consider it appropriate to draw firm conclusions only from the trends that 
are visible from 1984 onwards. 
One notable aspect of the reported empirical results is the extent to which 
output elasticity of labour exceeds labour share over the period 
1984 to 1989. It strains credibility to suppose that labour was actually 
under-compensated to the extent suggested by Figure 5.2 during these years. 
It is more intuitive to believe that labour was under-compensated at the 
outset of the reform period and moved gradually to over-compensation 
thereafter. I believe that the substantial under-compensation implied for the 
period 1984 to 1989 probably reflects a margin of error surrounding the 
results for the 1980 to 1989 survey period, and that this margin of error is 
due to such factors as data deficiencies and institutional arrangements that 
are very different from normal market competition. However, even if we 
were to suspend judgment over the elasticity results for the 1980s (the first 
survey period), we could still make the following assertions from the results: 
( 1) labour share of income shows a quite consistent upward trend over the 
reform period, (2) from 1990 onwards, output elasticity of labour clearly 
trends downwards, and (3) elasticity lies significantly below the labour share 
by the end of the period. Therefore, whatever may be the true trend of 
output elasticity of labour over the 1980s, it is difficult to imagine any 
circumstance that would overturn the basic conclusion that SOEs moved to 
over-compensation over the reform period. 
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It is interesting to consider the question as to why both the rise in labour 
share and the fall in output elasticity of labour both began in earnest around 
1989-1990. As was discussed in Chapter 2, this was around the time of the 
recession that followed Tiananmen and the temporary reassertion of State 
controls. All other things being equal, a recession will normally be reflected 
in overcompensation. A recession will be associated with falls in value 
added at the firm level, and the ref ore the total wage would need to be cut in 
order to keep the labour share of value added constant. But since wages are 
typically downwardly sticky, this does not occur and labour share can easily 
rise, creating an overcompensation effect even if the output elasticity of 
labour were to remain constant. However, in China in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the output elasticity of labour was falling. Therefore the 
overcompensation effect was exacerbated. 
In 1989 industrial production fell sharply in both the investment and 
consumption goods sectors. The impact on investment of the credit 
contraction imposed in that year was more severe than intended because 
authorities overlooked the impact of high inflation on quantitative 
investment targets that were fixed in nominal terms (Naughton 1995). In 
addition, consumption patterns soon switched from the hoarding of goods to 
the building up of precautionary savings. The rise in the labour share in 
1989 therefore was driven by falling value added rather than rising labour 
costs in absolute terms. In 1990 the nature of state intervention changed in 
reaction to the sharp downturn. The State pushed firms to re-employ 
workers even where they were not required, and to keep producing 
regardless of market conditions. This .is likely to have precipitated the 
decline in the output elasticity of labour that is evident from that year. 
Indeed, 1990 was the year when the bulk of the decline in output elasticity 
occurred. 
But this decline also continued in the years after 1990. The reasons for this 
trend are likely to include the following: 
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(1) Compensation from the non-state sector was intensifying at a particularly 
rapid rate at this time. Once Japan lifted its post-Tiananmen economic 
sanctions against China, other trading partners quickly followed, and foreign 
investment expanded rapidly. Other non-state sectors expanded quickly too. 
As Table 1.1 shows, the share of 'individual' and 'other' enterprise 
ownership types in gross industrial output grew from 9.8 per cent in 1990 to 
24.9 per cent in 1994 - a two and a half-fold increase. SOEs who are 
pressed by new competition may have difficulty in selling their output even 
if overall demand is strong, and may therefore suffer from excess capacity. 
(2) Although reforms were underway by this time to facilitate labour force 
flexibility (see Chapter 2), it was still difficult to shed excess labour. It is 
likely therefore that surplus labour was building up faster than it could be 
shed, and faster than the accumulation of surplus capital, leading to a 
decline in labour's output elasticity. 5 
(3) Trends in the quality of inputs may have been unfavourable to SOE 
labour. Although the labour force was gaining from improving education 
and training standards, many of the most talented and energetic employees 
were migrating from SOEs to the growing non-state sector. Meanwhile the 
quality of capital inputs was improving due to the increased availability of 
foreign technology imports. 
Does the downtrend in the output elasticity of labour that we observe from 
1990 agree with the findings of other studies? Of the many production 
function studies carried out on Chinese SOEs over this period (see Section 
3.2) very few include a time-variant labour coefficient. Most researchers 
were concerned to measure changes in TFP over time, and imposed capital 
and labour coefficients that were fixed over the period. Three exceptions 
are Minami and Hondai (1995), Huang et al (1997) and Huang and Meng 
(1997). Each of these sets of findings is only partially comparable to my 
own. 
As reported in Table 5. 7, Minami and Hondai ( 1995) found declining 
output elasticity in the machinery sector over the years 1987 to 1990. 
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Huang et al ( 1997) reported mean response coefficients on labour for the 
years 1980 and 1994, for six sectors; the coefficient on labour declined over 
that period in four of the sectors (food processing, textiles, building 
materials and machinery) but rose in the other two (chemicals and 
electronics). It is not clear from the published results whether most of the 
decline in labour productivity occurred in the early 1990s, as per my results. 
Huang and Meng (1997) report estimated output elasticities for capital, 
skilled labour and unskilled labour for a sample of state firms from 1986 to 
1990. The elasticity of skilled labour rose slightly from 0.162 to 0.169 over 
the period, while the elasticity on unskilled labour fell from 0.483 to 0.465. 
This analysis ends just before the period of interest in my study. 
Nevertheless, it suggests that improvements in skilled labour productivity 
(perhaps through education and training) were counteracted by declines in 
unskilled labour productivity (perhaps through the accumulation of surplus 
unskilled labour). Overall therefore, although the evidence from other 
studies on trends in output elasticity is scanty, it is more in agreement than 
disagreement with my own findings. 
My results indicate that labour share continued to rise through the post-
Tiananmen recovery period. This suggests that the early 1990s were the 
time when wage controls broke down most seriously. The loss of credibility 
by central monitoring authorities following the Tiananmen downturn 6 may 
have goaded firms towards more pervasive employee income maximising 
behaviour at the expense of official objectives. Also, by this time SOEs had 
become primarily reliant on bank financing, which due to the various flaws 
discussed in Chapter 2 was prone to soft-credit problems. This and the 
breakdown of the Contract Management Responsibility System would have 
combined to create a soft-budget environment by the early 1990s within 
which employee income maximising behaviour could proliferate. 
A comparison of the results across sectors roughly accords with a stylized 
fact asserted by Derong Chen ( 1995), that central control mechanisms were 
withdrawn from labour-intensive light manufacturing industry to a greater 
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extent than from capital-intensive heavy manufacturing. This would be 
consistent .with a lingering of the Stalinist preference for heavy industry-led 
industrial development, and with the Stalinist view that rapid growth is best 
achieved through the planning mechanism. If this stylized fact were 
accurate, it would lead us to expect a greater propensity to overcompensate 
in light industry as opposed to heavy industry, as a lesser degree of state 
monitoring in light industry would have provided more opportunities for 
income-diverting behaviour. Of the five sectors featured in our analysis, 
clearly the greatest tendency towards overcompensation is exhibited by the 
textile sector, a labour-intensive sector. The weakest tendency towards 
overcompensation is exhibited by the capital-intensive machinery sector. 
The remaining three sectors, building materials, electronics and chemicals, 
lie within these two extremes and are not clearly ranked. Recall that 
Raiser ( 1997b) also found a greater propensity to overcompensate within 
the labour-intensive garment and textile sectors (see Section 5.3). 
A few more specific, minor comments can be made regarding the pattern of 
the sectoral results. First, in comparing the trends in labour share versus 
output elasticity for each sector, it should be borne in mind that although · 
the labour share measurements are entirely specific to the sector, the output 
elasticity measurements are not; the intertemporal patterns of the output 
elasticity measurements represents the pattern for the all-sector sample 
imposed on each individual sector, since sector-specific estimations did not 
show sufficient statistical significance. Only the intercepts on Figures 5.3a 
to 5.3e vary between the sectors. Therefore the year-to-year divergences 
. between labour share and output elasticity for each sector should not be 
interpreted too dogmatically. 
Second, there is an apparent sharp decline in labour share in the electronics 
sector from 1981 to around 1984. I believe that this impression may result 
from the particular circumstances of that sector at the time. In the early 
1980s the consumer electronics sector was something of an infant industry 
in China. The pre-1980s planned economy had placed little emphasis upon 
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the consumer goods sectors, although it may have placed somewhat greater 
emphasis on the military applications of electronics. Also, in the decades of 
virtual autarky leading up to 1980, China was largely cut off from the rapid 
developments that had been occurring in the international consumer 
electronics industry; in Japan and the West this was the era of the transistor 
and colour television and the eve of video recorders and the PC revolution. 
By 1980, the Chinese electronics sector faced a considerable technological 
gap relative to international competitors. As Western electronics goods 
became more accessible with the commencement of reform and openness in 
the early 1980s, Chinese electronics firms would have had many 
opportunities to change and expand their product lines and improve their 
technical designs and quality, for example through reverse engineering or 
the importation of key components or equipment. Therefore it is reasonable 
to expect that Chinese firms in the early 1980s would have had 
opportunities for rapid growth in value added through improvement in 
product lines, without the need to expand labour costs at the same rate. 
Examination of the database confirms this; aggregate total remuneration in 
electronics sector firms grew by 51.0 per cent from 1981 to 1984 whereas 
value-added grew by 134.8 per cent. The decline in labour share over this · 
period seems to result from value-added starting from a low base. The sharp 
decline in labour share in the electronics sector from 1981 to 1984 
contributes to the slight decline in the full-sample measurement of labour 
share in the same period (Figure 5.2). This contributes in turn to the 
impression of a trend towards under-compensation across all sectors from 
1981 to 1984, which I have argued above to be misleading. Why the 
electronics sector commenced the 1980s in an apparent position of heavy 
overcompensation is less clear. To fully answer this question would require 
a detailed know ledge of the circumstances of that particular sector in the 
1970s and 1980s and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
There is a rough correlation between factor intensity and firm size; labour-
intensive sectors tend to feature firms of smaller average size than capital-
intensive sectors. Furthermore, it can be argued that state monitoring is 
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more effectively carried out with a small number of large firms than with a 
larger number of small firms. Therefore, to some extent the sectoral results 
and the results with respect to firm size are delivering the same message. 
The results on the basis of firm size indicate clearly that small and medium-
sized firms were more prone to overcompensating behaviour than were 
large firms. As such, they provide some measure of endorsement to the 
Zhuada F angxiao policy of commencing ownership reform in the 
smaller-scale end of the SOE sector. Since overcompensation is greatest in 
the smallest firms, the marginal gains from ownership reform of small firms 
in terms of improving the financial position of the State ought to be high, a 
point that has been borne out by the improved financial performance of the 
SOE sector as noted earlier in this chapter. This justification of the Zhuada 
F angxiao policy stands beside two others; the corporate governance 
. argument that the state can more effectively monitor a small number of 
large firms, and the political economy argument that Zhuada F angxiao 
allows substantial ownership reform to proceed whilst satisfying the 
political constraint of not flying too brazenly in the face of Marxist 
ideology. 
This endorsement of zhuada f angxiao should not be construed as arguing 
that the larger SOEs should never undergo ownership reform. This can 
always remain an option for a still later stage in the reform process. 
Furthermore, successful ownership reform of large SOEs would require 
considerable development of corporate governance capacity in areas such as 
stock market infrastructure, the development of financial institutions that 
can serve as effective institutional investors, and development of the 
accounting and legal professions. These considerations are not so serious 
for SOEs that are small enough to pass into the hands of owner-operators. 
The Zhuada F angxiao strategy need not be seen as freezing all progress on 
ownership reform in large SOEs but could rather be seen as allowing time 
for the infrastructure of ownership reform to be built up. The joint stock 
ownership system provides a mechanism whereby ownership reform in 
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large SOEs could be accomplished in an evolutionary way by gradually 
reducing the state's equity share; the World Bank (1996b) has argued for a 
strategy whereby the State's ownership presence in large firms recedes to 
that of a passive minority shareholder over time. 
Contribution of the Thesis, Implications and A venues for Further 
Research 
This thesis has contributed to our knowledge of Chinese SOEs in three 
principal respects: 
1. The theoretical analysis of Chapter 4 has shown that the most 
appropriate empirical test for both labour-managed firm type 
behaviour and over-compensation is a comparison of the output 
elasticity of labour with the labour share of income. 
2. Chapter 5 has enriched the body of evidence available to 
contemplate the over-compensation issue. This study compares 
favourably with the existing literature for comprehensiveness in 
terms of its coverage over time and across industrial sectors, and in 
terms of testing with a number of different statistical techniques. 
At an overall level, the results support the claims of the convergent 
or 'pessimistic' school that over-compensation was behind the 
decline in profitability up to 1994, thus supporting their 
prescription for more fundamental reform. 
3. This is the first empirical study to consider the over-compensation 
question by large, medium and small firms separately. The finding 
that over-compensation has been concentrated at the small-scale 
end of the SOE sector lends support to the Zhuada Fangxiao 
strategy of pursuing 'big bang' reform of small SOEs whilst 
retaining a more gradualist approach to the reform of large SOEs. 
What do the findings of this thesis imply for the future prospects of the SOE 
sector in China? First, we have found evidence that in an environment 
where SOEs are made to compete in a market setting, although improved 
efficiency may result, the phenomenon of firm capture and income 
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maximization by SOE employees is problematic. Moreover, no solution 
involving a permanent and dominant SOE presence has yet been found. 
Indeed, despite the improvement in SOE financial performance since 1994, 
the ongoing macroeconomic strains caused by SOE loss-making require 
continued reform. The direction of that reform appears to have been set by 
the Zhuada Fangxiao strategy- to divest poorly performing firms where 
there is capacity to do so and to build up such capacity where it does not yet 
exist. Therefore, the endpoint for the SOE sector is therefore likely to 
feature a still smaller relative presence for the SOE sector in the Chinese 
economy. The pace of its rationalisation will be governed by such factors as 
the speed with which capacity (in the form of well-functioning capital 
markets, accounting and legal services and regulatory capacity) can be built . 
up, the extent of SOE underperformance and the systemic pressures created 
by that underperformance. The SOE sector will not disappear entirely, but 
increasingly those SOEs that remain will predominantly represent those 
special cases that are familiar in market economies, such as public goods, 
natural monopolies and defence industries. The Chinese experience to date 
has not demonstrated any special raison d'etre for state ownership beyond 
these familiar ones; any 'Third Way' remains elusive. That said, joint-stock 
enterprises with both state and private ownership shares are likely to be a 
feature for some time. 
It has often been said that in economics it takes numerous empirical studies 
to establish the validity of a sound hypothesis, although sometimes a false. 
hypothesis can be convincingly disproved with a single argument. Although 
this thesis has added to the stock of evidence on overcompensation in 
Chinese SOEs, there is still ample room for further research on this topic. 
Given the difficulties that have been encountered with the available data, it 
would be constructive to repeat the analysis of Chapter 5 with other suitable 
data sets that might be available. In particular, the exercise should be 
repeated on more recent data representing the post-1994 period of more 
radical SOE reform. The methodology of such empirical analysis could be 
refined by measuring the productivity and income shares of different types 
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of employees - for example by level of skill or education, or segregating 
permanent from contract employees - along the lines of Meng and Zhang 
(2001); the CASS data set did not have sufficient detail for this approach. It 
may also be possible to examine explicitly the capital side of the factor 
income equation, to analyse the question of whether capital was apparently 
under-compensated while labour was being over-compensated. This 
approach presents a number of difficult methodological problems however, 
such as in differentiating between profits and the rental costs of capital 
(when the state is the ultimate recipient of both) and in correctly measuring 
interest costs in an environment of soft credit. (Certainly this author could 
see no remedy to such problems contained within the CASS data set.) 
Further analysis could also examine the extent to which measured 
overcompensation in SOEs actually reflects the costs of surplus labour. 
More research is also needed to analyse the impact on SOE performance of 
the Zhuada Fangxiao reform process; such research could use various 
approaches and encompass both the divested firms and those that were 
corporatised while remaining under state ownership. The potential in this 
direction would appear to be considerable. 
This point brings me to a final note, which is that this thesis does not tell a 
comprehensive tale of SOE reform in the period under the Zhuada Fangxiao 
slogan. What it does is to inform the current-day scholar of SOE reform by 
presenting evidence on employee overcompensation in the period up to 
1994. This defines the main boundary of the topic and therein lies its 
contribution. 
Endnotes 
1 Quoted in Asia week.com, 26 September 1997. 
2 The source for this data is a briefing by Minister in charge of the State Economic and 
Trade Commission Li Rongrong on 19 September 2002, as reported by the People 's Daily 
on 2 September 2002. 
245 
3 The fact that CRS does not hold strongly in the early years of the reform period may be 
due to some lingering effects of central planning. As note in Chapter 2, under central 
planning the firm does not truly choose its levels of inputs and outputs; these are set by the 
plan. Therefore, measured production functions could be quite different form those that 
would have prevailed under market conditions. Also, Stalinist central planning both 
exercised a preference for large, heavy industrial enterprises and exhibited 'investment 
drive'. Therefore, a tendency to over-invest resources in larger enterprises would be likely 
to arise; such a tendency would manifest itself in declining returns to scale. 
4 In addition to the consideration of data quality, the production characteristics of planned 
economies may make the interpretation of production function results in the early 1980s 
difficult. Centrally planned economies tend to suffer from extensive supply bottlenecks due 
to the frequent failure of upstream suppliers fail to deliver required inputs. This would tend 
to complicate the interpretation of production function results, since a bottleneck arising in 
one sector (coal for example), would impact upon production in another sector (such as 
power generation or steel). As reforms progressed and SOEs were permitted to obtain 
inputs from non-plan sources, the severity of supply bottlenecks would certainly have 
lessened. 
5 As the empirical analysis has been carried out with CRS imposed, our measures of the 
output elasticity of labour reflect the relative productivity of labour with respect to the 
productivity of capital. 
6 See the quote from Derong Chen (1995) on page 36. 
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